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2. CORPORATE CRIMINAL STATES DENY CIVIL LIBERTIES
Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99

Corporatist states, marked by high-level criminality but bearing the trappings of democracy, differ more than is sometimes recognized from Western-style market democracies. Their markets are driven by oligarchs whose highest goal is increasing their personal wealth. Freedom of the press and other civil liberties are suppressed. Laws are frequently ignored or suspended and constitutions obeyed only when convenient. Corruption is rife from the streets to the halls of power. Personalities, contacts, and clans count for more than institutions and laws. For examples, one need only reflect on the unhappy experiences of many Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s.


BRINK: RUSSIA IS AT A CROSSROADS. IT WILL EITHER BECOME A DEMOCRATIC STATE OR A STATE RUN BY ORGANIZED CRIME.
John Lloyd, January 31, 1998 [The Times. HEADLINE: Red alert \\ jan]VT99

Russia's foremost reformer in parliament, Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko group, toured the US in the autumn of 1996 with one message to his audiences, private and public - that Russia had shifted "from a closed criminal system under communism to an open criminal system". The support Russia gets from the West, claimed Yavlinsky, bewilders the Russian people who do not understand why the international community should support a regime they believe corrupt. "Russia now stands at a crossroads," he said in a speech at Harvard. "Will it be a normal, open democracy? Or will it be a Latin-American type, corporatist, criminal oligarchy- as is the present tendency?" But the choice is made harder for those who want the latter course by the very nature of the present regime. In February 1996, a group of Yeltsin's closest aides and advisers gathered in the Kremlin to discuss his re-election - then looking doubtful, with the communists riding high in the polls and his ratings floundering. Yet there was no great air of gloom, A participant in the meeting told me that General Alexander Khorzakov, the man responsible for Yeltsin's personal security and then the closest man to the Russian president, took the floor and said, "Money will be no problem at all in this campaign. Everyone in Russia who has made a rouble, has made it because of Boris Nikolayevich (Yeltsin)".


TRYING TO IMPOSE A NEW ORDER ON A COLLAPSING OLD ORDER CREATES NEW AND DANGEROUS GRAY ZONES FOR ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 155 , acs-VT99

If the "older order" collapses suddenly and entirely, such a totalitarian hierarchy spreads quickly over the whole of society (we discussed this in Chapter 4) and contributes to the creation of a "new ideological order."

If, however, the "older order" has not been destroyed completely, the liberated man creates embryos of a new order at his own will and discretion, utilizing the limited resources available to him. This leads to a disintegration and atomization of society. Completely new conditions emerge favoring an unprecedented flourishing of personality, but society as a whole transforms into one large "gray zone" in which multiple systems of "local law" function. These "local law" systems are established by those who possess temporary, and sometimes purely ephemeral, power due to their personal energy, charisma, or circumstances.
WITHOUT LEGAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY WILL REMAIN IN THE GRAY ZONE
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations,, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 152 , acs-VT99

For instance, in March 1996, the Moscow Revenue Service revealed an underpayment of taxes (in the amount of 600 billion rubles, that is, some $130 million) by the stock company Gazprom, the gas-industry monopoly of Russia. Under such circumstances, many influential politicians throughout the country are not very sympathetic to the process of privatizing profitable enterprises. And this conflict of interests within the Russian political elite further obstructs the creation of institutional and legal support for private property in Russia. Without effective state assurances of property rights, the privatized sector of the national economy will remain in the "gray zone," and it will be almost impossible to decriminalize it.


LINKS: ASSISTANCE AND PROMOTED REFORM IN RUSSIA INCREASE THE GRIP OF ORGANIZED CRIME
HELPING RUSSIA NOW ONLY FEEDS AND EXPANDS ITS ORGANIZED CRIME PROBLEM
Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99

Three years ago, Mr. Yeltsin described his own country as "the biggest mafia state in the world" and "the superpower of crime." By looking the other way, and continuing to dole out the aid, the United States and its allies have only made matters worse. The time has come to heed Mr. Yavlinsky's advice -better to tell the truth.


ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE CHANGE BEFORE SOCIAL ATTITUDES ARE READY FOR IT WILL ONLY ACCELERATE THE CRIMINALIZATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 167 , acs-VT99

The main idea of the present book is that, in order to avoid "wildness" of either the "Western" or the "Eastern" type, excessively rigid or excessively "revolutionary" measures cannot be applied in the spheres where no social consensus exists regarding actions or types of activity that are permissible or impermissable. Such measures will only accelerate the criminalization of both the state and soclety.


RUSSIAN CAPITALISM BENEFITS CRIMINALS AND THE SELFISH, NOT INCREASED PRODUCTION
Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 105-107 , acs-VT99

We begin with the views of the sociologist Tat'iana Zaslavskaia, a respected voice of reform. Her characterization of some of the "deformed features of Russian entrepreneurship," and of the business groups that have gained most from the market-oriented transformations currently under way, paint a highly critical portrait of leading sectors of the emerging business class, one that contrasts quite sharply with 4 the expectations of free market reformers. The illicit origins of most of the large-scale and medium-sized capital in the country, the mass corruption of government bodies, the predominance of commercial and financial middleman activity relative to production activity, the feeble legal control over economic activity, and the spread of racketeering, violent "showdowns" between groups of commercial operators, and terrorist actions have had the result that entrepreneurship has begun to be perceived not only as the most criminal sphere of life but also as a source of the criminalization of the entire society. Today the Russians who have the best chance of enriching themselves are distinguished not so much by their high level of skills, knowledge, and business energy and talent, as by their possession of advantageous connections, their impudence, and their disdain for the law and for morality. This state of affairs does not correspond to Russians' sociocultural norms and values, and hence is perceived by the majority as a violation of social justice.


PRIVATIZATION HAS CREATED A HUGE ROBBERY MENTALITY
Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99

At recent debates at Harvard University's U.S.-Russian Investment Symposium and at the Davos World Economic Forum, Western investors sharply criticized the robber-baron mentality of many Russian business leaders and the process of privatization under former Deputy Premier Anatoly Chubais. As George Soros put it, first "the assets of the state were stolen, and then when the state itself became valuable as a source of legitimacy, it too was stolen."


GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS CANNOT CONTROL CORRUPTION -- THE BEST SOLUTION IS TO BREAK GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE ECONOMY
Grigory Alexeyevich Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko faction in the State Duma, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, OCTOBER 6, 1997, HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE LEADER OF THE YABLOKO FACTION acs-VT99

Generally, liberalism is the key instrument of the war on corruption. Not government control or some extraordinary commission -- not at all government control, about which our President has begun talking, all of a sudden. It is absolutely wrong. The picture is just the reverse: the more government control, the more corruption. This is perfectly obvious. The more controllers, the more bribes are handed out. What is there that is hard to understand? The fewer controllers, the less corruption. That is why systemically, the general policy line is economic policy as a whole rather than some individual steps to tighten order. But the war on corruption begins precisely in the way in which you would begin it in your office:


BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER MUST BE SEPARATED IN RUSSIA IN THE INTERESTS OF PROSPERITY AND DEMOCRACY
Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99

A RUSSIA that works for its citizens and plays a constructive role in world politics will be a Russia that has chosen well. To achieve such an outcome, a new set of rules must be established. The most important step is to separate business from political power in order to fight corruption. There must be a decisive break with the legacy of the past, when administrative power stood above the law. Individual businesses should be regulated by legislation, not by government officials or local barons who are often not easily distinguishable from gang leaders. The power of oil and gas tycoons, who generate huge profits using the country's natural resources, must be curtailed. They should be made accountable to parliament, and their activities should be made transparent and subject to public control.


SWEEPING THE PROBLEM OF THE RUSSIAN MAFIA UNDER THE RUG ONLY MAKES IT WORSE
Reuben Johnson, The Moscow Times, December 3, 1997, HEADLINE: U.S. Shirks 'Tough Love' acs-VT99

However, the study very clearly warns of succumbing to this generous impulse and the serious danger of the United States being seen as ignoring or denying the existence of the menace, stressing that "the United States must avoid the appearance of unqualified support for what is routinely seen as a kleptocratic establishment. Such linkage reinforces the growing popular perception that democratic political and market economic systems are merely code words for rapacious criminality."


IMPACTS OF A CORPORATIST CRIMINAL STATE
THE GREATEST THREAT TO RUSSIA IS BEING CONTROLLED BY ORGANIZED CRIME
Viktor Bondarev, January 31, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: Threat To Russia Comes Not From Communists ... \\ jan]VT99

The main threat to Russia comes neither from communists nor from fascists, but from a rise oligarchy, from a possible movement of the country along the Latin American way, writes KURANTY. The weakening of political parties and public movements in a weak civic society may give rise to the growth of bureauc racy, to a political power of capitalists and criminals. Therefore, Russia's slide down not only to "wild capitalism" but also to primitive, savage democracy, when power is concentrated in the hands of those who have money and command people, must be stopped.


WE MUST AVOID A CORPORATE CRIMINAL TAKE OVER OF RUSSIA AND ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99

There are many reasons why a country with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons should not be allowed to slip into the chaos of rule by semi-criminal, corporate, oligarchic robber barons. Unfortunately, those who believe that the capitalism of the robber barons will eventually give way to a market economy that benefits all in society, as occurred in the United States at the turn of the century, are mistaken. America had an established middle class with a work ethic and a government that remained largely free of robber-baron infiltration. The American tycoons were still investing in their own country. Russia's robber barons are stifling their homeland's economic growth by stealing from Russia and investing abroad. In the late 1990s, Russia has no emerging middle class, and the oligarchy, which is deeply involved in the government, can alter policy for its private benefit.


GROWTH OF GRAY ZONES LEADS TO SUPERMAN CONCEPT OF SOCIAL TITANISM
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 159 , acs-VT99

The outburst of crime, in addition to the social and institutional factors comprising the numerous "gray zones" already mentioned, have psychological and, however strange it may be, aesthetical dimensions -- something like a Nietzschean thirst for the advent of a "superman." In Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, the ideas of the "superman," elaborated by such intellectuals as Friedrich Nietzsche and Gottfried Benn, were implemented by former marginals. In today's Russia, similar ideas are being developed and implemented by those who suffered a hopeless, half-hungry existence in branch research institutes or remote military units.


RUSSIAN ORGANIZXED CRIME CAN DOOM ITS ECONOMY
Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99

This "false political picture of what is going on in Russia is creating the climate for business failure," Mr. Yavlinsky [Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the liberal reform party Yabloko ] wrote. He and his close friend Boris Nemtsov, the first deputy prime minister in charge of reform, know that the greatest single threat to a nascent democracy is institutionalized corruption and organized crime, and the political and economic distortions they have already generated.


EVEN A STABLE CORPORATE CRIMINAL STATE CAN STILL COLLAPSE, MUCH AS INDONESIA DID
Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99

A corporatist Russian government would be more challenging and less stable. Realists may argue that a corporatist Russian government would value stability above all and therefore cooperate with the West to ensure the status quo. But such a system, although stable on the surface, would be built on false foundations, much like today's Indonesia, where any change of leadership could undermine the entire order. Nor would it necessarily be a status quo power. Another scenario has such a government becoming contentious and suspicious of Western actions and goals. Cooperation on important global issues would be less forthcoming, and rules and laws would change to fit personalities, hindering economic development.


RUSH TO REFORM
THESIS: Russia is undergoing a transition from an authoritarian society to a completely different sort of society. The most important changes are the changes in attitudes among the people at all levels of Russian society. If changes come too fast, before attitudes have changed to accomodate and use those changes, then Russia will be thrown back into its dark, authoritarian past. The best policy is NOT to try and introduce new reforms in Russia, because left to its own pace of reform all will work out fine, but if it is pushed to reform too quickly the entire process will backfire.
A. IT IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES INTO A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE WHICH WILL DETERMINE IF AUTHORITARIANISM TRIUMPHS
Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 21-22 , acs-VT99

As already noted, the political development of any post communist country is strongly influenced by the attitudes and strategies of elites and the character of the parties and other institutions through which they vie for power. Equally important to long-term post communist outcomes are the initial condition and subsequent evolution of the country's political culture and political society. Broadly speaking, a country's political culture reflects the inhabitants' basic attitudes toward such matters as the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens, the legitimacy of others citizens' rights and interests, the fashion in which conflicting interests ought to be reconciled, the ability of citizens to influence government policies, and the legitimacy of existing political institutions. A civic political culture embodies high levels of interpersonal trust, a readiness to deal with political conflict through compromise rather than coercion or violence, and acceptance of the legitimacy of democratic institutions." It stands to reason that political culture affects whether citizens choose to support moderate or extreme political movements and parties, and whether they choose to engage in democratic or antidemocratic forms of political participation.


B. AFFIRMATIVE ATTEMPTS TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF REFORM AND CHANGE IN RUSSIA
C. IF THE RATE OF CHANGE IS TOO FAST SOCIAL STABILITY IS UNDERMINED -- CHANGE IN RUSSIA NEEDS TO BE SLOW
Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 6 , acs-VT99

To reduce the pain of change, consideration needs to be given to the relationship between the rate of change and the time it will take to adjust to change. As Karl Polanyi noted in his classic study of the first transition to a market system, common sense should suggest that if the pace of change is too fast, it should be slowed down, if possible, to safeguard the welfare of the community. He might also have added that the more privileged are always in a much better strategic position to accommodate to changing circumstances than less fortunate and vulnerable groups. Most Russians, regardless of their economic status, when asked about the pace of marketization, have repeatedly expressed the view that reforms should proceed more slowly.


D. IMPACT: IF CHANGE IS TOO RAPID IT LEADS TO ETHNIC SCAPEGOATING AND DANGEROUS NATIONALISM
Matthew Wyman, Prof. of Politics at Keele University [UK], 1997, PUBLIC OPINION IN POST COMMUNIST RUSSIA, p. 237 , acs-VT99

Politically, such a process is leading, among many people, to a craving for order and protection, and for some new certainties. Many of the excluded begin to search for scapegoats for their own problems and anti-Semitism and ethnic conflicts rise. This is fertile ground for populist forms of politics, even fascism. This is true of many post communist countries, and emphatically true of Russia, since as well as appealing to the economically insecure and the psychologically alienated, the demagogic leader can manipulate a nostalgia for the days of empire, a lost feeling of pride in superpower status and in Russia's control over the destinies of many subordinate peoples, and a sense that Russia was somehow special and unique

PUBLIC ATTITUDES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR, AND DETERMIME WHETHER RUSSIA’S TRANSITION WILL BE SUCCESSFUL
BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC ACTION, POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES FACE A VERY DIFFICULT TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. I I , acs-VT99

By comparison with many democratizing countries that were never communist, the post communist countries have little prior democratic experience on which to draw, as Valerie Bunce has forcefully argued. This disadvantage is clearest with respect to human capital. Measured against Latin America and Southern Europe, where authoritarian and democratic rule frequently alternated with one another in the past, "Eastern Europe has no such democratic tradition. The so-called democratic experiments of the interwar period lasted less than a decade and are best understood, in any case, as authoritarian politics in democratic guise." Lacking "the 'feel' for democracy that Latin America and Southern Europe enjoyed," post communist states face special political obstacles.


PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE LAG BEHIND EVENTS, BUT ARE THE MOST POWERFUL FORCE
Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East EuropeanStudies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 22 , acs-VT99

Empirical evidence suggests that a country's political culture is neither fixed once and for all, nor completely malleable. It changes in response to new historical events and personal experiences, but with a considerable lag, and primarily through the generational turnover of citizens.' This makes political culture an important determinant of the way that political institutions evolve and operate. Over time political institutions and major sociopolitical events exert a reciprocal influence on the content of the country's political culture. But in any given period, the content of the political culture shapes the perceptions and actions of the political elite and the mass public.


RESPONSIBLE NEW SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE FORMING IN RUSSIA, BUT SLOWLY
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 163 , acs-VT99

New social institutions in Russia are forming, but extremely slowly. They are emerging from chaos and fragments of older social structures, and the contribution of "New Russians" to this process is small. "Authorized" structures supported by continuing corporate solidarity, especially among the older elite who decided to learn to work in new conditions, is much more positive in this respect.


WITHOUT A BROAD TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES IN RUSSIA, NO LEGAL SYSTEM CAN SUCCEED
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 166 , acs-VT99

If a country lacks a smoothly functioning industry, which is an institution of modem society ensured by the standard moral practices of honest labor (without theft and idleness) and honest management (without delays in payment and the illegal "revolving" of money), then all speculations about competition and monopolies are nothing more than attempts to discuss the basically noneconomic problems of violence, power, and deception in economic terms, which is hardly productive. If the government of a country ensures neither the security of its citizens nor acceptable social conditions for elderly persons and children, it makes no sense to speak about a normal tax system: Who is going to pay for nonexisting services? Again, it would be better to speak about power and subjugation, that is, about tributes, not taxes.


PROMOTING QUICK CHANGE IN RUSSIA, BEFORE ATTITUDES ARE READY, WILL CREATE A DANGEROUS POLITICAL RETROGRESSION
TRYING TO PROMOTE QUICK CHANGE IN RUSSIA SPARKS A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY BACKLASH
Carl Linden, Prof. Intl. Affairs George Washington Univ., 1997; RUSSIA AND CHINA ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM, p. 120, acs-VT99

What is clear in theory may be muddy and beset with complexities in practice. Crossing the zone of anarchy between an old and a new contract is not only perilous but full of paradox. It is a change revolutionary in implication and almost always precipitates an agonizing conflict of human loyalties. However strong popular pressure for change, the change provokes a counterrevolutionary resistance, especially from the old elite. All this has been especially true in the labor of Russia's rebirth.

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