Affirmative section consultation and cooperation through dialogue networks



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TWO: COMPETITION

The counterplan is net beneficial because it solves as well as the affirmative but avoids the probnlems of Russian central government gridlock and the nationalism disadvantage.


THREE: SOLVENCY
A. ATTEMPTS TO ASSIST RUSSIA WILL WORK BETTER IF THEY ARE TARGETED TOWARDS THE RIGHT REGIONS
Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99

Devolution of power is a new reality in today's Russia. Kremlin politics still matter, but outsiders' policies can better promote reform if they pay more attention to the ''Federation'' part of the Russian Federation. -


B. BECAUSE OF GRIDLOCK IN MOSCOW, REGIONS IN RUSSIA HAVE LARGELY GONE THEIR OWN WAY
Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99

The political and economic levers of Moscow's power collapsed in 1991. No well-functioning system of central power has replaced the old regime. Regional governors and legislatures have taken up the slack

The Russian executive and legislative branches have frequently deadlocked on important issues, such as land reform, with the result that the regions have made their own decisions and gone their own way.
FOUR: STRENGTHENING REGIONS HELPS SOLVE FOR NATIONALISM AND EXPANSIONISM
A. REGIONAL DEVOLUTION OF POWER IN RUSSIA MAKES IT FAR MORE DIFFICULT FOR AN AUTHORITARIAN STATE TO RE-EMERGE IN RUSSIA
Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99

Boris Yeltsin may be the president, but significant political power is flowing from Moscow to the regions. Democratically elected regional leaders have growing power in Russia's politics, economics and even foreign policy. Russia's evolution toward a decentralized federal state has important and positive implications, including a reduced likelihood that Russia will revert to a Soviet-style authoritarian state any time soon.


B. POWER HAS DEVOLVED TOWARDS THE REGIONS, AND THAT KEEPS THE MOSCOW ELITE UNDER CONTROL AND STOPS EXPANSIONIST POLICIES
Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99

Moscow still sets the general approach toward reform and is still an important arbiter of political power and dispenser of resources. Moscow retains control of the security forces. The Russian Federation is not disintegrating. But the underlying shift in power tothe regions is clear. The diffusion of power in Russia has important implications. The ability of Moscow to amass economic and military resources for an expansionist foreign policy has significantly diminished. This diffusion of power helps check and balance central authority. Democracy in the regions, as well as in Russia's cities, tempers imperial tendencies in the Moscow elite.

REGIONAL COUNTERPLAN EXTENSIONS
USA SHOULD TARGET REGIONS WHERE REFORMS ARE WORKING FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE
Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99

The United States and other Western countries should target their assistance on regions and municipalities where local leaders are committed to reform. An important lesson from the past five years of U.S. assistance to Russia is that a committed and effective Russian partner makes all the difference in helping political and economic reform happen. The focus should be on training for regional officials in good governance and in creating the right business conditions to stimulate investment.


MOST OF RUSSIA’S REGIONAL GOVERNORS ARE NOW DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED AND ARE SHARING POWER WITH MOSCOW
Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99

Most governors of Russia's regions now have been elected democratically. These elections have empowered governors whose focus is on promoting the interests of their regions. The governors now automatically sit in the upper house of the Russian Parliament, which gives them greater ability to defend regional interests.

The Kremlin and various regions have agreed to some 30 power-sharing treaties. These treaties define the respective power of the center and the regional governments, and increase regional autonomy.
PROGRESSIVE REGIONAL GOVERNORS HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL AT INTRODUCING EFFECTIVE REFORMS
Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99

Crucial decisions on reform are made at the regional level. Reform has prospered in regions where the governors are progressive - Samara, Novgorod, Nizhni Novgorod - and had setbacks where governors are Communist or corrupt.

Regional leaders are increasingly active in foreign affairs. Governors in the Far East are engaged on a range of issues with Asian neighbors.
EXPERIENCE IN RUSSIA'S THIRD LARGEST CITY SHOWS THAT REFORM AND DEMILITARIZATION CAN SUCCEED
David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 365 , acs-VT99

Beyond Moscow, the most encouraging region is centered around Nizhny Novgorod, where young and progressive politicians like Boris Nemtsov have made good on their promises to create "capitalism in one country." One of the biggest problems with the Soviet economy was that it ,vas so heavily militarized; Nizhny Novgorod, the third-largest city in the country, has been one of the most militarized of all. And yet not only, has the city managed, through privatization, demonopolization, and bond issues, to create thriving service and production economics, it has also managed to convert 90 percent of its collective farms to private hands.


REGIONS HAVE GAINED GREATER AND GREATER CONTROL OVER THEIR RESOURCES
Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99

The Russian Federation is still evolving, but the important point is that the constituent parts of Russia now matter. Resource-rich regions such as Tatarstan, for example, have signed advantageous treaties that give them a greater share and greater control over their resources.


POWER AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES MUST BE DECENTRALIZED FROM MOSCOW FOR RUSSIA TO DEVELOP EQUALLY
Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99

Finally, both power and financial resources must be decentralized. Russia will be doomed to instability and underdevelopment as long as 85 percent of the nation's money remains concentrated in Moscow. Local initiatives and entrepreneurship should be encouraged if the fruits of economic growth are to be shared among Russia's numerous regional, social, and ethnic groups.


CONSULTATION COUNTERPLAN
THESIS: Just taking Russia for granted is a very dangerous foreign policy. BEFORE adopting the affirmative plan to make sure that they feel included and involved. They may disagree, but we will have consulted them. After consultation, the plan can be adopted.
We advocate the following counterplan:
The United States shall inform Russia and consult them about our planned actions and ask if they wish to be involved in the process. Then the United States will: (read affirmative plan).
ONE: NOT TOPICAL

A. The counterplan is not topical because it takes the action of consultation before it acts to change its foreign policy, hence the counterplan is extra topical.

B. Topical counterplans are justified. Once the affirmative chooses its plan all other policy options become negative ground to test the desirability of the affirmative plan. The affirmative does not have to defend the entire resolution so there is no reason why rejected affirmative ground should not become ground for the negative. The burden of competition remains and checks abuse.
TWO: COMPETITION

The counterplan is net beneficial because it solves as well as the affirmative but avoids the consultation disadvantage. The affirmative takes Russia for granted.


Marshall Goldman, March 8, 1998 [professor at Wellesley College specializing in the Russian economy. He also serves as associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. THE ORLANDO SENTINEL SECTION- EDITORIAL; Pg. G3 HEADLINE: DON'T DARE TAKE INTERESTS OF RUSSIANS FOR GRANTED\\jan]VT99

The Cold War is over, and we've got to bring them in. This means that we can't just act unilatually. It's not necessary that we have consensus on everything. But we can't take the Russians' interests for granted.


THREE: SOLVENCY

The counterplan doesn’t allow Russia to change the policy option in any way, therefore it solves as well as the affirmative plan.


FOUR: CONSULTATION IS A SUPERIOR PROCESS
EARLY ENGAGEMENT OF RUSSIA BY THE USA IS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID CATASTROPHE
F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 51 , acs-VT99

Second, the United States should try to engage Russia sooner rather than later. The longer the United States waits, the more complicated and messy Russian politics is likely to become and the more Russian policy is likely to be influenced by domestic factors-above all the succession issue-over which the United States has little control. There is a danger, moreover, that Yeltsin's health could suddenly deteriorate or that lie could become incapacitated. This could result in a prolonged paralysis in U.S.-Russian relations. In the meantime, important arms control treaties such as START and CFE Could collapse. By the time the Russians are in a position to reengage, it may be difficult-or too late-to repair the damage.


DISADVANTAGE SECTION
NATIONALIST TAKE OVER

page 169
REFORM INCREASES THE RUSSIAN MAFIA

page 191
RUSH TO REFORM DISASTER

page 196
ELECTION 2000

page 209
DIPLOMATIC PARTNERSHIP

page 221
RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR

page 235
CHINA-USA RELATIONS

page 241
CONSULTATION

page 252
US FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP

page 253


NATIONALIST TAKE OVER
THESIS: Russia is at a crossroads between choosing an integrative path with its neighbors or pursuing a nationalistic path -- where Russia tries to dominate world affairs. Strong nationalist feeling exists in Russia, among its people and the military, and if those nationalist feelings are increased, nationalist forces will be able to impose their dangerous policies on the nation. Their policies feature a new arms race, a new cold war with the West, and a war to reconquer the former Soviet Union.

Two transition scenarios:

*Yeltsin gives in to nationalist feelings and adopts their policies. [co-optation version]

*Military coup gives nationalists control over the government. [coup version]

We suggest using the “coup” version when the affirmative acts to decrease Russia’s military might, and the “co-optation” version at other times.
NATIONALIST TAKE OVER [co-optation version]
A. RUSSIA IS AT A CROSSROADS -- BECOME PRO-WESTERN IN ITS OWN BEST INTERESTS, OR ALLOW POWER HUNGRY RUSSIAN ELITES TO PULL IT INTO A NEW MILITARISM
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE at this time to foresee which path Russia will choose, pro-Western or anti-Western. The country's political structures are too fragile and the mood of its people too volatile for predictions. Russia's true national interests demand a pro-Western alignment and integration into the world economy. The ambitions and emotional needs of Russia's elite, however, pull in the opposite direction: away from the global economic order dominated by the industrial democracies and toward reliance on military power as well as rapprochement with countries that for one reason or another are hostile to the West. The latter course is alluring because catching up with the West militarily would be much easier for Russia than catching up economically.


B. AFFIRMATIVE PLAN MOBILIZES RUSSIAN NATIONALISM
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C. YELTSIN MAY BOW TO NATIONALIST PRESSURES IF THEY GROW
Fred Hiatt, editorial page staff of The Washington Post, The Moscow Times, April 11, 1998, HEADLINE: Perils of Disengagement , acs-VT99

But as would-be successors jockey for Yeltsin's job, the atmosphere could change. Yeltsin's prime minister-designate, Sergei Kiriyenko, hasn't announced an economic program, but he felt compelled first thing to disclose that his father was Jewish, hoping thereby to defuse what might have become a whispering campaign against him. Already, Luzhkov has laid claim to parts of Ukraine and inflamed Muscovite prejudices against darker-skinned residents from the south. Yeltsin is not above bowing to such winds if they gain strength.


D. THE RUSSIAN NATIONALIST LEFT WANTS TO AGGRESSIVELY MOVE AGAINST OTHER FORMER SOVIET STATES
Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99

One aimed at reviving something resembling the former USSR as quickly as possible. The cost -- in treasure, world opinion, and even blood was no object. All means were acceptable, including the stirring up of nationalist and irredentist passions among the 25 million ethnic Russians living in the region. Moscow was urged to threaten recalcitrant states with the " politicization" of their Russian communities and the redrawing of borders to reclaim areas with large Russian populations, like northern Kazakhstan and eastern Ukraine. This imperial, revanchist, and ideological agenda was advocated largely, though not exclusively, by the nationalist Left.


E. A REFORMIST RUSSIA CAN HELP SOLVE WORLD PROBLEMS, A HOSTILE RUSSIA WILL BE THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PROBLEM
Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99

We are not neutral bystanders. There is no doubt where our own national interest lies: Quite simply, we want to see the ascendancy of Russia's reformers, those who look outward and forward rather than inward and backward for the signposts of national revival. A Russia that reflects their aspirations is likely to be part of the solution to the world's many problems. Conversely, a Russia that erects barriers against what it sees as a hostile world and that believes the best defense is a good offense -- such a Russia could be, in the 21st century just as it was in much of the 20th, one of the biggest of the problems we and our children will face.


NATIONALIST TAKE OVER [coup version]
A. RUSSIA STANDS ON THE BRINK OF A WIDESPREAD MILITARY REVOLT
Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99

It was in this context that the specter of a military "mutiny" suddenly and unexpectedly emerged inside the Yeltsin camp itself. All but unreported in the U.S. press, the Rokhlin affair, as it became known, shook Moscow in June and July. In a seven-page open letter to the "Commander in Chief," which he sent to garrisons across the country and then published in opposition newspapers, Gen. Lev Rokhlin accused Yeltsin of surrounding himself with brazenly corrupt advisers, willfully destroying the army and the defense industries, betraying Russian national interests and acceding to NATO expansion and thus America's "diktat over Europe's political and military order."

Such charges have long been leveled by Communists and radical nationalists, but Rokhlin is neither. Previously a top army commander under Yeltsin and now chairman of Parliament's Armed Forces Committee, he was elected to the Duma as a member of the main pro-government party. Two points in his open letter were therefore a bombshell. Yeltsin, he wrote, was purposely impoverishing the army in favor of Interior Ministry troops, which are to be used as a Praetorian Guard in the event of popular unrest. " Russia is being turned into a police state," he insisted. And he called upon the military to "close ranks" and defend itself against the Yeltsin government.
C. USA HARD LINE POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA ONLY HELPS FUTURE RUSSIAN DICTATORS
Jess Frost ; teaches Russian language at Clark College, The Columbian (Vancouver, WA.), April 05, 1998, SECTION: B; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: SUPPORT RUSSIA, NOT NATO ANTAGONISM acs-VT99

With her vast resources and talented people, Russia one day again will be a powerful force on the worlds stage with our help or without it. Over that reality, we have no control. But whether shell be led by a democrat or a dictator is a reality we must try to influence. And we’d better well understand that atavistic, Cold War policy today helps despots in Russia, not democrats.


D. MILITARY IS A POWERFUL FORCE PRESSING FOR REINTEGRATION OF FORMER SOVIET STATES
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

The main instrument of "reintegration" today is the Russian army, and this is worrisome because its formidable officer corps is society's most embittered and vindictive group. Anyone who spends an hour with Russian generals cannot but feel the intensity of their resentment against the West as well as against their own democratic government for reducing to the status of a negligible force the army that defeated Nazi Germany and was acknowledged by the U.S. military as a peer. The dethroned Communist Party nomenklatura has adapted to the new era by appropriating some of the state's wealth and continuing to manage much of the rest. But the generals, dependent on government allocations, have had no such opportunity, and they seethe with humiliation both personal and professional.


E. A REFORMIST RUSSIA CAN HELP SOLVE WORLD PROBLEMS, A HOSTILE RUSSIA WILL BE THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PROBLEM
Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99

We are not neutral bystanders. There is no doubt where our own national interest lies: Quite simply, we want to see the ascendancy of Russia's reformers, those who look outward and forward rather than inward and backward for the signposts of national revival. A Russia that reflects their aspirations is likely to be part of the solution to the world's many problems. Conversely, a Russia that erects barriers against what it sees as a hostile world and that believes the best defense is a good offense -- such a Russia could be, in the 21st century just as it was in much of the 20th, one of the biggest of the problems we and our children will face.


RUSSIA IS ON THE BRINK OF GIVING IN TO NATIONALIST AUTHORITARIANISM
NOW IS THE TIME WHEN RUSSIA WILL CHOOSE BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

Yet doubts linger because so much about post-communist Russia is unfinished and unsettled. Fledgling democracy contends with ancient authoritarian traditions; private enterprise struggles against a collectivist culture; frustrated nationalist and imperialist ambitions impede the enormous task of internal reconstruction. Russians, bewildered by the suddenness and the scope of the changes they have experienced, do not know in which direction to proceed. A veritable battle for Russia's soul is in progress.


RUSSIA IS STILL AT THE CROSSROADS OF ITS HISTORY
Mikhail Gorbachev, former leader of the Soviet Union, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), December 14, 1997, Pg. 41A, HEADLINE: For the change Russia needs, Yeltsin regime must leave power acs-VT99

Today Russia is extremely complicated and contradictory. Its prospects are not yet clear. Contrary to what Russia's leadership says, Russia actually has not yet made a choice. It is still at a fork in the road.


RUSSIAN PUBLIC’S ANGER OVER ITS FOREIGN POLICY MAKES IT RIPE FOR FASCISM
Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99

Naturally, this united opposition to Yeltsin's foreign policy does not hold anything good either for the elections in the year 2000, or for his place in History. For it is only a small step from such a "patriotic consensus" to what Andrey Galkin, the well-known historian of Fascism, calls "getting used to Fascist values." More than this, he thinks that in today's Russia, "this habituation is evident, not least in intellectual circles who until recently were congratulating themselves on their democratism."


"TOP DOWN" REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA IS FAILING, AND THE STAGE IS SET FOR THE BACKLASH OF TRADITIONALISM
Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 68-69 , acs-VT99

Historical processes are quite important in a book dealing with the rise of crime in postCommunist Russia, a society in transition. Today, after a short period of "white" revolution in Russia (the economic reforms of 1992-93), the prospect of a "black" revolution is real again. Vocal reactionaries are calling for a return to Russia's traditional ideology of "derzhavnost "' and declaring the 1991-93 events to be a "criminal revolution," and similar ideas are now expounded not only by Communists. Moderate and especially extreme left-wing Communists have created an unimaginable union with "deizhavniki," many of whom (for example, the 'inventor of the term "criminal revolution," Stanislav Govorukhin) behaved like anti-Communists during perestroika. Incidentally, the same kind of union existed in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when some monarchists and other groups of the intelligentsia devoted to the traditional ideology of statism and "derzhavnost "' supported Stalin in his struggle against Leo Trotsky; for them, Stalinism was above all a return to traditional moral practices.


WE SHOULD VIEW RUSSIA AS OUR BIGGEST SECURITY CONCERN IS NOT GUARANTEED
Doctor John Deutch, FEBRUARY 12, 1998 [served as President Clinton's deputy secretary of Defense and then CIA director, Federal News Service. HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE. SUBJECT: THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY \\ jan]VT99

I want to review very briefly for the committee the judgements that I have about the security challenges our country face and also to highlight a few defense and intelligence programs that I believe deserve this committee's strong support. First of all, Russia. Russia should continue to be our top security concern even though we don't have the same adversarial relationship that we had during the Cold War. Why? Because Russia still possesses 20,000 plus nuclear weapons and at the same time there is widespread corruption. The absence of honest and accountable government in Russia and absence of administrative functions which are slowing Russia's erratic and periodically movement towards a democratic goverment and a market- oriented economy. Thus it is critical that we follow internal political developments in Russia most slowly, most carefully and we must also follow, as carefully as possible, Russian foreign policy activity for example, as the Chairman mentioned, relations with Iran which are an indicator of Russian attitudes towards the United States and the West.

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