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THE RUSSIAN ARMY IS IN SHAMBLES AND BECOMING UNCONTROLLABLE
Andrei Zolotov Jr., February 5, 1998 [The Moscow Times. HEADLINE: Rokhlin Blames Policy for Army Deaths \\ jan]VT99

Lev Rokhlin, the radical chairman of the State Duma's defense committee, said Wednesday chronic under-funding and lack of political leadership was behind a recent spate of deaths in Russia's armed forces.

"The army is being destroyed, broken, is going under, but there is no concept of (military reform)," the former general said at a news conference in Moscow.

In the last two weeks alone, at least 13 soldiers have died in a series of accidents and armed rampages by servicemen under the influence of drink and drugs, In the most recent incident in western Siberia on Monday, a tank ran over a column of infantry troops killing four and wounding five others.

Rokhlin said the recent deaths were a direct result of the government's negligent approach to the military.

The lack of political will to improve the situation in the army has resulted in untrained draftees, lack of combat readiness and unpaid officers who have to moonlight as guards or porters to feed their families, Rokhlin said.


AT LEAST 20 GENERALS ARE BECOMING ACTIVE IN POLITICS IN RUSSIA AND ARE BEING ELECTED TO THE DUMA
Oleg Odnokolenko, January 30, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: Generals Go Into Opposition. \\ jan]VT99

A couple of Generals leaving military service in favor of politics can be regarded as an isolated incident but when the number of Generals dabbling in politics approaches 20, this is a clear trend. At the moment two Generals are claiming the Duma mandate vacated by Irina Khakamada -- former Defense Minister Igor Rodionov and former head of the Federal Border Service Andrei Nikolayev. Nikolayev's decision to go into politics and the reaction of the left-wing opposition to it are symbolic. According to information available to SEGODNIYA, Duma Security Committee Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin, one of the leaders of the left-win-, majority in the legislature, has promised Nikolayev electoral support on behalf of the entire left-wing bloc. Nikolayev is the latest favorite of the left-wing opposition -- until now their sympathies and pledges Of Support have been on Rodionov's side.


RUSSIAN GENERALS ARE NO LONGER UNWILLING TO GET INVOLVED IN POLITICS
Dmitry Zaks, The Moscow Times, December 30, 1997, HEADLINE: Russia's Biggest Stories of 1997 acs-VT99

The Kremlin could bide its time only because Russia's military has been reluctant to interfere openly in politics. Retired generals Rokhlin and Alexander Lebed have changed that, although so far, they have been unable to significantly tap into the army's discontent.


DEFENSE, THE MILITARY, AND THE SECURITY SERVICES HAVE BEEN UNTOUCHED BY REFORM
Ariel Cohen; Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP? WHAT KIND OF RUSSIA? acs-VT99

While "democrats," despite all accusations of corruption, made their mark in the economic policy realm, the Defense Ministry, the military, the security services, and the foreign policy apparatus remained untouched, almost pristine in their Soviet mindset. The "inside the Ring Road" crowd -- the Moscow equivalent of our inside-the-Beltway milieu -- is still sore from losing the Cold War.


RUSSIAN MILITARY HARD-LINERS ARE USING THIS PERIOD OF MILITARY DECAY TO FORGE A NEW AND POWERFUL FUTURE RUSSIAN FORCE
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

It is common knowledge that Russia's armed forces are destitute and demoralized. Officers drive taxis; soldiers engage in crime for the money. There is so much draft-dodging that officers are believed to constitute half of military personnel. While some generals find the situation intolerable and virtually threaten mutiny, the more far-sighted view it as a temporary setback that they can exploit to revamp the armed forces. Their ambition is to lay the groundwork for a military establishment so effective that its mere presence will guarantee Russia what they deem its rightful place among nations.


THE DUMA IS DOMINATED BY HARD-LINERS WHO VIEW THEIR WEAKENED MILITARY AS A SIGN OF DEFEAT AND HUMILIATION
Greg Myre, January 21, 1998 [AAP NEWSFEED. HEADLINE: CIS: YELTSIN SAYS MILITARY NOW SUPPORTS HIS REFORM CAMPAIGN \\ jan]VT99

Despite Yeltsin's assertions, opposition to his proposals remains strong.

Many senior officers rose through the ranks during the Soviet era when budgets, equipment and personnel requests were seldom denied.

Parliament is dominated by Communists and other hard-liners who see the military's decline as the ultimate symbol of lost Soviet power and glory. Even some of Yeltsin's supporters say the restructuring plan remains murky despite years of debate.

"Military reform, declared many times from 1992 to 1997, has not just failed or remained unimplemented, but its concept has not even been worked out," retired Gen. Lev Rokhlin, the chairman of the Defence Committee in parliament's lower house, said recently.

With his broad powers, Yeltsin can initiate some military reforms on his own. But the project is unlikely to succeed unless the military and parliament are working toward the same ends.


NATIONALIST ROKHLIN WOULD LOVE TO LEAD A MILITARY UPRISING

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ROKHLIN WILL USE ALL MEASURES TO REMOVE YELTSIN FROM POWER EVEN IF IT MEANS A MILITARY REBELLION
Sven Gunnar Simonsen, January 1, 1998 [doctoral candidate at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), Norway. He is currently conducting research at the University of 0 California at Berkeley's Center for Slavic and East European Studies. Jane's Intelligence Review. SECTION: EUROPE, Vol. 10; No. 1; Pg. 14. HEADLINE: Rokhlin enters the political fray \\ jan]VT99

Already, Rokhlin's assurances that the DPA will work only within the law and the constitution seem rather hollow. In July, Rokhlin reportedly stated that if army officers "rise in rebellion and march to Moscow", he would be among, them. Since then, he has suggested that the DPA might submit to the Duma a proposal to impeach the president and change the government (which would be legal but hardly effective), and he has, above all, promised to concentrate the DPA's energies into a joint opposition thrust at the regime: "We shall lead the people out into the streets and stay there until the president and government resign."

ROKHLIN WANTS TO TOPPLE YELTSIN THROUGH A MASSIVE MILITARY PROTEST
Sven Gunnar Simonsen, January 1, 1998 [doctoral candidate at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), Norway. He is currently conducting research at the University of California at Berkeley's Center for Slavic and East European Studies. Jane's Intelligence Review. SECTION: EUROPE; Vol. 10; No. I Pg. 14. HEADLINE: Rokhlin enters the political fray \\ jan]VT99

The barriers keeping Russian officers out of politics are being challenged with increasing fervour. Most recently, Lev Rokhlin, a key general and chairman of the parliament's Committee for Mlitary Affairs, has set up a movement aiming, to topple the Yeltsin regime through mass military protest.


BECAUSE YELTSIN HAS BEEN UNABLE TO REFORM THE MILITARY, UNHAPPY GENERALS ARE BECOMING ACTIVE IN POLITICS -- ROKHLIN HAS THE INTENT OF TOPPLING YELTSIN
The Economist, February 14, 1998, [SECTION: World Politics and Current Affairs; EUROPE; Pg. 49. HEADLINE: Russia's part-time president \\ jan]VT99

Another victim of Russia's drifting has been the army, which Mr Yeltsin has promised to reform time and again, but which has gone on decaying. Its neglect 0 I'D is giving a succession of rebellious generals an entry into politics, each claiming the sympathy of a million despairing soldiers.

General Alexander Lebed was an early contender for the military protest vote. He ran for the presidency in 1996 and finished third with 15% of the vote. He says he will run again in 2000, and he may warm up by running for a regional governorship in Siberia in April. Last year he was joined on his soap-box by General Lev Rokhlin, a more plainly mutinous figure who has made common cause with the communists. This year a third general may overshadow them both. He is General Andrei Ni-ko-la-ev, who resigned last month as head of Russia's border guards and who plans to run for a seat in the Duma, the lower house of parliament. General Nikolaev, much admired by the press, is also tipped as a presidential contender. The hardline interior minister, General Anatoly Ku-l-i-kov, has remained edgily within the government's ranks so far but clearly has bigger ambitions.
IMPACT: RUSSIA HAS NO CHOICE ONCE IT GOES NATIONALIST -- IT WILL ADOPT THE POWER SCENARIO
EXTERMIST RUSSIANS REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT THAT RUSSIA'S ECONOMY CANNOT SUPPORT A REVITALIZED MILITARY OPTION
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

In answering this challenge, Russian officials are left today with a meager set of options. If they choose the first scenario, power Russia, it will mean suicide -- economic and diplomatic isolation, world condemnation, perhaps even war. As its name implies, the second scenario would most probably lead to another cold war. The third scenario is very difficult and, unfortunately, humiliating for Russia. But Moscow has just two alternatives: Revive with the assistance of the technically developed and wealthy West, or oppose it. There is no other way, no nationalistic option that allows for rapid economic progress while rejecting relations with the West. Such is the dilemma of Russia today, a dilemma many of its extremist politicians refuse to confront.


WHICH SCENARIO RUSSIA TAKES WILL DEPEND UPON US ACTION. ALIENATING RUSSIA WILL BRING ABOUT THE POWER SCENARIO
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

At the same time, Russia's choice in these matters will depend partly on U.S. and Western policy on the determination, precision, and foresight of the Western effort to integrate Russia into the community of democratic nations. It is not in the U.S. interest to back a weak, humiliated Russia against a wall; alienating Russia will only bring about the disastrous power scenario and thus recreate a military threat to the West that has, at least for the time being vanished. NATO expansion in the absence of a viable Russian threat makes as little sense as disbanding NATO would have made during the Cold War; the West cannot take such a step without undermining both arms control treaties with Russia and the course of democratic reforms in Russia.


IN THE POWER SCENARIO, RUSSIA WILL MOBILIZE AROUND AN OUTSIDE ENEMY, DENUNCIATING ALL ARMS CONTROL TREATIES, MASSIVELY REARMING ITS MILITARY, AND INCREASING ITS RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington 0 Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START 11 and the Chemical Weapons Convention-, denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements.

In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already.
THE POWER SCENARIO WOULD INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RUSSIA'S NEAR ABROAD.
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out.


RUSSIA HAS LEADERS WHO ARE WILLING TO CARRY OUT THE POWER SCENARIO. THE COUNTRY WOULD REACT THE WAY WEIMAR GERMANY DID TO THE RISE OF HITLER
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives.


THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE POWER SCENARIO IS STARTING TO EMERGE IN RUSSIA
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

There are signs indicating that this scenario is emerging. The new military doctrine has actually reversed the pledge never to use nuclear weapons first. Earlier this year, Ivan Rybkin, secretary of Russia's Security Council, said, "Everyone must know that in case of a direct challenge our response will be fully fledged, and we are to choose the use of means." n 13 Later, in an interview, he said that parliamentary ratification of START 11 has become "almost impossible." n14 The Duma has again postponed the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Russian military planners are claiming that the only feasible military response to NATO expansion is the redeployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons closer to Russia's borders.


ECONOMICS WILL NOT PREVENT THE POWER SCENARIO FROM OCCURRING, IT WILL JUST INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE USED
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. I Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together."


IMPACT: QUICK MILITARY BUILD UP WILL ENSUE
OPINION LEADERS IN RUSSIA WANT THEIR COUNTRY TO BE A SUPERPOWER, AND FOR THAT IT WILL NEED A POWERFUL MILITARY
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

MANY INFLUENTIAL persons in Russia want to regain not only the empire but the status of superpower. Russia cannot attain the latter objective by economic means, which in the modern world confer such rank; its partial inclusion in the Group of Seven is little more than a public relations ploy to compensate it for its forced acquiescence to the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. Russia's claim to be a world power has traditionally rested on military prowess, and the temptation is to resort to this expedient once again.


BECAUSE RUSSIA ISN’T ECONOMICALLY STRONG ENOUGH TO INFLUENCE OTHER NATIONS, IT WILL UTILIZE MILITARY MEANS
The Baltimore Sun, April 16, 1998, Pg. 2A, HEADLINE: Moscow's into tough love again , acs-VT99

A foreign policy adviser to Shevardnadze, Gela Charkviani, asks why Russia doesn't try to win influence through business and trade instead of through bullying with sanctions and army bases.

The answer to that, says Trenin, is that Russia cannot compete economically with other countries. The day will come, he says, "when the ruble is more effective than the rifle."

But don't look for that to happen any time soon.


IMPACT: RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS RISKS NUCLEAR WAR
RUSSIA CANNOT DE-EMPHASIZE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL PRESSURES
Nikolai N. Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Summer; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons, acs-VT99

At the same time, the Russian government has to satisfy the perceptions held by relevant interest groups, such as political parties, the military, the defense industry, research centers, and others, or at least a majority of such groups. This makes the adoption of a minimalist approach to the definition of "unacceptable damage" and corresponding requirements for the force posture unlikely, because the government has to factor in views of nationalists and/or groups with an intrinsic interest in high levels of weapons.


THE RISK OF A NUCLEAR WAR IS GREATER NOW THAN IT WAS DURING THE COLD WAR, AND THE US AND RUSSIA HAVE ENOUGH WEAPONS TO DESTROY ALL LIFE ON THE PLANET
SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON, February 18, 1998 [Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast. "PERSPECTIVES OF A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD " \\ jan]VT99

Cranston: A strong movement is developing all over the world to reduce and eventually to end the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Leaders and countless citizens are shocked that the United States and Russia still follow the nuclear policies they followed during the Cold War. We both still keep deadly weapons on dangerous hair-trigger alert, able to be fired in a matter of seconds. We both still hold to a highly dangerous launch-on-warning policy. It's as if we were still enemies, which plainly we are not. In some ways, nuclear dangers are greater now than during the Cold War -- for example, the danger that terrorists will get and use nuclear weapons. Each country, US and Russia, still possess enough nuclear weapons to destroy every man, woman and child in both countries and conceivably all people everywhere. Over 35,000 nuclear weapons still exist on earth, with more one million times -- more than one million times -- the destructive power of the bomb used at Hiroshima.


RUSSIANS FEEL THEY NEED NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DETER CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS AND NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL
Nikolai N. Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Summer; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons, acs-VT99

Fourth, there is widespread agreement that a retaliatory capability must be retained at any cost, or nuclear weapons could turn into an instrument of political blackmail. Few, if any, serious Russian experts and politicians believe that the United States would actually use nuclear weapons even if it had a clear superiority. Many think however, that the loss of retaliatory capability could make Russia vulnerable to conventional attacks (for example, similar to the limited strikes in Iraq and Bosnia) and thus reduce its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy.


RUSSIAN MILITARY ACCEPTS THE NOTION THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS INSURE PEACE BY THREATENING UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE
Nikolai N. Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Summer; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons, acs-VT99

Third, there is broad agreement among Russian experts and politicians that nuclear weapons ensure Russian and international security through the threat of inflicting "unacceptable damage" in a retaliatory strike. This belief makes the preservation of a second-strike capability the key element in the nuclear equation. There is, however, no consensus on the definition of "unacceptable damage" or how many weapons would be needed to inflict it. Interpretations vary from one nuclear warhead to several hundred. The Duma's Committee on Defense mentioned 200 deliverable warheads as the threshold, although it is recognized that "unacceptable damage" is a perceptual category that cannot be precisely quantified. n6 The central point is that each side perceives the potential damage from a retaliatory strike as unacceptable -- that is, Russia thinks that it can inflict damage upon the United States that the United States would consider unacceptable, and the United States thinks Russia can, indeed, inflict damage that would be unacceptable. The actual capability of the nuclear potential is largely beyond the point.

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