Affirmative section consultation and cooperation through dialogue networks



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AFFIRMATIVE SECTION
CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION THROUGH DIALOGUE NETWORKS

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NUCLEAR DE-ALERTING

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CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AFFIRMATIVE
My partner and I are glad to be here to debate the resolution, RESOLVED: THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGE IS FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA.
A friendly and peaceful relationship between Russia and the United States is imperative for the future of both nations and to the world. We believe that the way we interact with Russia should reflect that hope. If you want to create a good relationship with a nation, you learn to communicate and cooperate in meaningful ways. There will not always be agreement, but a relationship built on these principles will make for a better 21st century for us all.
CONTENTION ONE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA IS SELFISH AND SHORT-SIGHTED
A. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY EMPHASIZES RUSSIAN INFERIORITY AND DEEMPHASIZES CONSULTATION
1. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT CONSULTED WITH RUSSIA AS A PARTNER, BUT REMINDS THEM OF THEIR INFERIORITY
Michael J. Mazarr, director of the New Millennium Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1998 Spring; Pg. 11, HEADLINE: Clinton Foreign Policy, R.I.P. , acs-VT99

But the administration has erred too far in the other direction -- offering kind words but little tangible evidence of support or partnership, and in fact (on issues from NATO expansion to Caspian Sea oil claims) taking steps seemingly calculated to remind Russians of their newfound inferiority. There is more than symbolic import to the fact that the sum total of all outside aid to Russia has amounted to less than $ 7 billion a year since 1991 -- four one-thousands of combined U.S., European Union, and Japanese annual GDP. The upshot is a higher risk of a collapse of reform and rise of anti-Western nationalism -- not an inconsiderable risk, involving, as it does, a country still in possession of thousands of nuclear weapons.


2. THE RESULT IS THAT USA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP WILL DETERIORATE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS
Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99

Of course, no one can predict the future. I will try to do so, however, and make the prediction that the U.S. -- Russian relationship will quite likely deteriorate over the next few years. I say this because the relationship has already deteriorated substantially over the past few years.


B. RUSSIA REACTS TO THIS POLICY WITH DISAPPOINTMENT AND INCREASED ANTI-AMERICANISM
1. RUSSIA VIEWS LACK OF CONSULTATION AS AN ATTEMPT BY THE US TO FORCE RUSSIA OUT OF WORLD POLITICS
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

Thus since the Cold War ended, Moscow has given Washington no persuasive reason to consult Russia on issues of international and military initiatives - but Moscow continues to view this lack of consultation as a deviation from the proclaimed strategic partnership and as an attempt by the United States to squeeze Russia onto the sidelines of world politics.


2. CURRENT USA POLICY IS CREATING STRONG ANTI-AMERICAN ATTITUDES IN RUSSIA AND ONLY A NEW SPIRIT OF CONSULTATION CAN RESET THE SITUATION PROPERLY
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

Negative perceptions of U.S. intentions, combined with an absence of satisfactory answers to the above questions, have created strong anti-American attitudes in Russia. Obviously, the success of the bilateral relationship depends on more than the leaderships of Russia or the United States; individual leaders will have their own policies, but they must respond to public perceptions. If the relationship had been carefully nurtured rather than allowed to drift, NATO and other issues could have been talked through at critical levels of the two bodies politic, thus strengthening cooperation. Instead, lack of full dialogue inadvertently sharpened tension. Now, only intense discussion can reset the course.


PLAN: The United States will substantially change its foreign policy towards Russia through the following mandates:

1. A network of dialogue channels will be established using the Inter-Tajik Dialogue model explained by Chufrin and Sanders.

2. The United States will consult with Russia before implementing any substantial foreign policy initiatives and invite their comments and/or involvement. This will be done through newly established dialogue channels.

3. These procedures will be established using a Presidential Order directed at the State Department. Funding and enforcement through normal means.


CONTENTION TWO: A PROGRAM OF CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION IS THE BEST APPROACH TOWARDS AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
A. THE BEST WAY TO IMPROVE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA IS TO COOPERATE WITH THEM MORE FULLY NOW
Paul Marantz, Prof. Political Science Univ. British Columbia, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 99 , acs-VT99

The West can best prepare for the political storms that he ahead, not by giving up on its relationship with Russia, but by deepening its cooperation with Moscow and by demonstrating that any future Russian rejection of cooperation with the West would harm Russia's national interests by jeopardizing much of what that country has gained in recent years. The stronger Russia's stake in cordial relations with the West is, the greater the probability that these relations will withstand future shocks.


B. ADOPTION OF THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION MODEL WOULD PREVENT FUTURE CONFLICTS
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

A fresh political discussion would stimulate both sustained dialogues and cooperative action in key arenas of the relationship, such as the interaction in the Near Abroad, and it would provide the opportunity for those specialized groups to share their insights to produce an understanding of the dynamics of the overall relationship. It would help to assess realistically both the intentions and the capabilities of the two sides to act together or at least to refrain from confronting each other on concrete political issues. This careful attention to the conduct of the Russian-U.S. relationship would contribute significantly to the prevention of renewed conflict.


C. THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION SYSTEM WOULD CONTAIN SIX PRIMARY COMPONENTS
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

A comprehensive agenda for this complex of dialogues might include the following:

1. A bilateral discussion of issues that are legacies of the Cold War. Many such issues continue to demand attention, particularly those concerning weapons of mass destruction. Carrying through on nuclear disarmament, creating an international regime for the control and reduction of nuclear weapons, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are responsibilities that Russia and the United States must assume as global powers. They must also work to promote a complete ban of such weapons and curb illegal trade in nuclear materials, arms of all kinds, and technology that fuels arms races.

2. Dialogue on Russian-U.S. interaction in the Near Abroad and other arenas of geopolitical interaction. Such talks could involve a frank discussion of the real interests of each country in places where key interactions take place, a discussion of principles that might govern international and regional peacekeeping operations when they take place outside the framework of the United Nations, and a determination of the acceptability under international principles of the involvement of governments and NGOs in the internal social and economic development of newly independent countries. The purpose would be to identify those activities most likely to cause tension between Russia and the United States.

3. Reinforcing the bilateral economic relationship between Russia and the United States. This is central to the overall relationship, as are issues concerning the organization of the global economic system. Interactions in these areas also reveal underlying strengths and tensions in the dynamics of the relationship. Although it is difficult to find individuals in business and banking who will give time to dialogues of this sort, work in this area could perhaps be accomplished if existing business organizations could be persuaded to devote a portion of their time to these issues.

4. Covering a variety of new global issues involving the interests of both countries. These include the drug trade, international terrorism, environmental problems, international health threats, and women's and human rights issues.

5. Strengthening civil society. Because both countries are struggling to develop and strengthen their own brand of civil society, it is important for citizens of the two countries to understand thinking on both sides about this subject.

6. Interacting with the media. Because journalists play such an important role in conveying and nourishing perceptions and misperceptions, fuller interaction in this area is important.


D. THERE WILL BE MANY FUTURE CONFLICTS AND PROBLEMS, BUT THEY WILL ALL BE BETTER IF WE DEVELOP A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA
Stephen Sestanovich; Ambassador at, U.S. Department of State, Heritage Foundation , April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: THE STATE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA; OPENING STATEMENT acs-VT99

To the contrary, we all recognize that the future will hold conflicts and new threats that we can only guess at now. Our conviction is that we will be able to cope with them more successfully if we can develop a cooperative relationship with Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union. And we aim to do so in a way that, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has put it, "encourages Russia's modern aspirations rather than accommodates its outdated fears."


We believe that the adoption of this proposal would gain a number of important advantages, as well as allowing us to turn most potential negative disadvantages. At this time we offer three advantages.
ADVANTAGE ONE: CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION PREVENTS A NEW COLD WAR
A. IF WE KEEP RUBBING RUSSIA'S NOSE IN ITS COLD WAR DEFEAT, A NEW WORLD WAR COULD BEGIN
The Washington Times, March 1, 1998 [SECTION: Part B; COMMENTARY; FORUM; Pg. B5. HEADLINE: What if the bear bites back? \\ jan]VT99

In "Who lost Russia. . . our new rival?" (Feb. 18), Pat Buchanan perceptively writes, "Much of the blame rests with a haughty U.S. foreign-policy elite that has done its level best to rub Russia's nose in its Cold War defeat - as it thumped its chest and trumpeted America's claim to be the 'world's only superpower'. " Instead of viewing Russia as a potential friend or partner after the -fall of the Soviet Union, those who seek to destroy her continue to demonize and demoralize her with one thought in mind. . . . her total destruction. Russia today is in deplorable condition. Her economy is in shambles. Russian women are leaving Russia for better opportunities only to find out that dreams of a better life are shattered after being humiliated by being forced to sell their bodies to greedy foreigners in order to feed their children. Her people are suffering and her once proud soldiers are begging in the streets, reminiscent of Germany's humiliation after its defeat in World War 1. However, it appears that we are on the road to making the same colossal mistake a second time; but it should be remembered that Germany's humiliation after World War I was the catalyst for World War 2. "


B. UNLESS RUSSIA IS INCLUDED IN WORLD AFFAIRS, THE ARMS RACE WILL RETURN
Dmitry Gornostayev, Russian Press Digest, April 29, 1998, HEADLINE: Primakov Follows Ideas Of Gorchakov , acs-VT99

It is important for Russia to occupy an optimal place in the currently crystallizing system of international relations. The tabling to excessively high claims that are not adequately substantiated and that fail to take into account the changes that have occurred in the world, the Foreign Minister pointed out, may be fraught with a return to the dangerous arms race.


ADVANTAGE TWO: CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION PREVENTS A DANGEROUS NATIONALIST BACKLASH IN RUSSIA
A. IT IS DANGEROUS TO ASSUME THAT RUSSIAN HUMILIATION OVER BEING CAST OUT OF WORLD POLITICS WILL NOT CAUSE A NATIONALIST BACKLASH
JAMES MEEK, February 11, 1998 [Journal of Commerce. SECTION: EDITORIAL/OPINION; Pg. 6A HEADLINE: Russia's spasmodic decline \\ jan]VT99

It has been left to a handful of old geopolitical hands, including President Carter's security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, to put the case that, threat or not, Russia is simply not a major player at this time. In an interview in an obscure Central Asian newspaper, carried by Russia's Interfax news agency, he spoke harshly of ""the Russian elite's illusions about its privileged geopolitical position and special role."

Mr. Brzezinski's line - he also likes to say that Russia has as much right to be involved in the Middle East peace process as Brazil - may be extreme, but there is much truth in it.

For the moment, at least, and for decades to come, perhaps. It has become a cliche of reportage from Moscow to suggest that somehow, somewhere, someday, the waters of bitterness at national humiliation will rise too high and the dam will burst across the world, Yet it hasn't happened, and it would be comforting for the West to assume it never will.

It's a dangerous assumption to make. The vanishing of Russia's weight in the world forces the remaining strong powers, the United States first of all, to fabricate their own constraints on freedom of military action. Otherwise they will overreach themselves, and it will not matter if the counter-blast comes from a revived Russia next century or if Russia's comeback is only one part of it.
B. SEE NATIONALISM DISADVANTAGE FOR IMPACT
ADVANTAGE THREE: CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION PREVENTS RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO REINTEGRATE THE FORMER SOVIET STATES
A. RUSSIA'S MAIN OBJECTIVE IS TO KEEP FROM BEING PUSHED TO THE MARGINS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WHETHER THEY CHOOSE A PEACEFUL OR MILITARY ROUTE FOR THIS IS YET TO BE DETERMINED.
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

Over the next several years, Russian foreign policy could take a number of distinct courses. Here I discuss three specific scenarios: the nationalist "power" scenario, "Cold War II," and a more moderate "survival" scenario. In each case, Russia's supreme objective will be to prevent its marginalization in world politics and to reverse the decline in its influence. Each scenario represents a different means by which Russia would seek this core objective.


B. IF RUSSIA IS NOT INTEGRATED INTO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM, IT WILL IMPLEMENT A HARD-LINE POLICY OF LAND COLLECTION
Valery V. Tsepkalo, Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, March, 1998 /Apnil, 1998 [Foreign Affairs. SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 107. HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia \\ jan]VT99

If the West does not support integration, Russia will implement a hard-line policy of "land collection" on its southern and western flanks. It will also adopt a confrontational attitude toward Western nations and probably China; Moscow will again begin supporting any state that opposes U.S. interests. It will likely start with Muslim nations like Iran, Iraq, and Libya and groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Cuba and North Korea. The weakness of Russia's conventional forces will probably lead it to rely on veiled threats of nuclear blackmail, using the above countries and groups, among others. Such a policy will allow Moscow back into the negotiation process in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula, marking its return to serious international policymaking. It would also mobilize and unite Islamic elements in Russia and the CIS, cutting the ground out from under Muslim separatists by casting Russia as the ally and friend of Islam. At one stroke, it would counter both the West and China, which is dealing with Muslim unrest of its own in Xinjiang province and elsewhere.


STATUS QUO FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA IS A SHAMBLES
USA FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE AND “ADRIFT”
Holger Jensen, international editor of the Rocky Mountain News, The Fresno Bee, September 29, 1997, Pg. B7, HEADLINE: U.S still searching for Russian doctrine in post-Cold War era acs-VT99

Today we have no doctrine for dealing with post-Communist Russia. U.S. policy is as adrift as the Russians themselves who, seduced by McDonald's, Levi Strauss and Wonderbras, wonder if they have any national identity left.


CLINTON’S RUSSIA POLICY IS CONTRADICTORY AND AMBIGUOUS TOWARDS RUSSIA
Yegor T. Gaidar, the director of the Institute for the Economy in Transition, Foreign Policy, December 22, 1997; Pg. 64; HEADLINE: A view from Russia; US foreign policy acs-VT99

Clinton's ambiguous attitude toward Russia is a case in point. With the changes wrought by the end of the Cold War, he faced two alternatives in devising a policy toward Russia. Much in the way that Britain and France treated Germany after the First World War, Clinton could consider Russia a potential enemy and therefore aim at its weakening or isolation. Or, as the Allies treated Germany and Japan after the Second World War, Clinton could establish a long-term partnership with Russia through which it would be incorporated into the alliance of developed market democracies.

In typical Clinton fashion - indeed, is there any other leader who talks so frequently in his speeches of avoiding "false choices?" - he is trying to do both. Clinton's decision to extend (largely unchanged) a military alliance created to deter the Soviet threat suggests that he is intent on "containing" Russia. But the president's efforts to promote Russia's integration into the Group of Eight and other international institutions argue that the opposite is true. These contradictory impulses and actions reflect his administration's lack of overall strategic guidelines. They leave the strong impression that Clinton's foreign policy is determined by immediate reactions to internal and, to a lesser degree, external factors.
USA FOREIGN POLICY LACKS COHERENT FOCUS AND A POST COLD WAR VISION
R.C. Longworth, Tribune senior writer, Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1998 SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 1; HEADLINE: FUMBLING GIANT; AMERICA'S AIMLESS FOREIGN POLICY , acs-VT99

Ideally, a nation's foreign policy should reflect its values, character and politics. In that sense, America's foreign policy in these post-Cold War years is just about right.

A fragmented, hyphenated nation plagued by interest-group politics is projecting a fragmented, hyphenated foreign policy dominated by so many lobbies and interest groups that, on any given day, there seem to be hundreds of policies out there, baffling the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, the U.S. administration, which was hired to frame a foreign policy embodying the nation's role in the world, still seeks a coherent concept to replace the anti-communist Cold War doctrine that served so well for more than 40 years.


US FOREIGN POLICY IS FRAGMENTED AND LACKS A FRAMEWORK
R.C. Longworth, Tribune senior writer, Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1998 SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 1; HEADLINE: FUMBLING GIANT; AMERICA'S AIMLESS FOREIGN POLICY , acs-VT99

In this atmosphere, the United States has not stated a set of clear foreign policy goals and made its action around the globe fit this framework. Instead, it has a rash of little policies, a few set by the White House, some by the Pentagon, some by Departments of the Treasury or Commerce. Is our policy toward China, for instance, aimed at containing China's military power (Pentagon), or keeping it friendly to American investment (Commerce)? The answer is both, or neither.


CLINTON HAS BEEN TOO PREOCCUPIED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON RUSSIA
John F. Harris; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), May 5, 1998, Pg. 1 HEADLINE: Clinton Under Pressure to Test Bond With Yeltsin // acs-VT99

Mr. Clinton, the argument goes, has devoted his time to such things as expanding NATO, traveling in Africa and courting China in anticipation of his trip there next month but has let Russia slip from the central place it deserves in U.S. foreign policy. Adding to the distractions has been Mr. Clinton's preoccupation with legal matters, including the investigation led by the independent counsel Kenneth Starr into some of his business dealings and allegations of sexual impropriety.


LACK OF CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION ARE ENDANGERING AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
US RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE SHAKY BECAUSE THE US HAS BEEN INCREASING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE FORMER SOVIET STATES AND HAS CONTINUALLY SNUBBED RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN THOSE AREAS
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

Partly as a result of the Russian failure, Washington refused to accord Moscow special status in the region and strove instead to gain influence equal to Russia's through the development of ties with other CIS countries. Of particular importance in this connection was the establishment of a special U.S. relationship with Ukraine aimed, in the eyes of many Russian observers, at preventing close ties between Moscow and Kiev. But the anti-Russian bias in U.S. policy toward CIS states went well beyond Ukraine: The United States supported the Azeri and Kazak position on the status of the Caspian Sea, preferred the "Dayton solution" of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to Moscow's suggestions, and championed the Turkish proposal concerning the Caspian oil pipeline. All these positions were at odds with the aims of the Russian government, and U.S. efforts to establish political, economic, and military counterweights in the post-Soviet space to balance Russia's influence have considerably complicated U.S.-Russian relations.


RUSSIA HAS LOST ITS INFLUENCE IN MOST AREAS OF THE GLOBE, AND THE US USES THIS POWER IMBALANCE TO FURTHER ITS OWN INTERESTS AT THE EXPENSE OF RUSSIA
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

To the United States, on the other hand, it has become clear that the democratic transformation of Russia is an extremely complicated and painful process, that the relations between the two countries have under-gone radical changes in America's favor, and that, as a result, the economic, technological, and social gaps between the two countries are likely to grow in the near future. This widening power gap helps to explain the failure of the Russian-U.S. partnership to become the axis of international relations it was during the Soviet-U.S. stand-off. Those relations were of a different quality -- between equal adversaries. When it ceased to be a superpower, Russia lost its grounds for establishing equal, mutually beneficial relations with the only remaining ID superpower, the United States. This decline in influence has not been lost on U.S. officials determining foreign policy priorities in the post-Cold War era.

It has also become obvious to U.S. policymakers that Russia is no match to the former Soviet Union in its influence on different regions of the world. It has lost its weight not only in Latin America and Africa, but also in the Middle East, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and East Asia traditional areas of Russian national interests and influence. Russia is no longer able to mold the position of the Arabs, as did the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The same can be said, notwithstanding Western assumptions to the contrary, of Russian influence over the Serbs, who had treated Russia as their sole ally and patron for centuries.
THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE US WILL LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENT TO CONSULT RUSSIA. IF THE US CONTINUES TAKING RUSSIA FOR GRANTED, RELATIONS WILL BE KILLED.
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. I Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

But only time will tell if the historic obligations and commitments will be honored. By fulfilling the commitment, the United States would act in accordance with President Clinton's concept that U.S. security and its support for economic and social modernization in the post-Cold War era depend on the state of U.S.-Russian relations. The realization of the most important U.S. foreign policy goals maintenance of peace and international security and creation of a just world order -- will be impossible without Russia's active cooperation. But that cooperation cannot be assumed, and will not be forthcoming, if the United States continues to take Russia for granted. It is dangerous, indeed, to tease a wounded bear.


CURRENT POLICY DOES NOT TREAT RUSSIA LIKE AN IMPORTANT PARTNER
CLINTON’S RUSSIA POLICY HAS LUCKILY SURVIVED THIS FAR, BUT IT WILL SOON BEGIN TO FAIL UNLESS THERE IS A CHOICE TO MAKE RUSSIA A FRIEND
Yegor T. Gaidar, the director of the Institute for the Economy in Transition, Foreign Policy, December 22, 1997; Pg. 64; HEADLINE: A view from Russia; US foreign policy acs-VT99

So far, Clinton's success at tactical implementation has made up for his foreign policy's missing strategic core. He has managed to pull off the seemingly impossible: to implement NATO enlargement without causing irreparable damage either to democratic elements in Russia's political establishment or to U.S.-Russian relations. But here in Moscow, just how much longer Clinton can count on tactics to save him from having to choose between Russia as enemy or ally is unclear.


THE USA HAS NOT TREATED RUSSIA AS AN IMPORTANT COLLABORATIVE PARTNER
Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99

For Russia, the lesson from the wars and diplomatic crises of the 1990s in the Gulf and former Yugoslavia is that the US, despite its promises, has not treated Moscow as an equal partner in the post-Cold War age. Instead, it sought to humiliate Iraq, once a Soviet ally, and pressure Serb-led Yugoslavia which, with Greece, is Russia's most sympathetic friend. Most seriously, the US pressed ahead with Nato's expansion into central and eastern Europe despite what Russia believed was a firm assurance that, if Moscow withdrew its forces from former Warsaw Pact states and permitted Germany's unification, enlargement would not go ahead. In short, the Russians are no longer sure that close co-operation with the US reaps the right results. To some extent, Russia's decision to act as a broker in the re- cent US showdown with Saddam Hussein over UN weapons inspections could be partly justified by the support that Moscow garnered in the Arab world for its show of sympathy towards an Arab country being "bullied by Uncle Sam".


AMERICAN POLICY DOESN’T ALLOW RUSSIA TO SEE THINGS DIFFERENTLY
Sergei Markov, director of the Institute for Policy Studies. Izvestia, Feb. 26, 1998, p. 3., Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, March 25, 1998; Pg. 8,HEADLINE: Iraq Accord Reached: How Big Was Russia's Role? acs-VT99

In 1998, everything proceeded according to a different scenario. The US made preparations for the public punishment of Hussein, and when Russia balked, in an attempt to keep the situation from moving toward a military option, the Americans, from force of habit, tried to tell the Russian leadership that it must not support Hussein. . . .


USA NEEDS TO DEVELOP BROAD RELATIONS WITH RUSSIAN SOCIETY, NOT PIN ALL ITS HOPES ON YELTSIN
Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99

Russian specialists have long criticized the Clinton administration for pinning relations with Moscow on personal ties with Yeltsin the man, rather than broader support for reform, the policy. Many thought the administration lucky that Yeltsin won re-election in 1996, now that it is known how ill he was then.

The luck of that policy, however, is now clearly running out. The administration will have to rethink Russia policy if it hopes to continue playing an influential role in Moscow.
RUSSIA FEELS ALIENATED BECAUSE THE USA WILL NOT LET RUSSIA BE A PART OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY
RUSSIA BELIEVES THAT THE US IS TRYING TO HUMILIATE THEM BY IGNORING THEM IN FOREIGN POLICY
GENNADY ZYUGANOV, FEBRUARY 4,1998 [Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast. HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH CPRF LEADER \\ jan]VT99

Zyuganov: As regards Russia's national interests and security many of our opponents are trying to humiliate Russia, to cut it down to size. They have violated the treaty on conventional armaments, violated the parity of forces that existed in Europe, they flagrantly did this. And today, disregarding everything, proceeding only from the thesis that if a country wants to join NATO, including if this is wanted by the Baltic states, it should definitely be admitted. And this instead of making a careful analysis of possible consequences tomorrow.


THE RUSSIAN'S BELIEVE THAT THE US IS RELEGATING THEM TO JUNIOR PARTNER STATUS AND WANT TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM HAVING ANY POWER IN THE WORLD
Oleg Vladykin, February 5, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: U.S. Knows Russia's 0 Place. SOURCE: OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, No. 5, p. 2 \\ jan]VT99

Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee general Lev Rokhlin said to a recent press conference that the United States did not consider Russia an equal power any longer, writes OBSHCHAYA GAZETA.

Last week, Rokhlin said, one of the Russian secret services forwarded a secret document to the President and other top Russian leaders, which was entitled: "A New Military and Political Course of the United States Toward Russia." In his opinion, the memo was a convincing proof that Russia's national security was being increasingly threatened.

OBSHCHAYA GAZETA has obtained that document and reproduces it in full. It says that the U.S. Institute for Strategic Studies concluded in late 1997 that the era of equal partnership between America and Russia ended together with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent change in the world balance of power. In the new situation, the United States should compel the international community to recognize its right to use force to achieve its political and economic objectives. In international politics, Russia should play the role commensurate with its real and economic potential. Partnership with Russia is possible only on one condition -- its leadership should recognize and accept the status of a junior and dependent partner. Moreover, Russia should not be allowed to interfere in the zones of U.S. vital interests.

The authors of the Russian secret memo to the President say that the Americans have concluded that Russia is past the critical point still allowing it to restore its defense and economic potential and will be unable to oppose the U.S. in the 21st century.
ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IS INCREASING IN RUSSIA. THE FEEL AS IF THEY ARE BEING PUSHED OUT OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS BY THE US
Andy Bowers, February 19,1998 [ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR), HEADLINE: Angry Russians. \\ jan]VT99

BOWERS: And in another similarity to the great game, Russia and the U.S. are currently struggling for influence over the massive oil wealth of the Caspian Sea region. But there's also in Russia a growing disenchantment with America, after a postcommunist love affair with all things Western. And as the U.S. seems intent on bombing Iraq despite Russian objections, it's easy to find that disenchantment on the streets of Moscow. SOUNDBITE OF A STREET MOSCOW RESIDENT (VIA TRANSLATOR): Russia is trying to play a more important role, but maybe some people don't want us to have our own voice. I'd say our attitude toward America is worse than it used to be. It's no longer heaven for us, and I think they like us less, too. MOSCOW RESIDENT (VIA TRANSLATOR): America is the world's policeman. They think they're the strongest in the world and can dictate their will to every other country.

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RUSSIA IS ANGERED BECAUSE THE US HAS BECOME THE SOLE SUPERPOWER


Andy Bowers, February 19,1998 [ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR), HEADLINE: Angry Russians. \\ jan]VT99

ANDY BOWERS, NPR REPORTER: During CNN's international town meeting on the Iraq crisis yesterday, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright referred to the U.S. as the "indispensable nation," trying to make the world a safer place. Such sentiments may please Americans, but they rankle in Russia, For decades, the Soviet Union competed strongly with the U.S. for influence around the world. But with the fall of communism, Russia had far too many problems of its own to worry much about flexing its muscles abroad. Some argue Moscow is still in a poor position to project its influence very far. They point to the debacle in Chechnya and Russia's fragile economy as evidence. But many in Russia firmly believe that the U.S. has become a little too indispensable since the end of the Cold War.


RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT A WORLD IN WHICH THE US IS THE LONE SUPERPOWER
Andy Bowers, February 19,1998 [ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR), HEADLINE: Angry Russians. \\ jan]VT99

BOWERS: Alexei Pushkov is foreign affairs columnist for the newspaper Nivsny Mayagosyeta. He points out that Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov has repeatedly promoted what he calls a "multi-polar" world -- one, in other words, not dominated by the U.S. China supports this notion, and so does Pushkov. PUSHKOV: We don't think that it, first of all, that it's a good thing for the world to be ruled from one center because this center may be wrong. The Americans have committed a number of mistakes in their history -- take the Vietnam War; take Somalia. The United States cannot always be right and it creates a number of dangers. The second reason is that Russia just do not think that if the world is ruled from one place, it will correspond to Russian interests.


RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT TO BE A JUNIOR PARTNER TO THE US
Milt Bearden, March 2, 1998 [the senior CIA. official in charge of the covert action program in Pakistan and Afghanistan from 1986 through 1989. The New York Times. SECTION: Section A; Page 17; Column 1; Editorial Desk. HEADLINE: Lessons From Afghanistan \\ jan]VT99

Russia rejects the idea of being a junior partner to the United States in foreign policy, preferring to create its own role in global politics. Moscow also has a pressing interest in recovering the $9 billion it is owed by Iraq. France, too, wants to establish its independence from American policy.


RUSSIA PERCEIVES THAT THE US BELIEVES THEM TO BE IRRELEVANT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BECAUSE THE US DOES NOT CONSULT THEM ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear // jan]VT99

Despite all these good wishes, the hopeful U.S.-Russian partnership has had a bumpy ride over the last year. Each side has blamed the other for the relationship's decline; each had its own opinion about the reasons for the tremendous gap between solemn declarations and sober reality. Moscow noticed that U.S. security planners seemed to regard Russia as nothing but a repository for a large number of nuclear weapons of uncertain accountability. The United States failed to consult Russia on many vital issues of world politics increasingly, Moscow perceived that Washington considered it irrelevant to world events, at least for the time being.


AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IS PUSHING RUSSIA INTO ANTI-AMERICANISM
AS LONG AS RUSSIA IS IGNORED, ITS SUSPICIONS OF THE USA WILL GROW
Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99

Russia still feels that its size, power and experience should translate into greater international influence. Until that happens, suspicions will linger in Moscow that the US is not according post-communist Russia the respect it deserves.


YELTSIN IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE DUMA TO STAND UP TO THE US
Amatzia Baram, FEBRUARY 23, 1998 [Amatzia Baram is a professor of Middle East history at the University of Haifa and a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The New Republic. SECTION: Pg. 19. HEADLINE: THE ODD COUPLE \\ jan]VT99

To be sure, Primakov is trying to act in what he believes is his country's best interest -- and lifting the sanctions on Iraq is a top priority. Iraq still owes Russia at least $7 billion from the pre- 1990 war era, and Saddam has promised to resume payment as soon as the oil embargo is lifted. In addition, Russian sources report that Russian firms and government agencies have signed contracts with Iraq since February 1996 to the tune of ten or eleven billion dollars. Once the embargo is lifted, Russia will participate in developing the huge oil fields of West Qurna and North Rumeila. Iraq has also asked to buy Russian antiaircraft and antitank missiles. Finally, Yeltsin is under pressure from a very nationalist Duma to demonstrate independence from, and even defiance to, the U.S.


RUSSIA HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT MAKE ANY MORE CONCESSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES IN FOREIGN POLICY.
Marina Kalashnikova, February 11, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: In Moscow, Cohen Will Have Been Put Before Nuclear Boundary \\ jan]VT99

U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen due to Moscow tomorrow [February 12] will have to face the new Russian determination not to make any more concessions to his country and the West in general, says KONMERSANT-DAILY. Boris Yeltsin has clearly outlined Russia's foreign policy interests and it was not just for effect that he mentioned a third world war in connection with putative U.S. strikes against Iraq. Coming out in support of Moscow, Minsk has prepared "a nuclear sensation" of its own for Cohen. America is being given to understand that she will not be the only one responsible for the new world order.


THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR RUSSIA TO BE INTEGRATED PEACEFULLY INTO THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY IS CLOSING. WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE US WILL ONLY MAKE MATTERS WORSE.
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the

Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

The years to come in many ways will be decisive for the fate of Russia, the development of the democratic process, and the alignment of political forces there. Both Russian foreign policy and the context of international relations in which it operates face serious challenges. Although the Soviet superpower disappeared from the world political map, its primary successor, Russia, has remained an important player in the international community -- a player, it was hoped, that would contribute to world stability abd strengthen democracy in international relations. And indeed, the Kremlin's 1992 foreign policy concept stressed Russia's responsibility as a great power for the maintenance of global and regional security, the preservation of peace, and the development of stable international relations based on the supremacy of law, democracy, and human rights. The document stated Russia's three "circles of interests" in the field of international relations: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, the West, and others.

Early hopes for a warm, broad-based Russian-US partnership that would draw Russia fully into the world community of democratic states have been dashed by exaggerated expectations, a lack of vision and political will (especially on the US side), and recurrinq Cold War symbols of hostility. It is not generally recognized just how close the West is to losing a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to ensure that Russian reform takes place and to bring Russia definitively into the group of peaceful, prosperous democracies. As I will suggest below, realistic scenarios for outcomes in Russian politics over the next several years no longer include an ideal option. At this point, the best we may be able to do is to prevent a new confrontation between the former Cold War adversaries in an arrangement that I call the survival scenario.

This is a depressing conclusion as we approach the 10-year anniversary of the end of the Cold War. But it is the only honest one. Continued wishful thinking about the state of relations between Russia and the West will only postpone needed initiatives even further.
IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ACT NOW TO CREATE A NEW SYSTEM OF ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIA
EARLY ENGAGEMENT OF RUSSIA BY THE USA IS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID CATASTROPHE
F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 51 , acs-VT99

Second, the United States should try to engage Russia sooner rather than later. The longer the United States waits, the more complicated and messy Russian politics is likely to become and the more Russian policy is likely to be influenced by domestic factors-above all the succession issue-over which the United States has little control. There is a danger, moreover, that Yeltsin's health could suddenly deteriorate or that lie could become incapacitated. This could result in a prolonged paralysis in U.S.-Russian relations. In the meantime, important arms control treaties such as START and CFE Could collapse. By the time the Russians are in a position to reengage, it may be difficult-or too late-to repair the damage.


THE PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE ARE BASED ON HOW QUICKLY FORMER OPPONENTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE NEW SYSTEM -- THUS, RUSSIA NEEDS TO BE QUICKLY INCLUDED
Gwynne Dyer, Univ. of Toronto, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), May 5, 1998, Pg. 15A, HEADLINE: Bigger NATO may be an even bigger mistake // acs-VT99

In the early post-Cold War days, it was clearly understood by American policy-makers that the priority was to include Russia in the system. Anybody with a grasp of history knows that after a great war, the prospects for lasting peace depend on how fast and how well you reintegrate the defeated powers into the system.


AFTER THIS ROUND OF NATO EXPANSION, OUR MAIN GOAL SHOULD BE ENGAGEMENT OF RUSSIA
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Plain Dealer, May 7, 1998; Pg. 11B, HEADLINE: RUSSIA'S ROLE IN AN EXPANDED NATO // acs-VT99

Following the Senate's vote to ratify the expansion of NATO, the next historic task for the Euro-Atlantic community is to engage Russia. This will take time, but success will signal the resolution at last of the fateful dilemma that 20th century Europe was unable to solve on its own: How to deal with the rise of German and of Russian power, respectively.


EACH YEAR THAT WE KEEP RUSSIA IN A PRO-WESTERN MODE MAKES IT MORE CERTAIN THAT IT WILL STAY THERE
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

The next few years will confront Russia with a supreme test. Can the nation realize its aspirations through internal reconstruction and international cooperation, or will it once again seek to make its mark by resorting to military force and exploitation of international tensions?

Each year that Russia continues as a partner of the West strengthens the forces that favor development over expansionism. A younger generation aspiring to be Western gradually replaces the older one mired in nostalgia for the Soviet past. A business class emerges that has little use for militarism, along with a new breed of politicians who cater to an electorate more concerned with living standards than imperial grandeur.
LACK OF RUSSIAN INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM IS A SOURCE OF FUTURE DISASTER
Gwynne Dyer, Univ. of Toronto, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), May 5, 1998, Pg. 15A, HEADLINE: Bigger NATO may be an even bigger mistake // acs-VT99

After 23 years of war against revolutionary France ended with Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815, France was a full member of the "Concert of Europe" within three years - and Europe had half a century of peace. After World War I, defeated Germany was isolated and punished - and the next war came in only 21 years. After World War II, defeated Germany and Japan became full U.S. allies within 10 years - and the great powers have been at peace ever since.

If the analogy holds for the Cold War (and it probably does), then either Russia should belong to a transformed NATO already, or NATO should already have disbanded. Neither of those things has happened, and that may be the source of future disaster.
COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION CAN FORESTALL A RISE IN RUSSIAN NATIONALISM
TO AVOID A FLARE UP OF DANGEROUS RUSSIAN NATIONALISM, THE USA MUST COOPERATE AND CONSULT WITH RUSSIA ON FOREIGN POLICY
Roger Kanet, Prof. Political Science Univ. of Illinois, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 200201 , acs-VT99

This is precisely why, as contributors to this volume have suggested, the West must be careful not to provide nationalist forces with additional fuel to fan the flames that they have already started through their rhetoric. This means that the West should be sure to involve Russia in important world affairs. Furthermore, the West and international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), should be flexible in assisting Russia to transform politically and economically by not setting down rigid terms that could be, and often are, interpreted as infringements on Russia's sovereignty. In sum, although Russia's foreign policy seems to have become much more coherent and somewhat more stable) domestic circumstances in Russia are such that a dramatic and sudden shift in foreign policy orientation should not be discounted as a possibility in the near future .


NOT COOPERATING AND CONSULTING WITH RUSSIA ON FOREIGN POLICY FUELS DANGEROUS NATIONALIST ELEMENTS
Roger Kanet, Prof. Political Science Univ. of Illinois, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 197, acs-VT99

The lesson for the West, as Marantz points out, is that the international environment can be a critical factor in the formulation of Russian foreign policy. Western states must be careful to craft policies that are not construed by Russia as potentially threatening to their national security or as snubbing Russia's international status as a major player in world affairs. This could play into the hands of nationalist forces in Russia and drastically alter Russian foreign policy by helping to strengthen the influence that these forces have in the formulation of such policy.


RUSSIA WILL DETERMINE ITS FUTURE, AND A COOPERATIVE POLICY IS NECESSARY, NOT A POLICY OF SPECIAL FAVORS BECAUSE THAT MOBILIZES NATIONALIST ELEMENTS
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99

The choice will be made by the Russians themselves; the West can influence the decision only marginally. The situation calls for a subtle policy that mixes toughness with understanding of Russian sensitivities. No special favors should be granted. They only whet the appetites of nationalists who interpret undeserved concessions to mean that the world is so anxious to bring Russia into the international community that it is prepared to show boundless tolerance for its behavior.


COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION CAN FORESTALL A NEW COLD WAR
USA COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA WORKS TO STOP A RETURN TO THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE OLD SOVIET REGIME
Angela Stent, professor of government at Georgetown University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEW PRAGMATISM acs-VT99

As Russia continues its difficult transition away from communism, the voices of pragmatism and economic rationality will continue to do battle with those of the old Soviet foreign policy elite. It will be a long process whose outcome will partly depend on the internal succession struggle after Yeltsin. But it will also be affected by how the outside world treats Russia and whether the United States and its allies continue to seek cooperative ties or return to a neo-containment policy.


GREATER USA-RUSSIA COOPERATION CAN FORESTALL A NEW COLD WAR
Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. xi acs-VT99

Russia and America must know each other better. This, I believe, will guarantee that the coldwar era can never return. We are two great countries, two great peoples. We have our own historical destinies, our own cultures, our own national values. We both have much to be proud of. So let us strengthen our dialogue through various channelsculture, science, economics, and politics--not suppressing or opposing but rather complementing and enriching each other.


THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION MODEL IS EFFECTIVE AND TESTED
IMPROVED CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS WILL REMOVE MISPERCEPTIONS AND SUSPICIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE USA, PREVENTING CONFRONTATIONS IN THE FUTURE
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

Given these examples of misunderstanding, misperception, and misinterpretation, Russia and the United States must develop corrective mechanisms that would help them to clarify troublesome questions and remove potential suspicions. We propose developing improved consultative mechanisms both in the government and in the public arena as essential tools to prevent the gradual slide of the Russian-U.S. relationship toward the confrontations of the past.


DIALOGUE GROUPS ARE A GOOD WAY TO CREATE NEW AVENUES OF CONSULTATION AND COMMUNICATION
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

To begin, the two governments need to change the way they talk with each other and the way they analyze their relationship. They need a different format that permits them to probe the deeper concerns that affect the relationship. Subjects such as domestic politics, which are normally barred from diplomatic discourse, need to be a regular part of the agenda, and exchanges of policy views need to give way in certain circumstances to genuine dialogue. That is not to say that formal sessions will become unnecessary; rather, in addition to regular meetings of officials working on the same problems, the two governments should bring together at regular intervals a group of officials charged with keeping their fingers on the pulse of the overall relationship and analyzing its dynamics, looking as far into the future as possible.


A DIALOGUE CONSULTATION SYSTEM EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSES LARGER POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

Reestablishing a continuing dialogue is essential not only because it creates conditions for discussing highly complicated problems that have a direct bearing on Russian and U.S. interests but also because it addresses larger political and security issues critical to the prevention of future conflict. The Experience of Inter-Tajik Dialogue


THE REGIONAL CONFLICTS TASK FORCE HAS BEEN TESTING THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION SYSTEM SINCE 1992 IN TAJIKISTAN
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

Although many such forums ceased to function, some survived and continue to provide opportunities for dialogue on a broad range of specific issues. For instance, the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts Task Force, formed in 1981 to analyze Soviet and U.S. interests and interactions in developing world conflicts, decided in 1992 to enlarge its agenda to include three components:

1. It would focus on the new arenas of Russian-U.S. interaction in conflict areas -- the area now called the Near Abroad. n15

2. It would conceptualize the process of sustained dialogue that participants had developed through the experience of semiannual meetings through the 1980s with a cumulative agenda built as each meeting began where the last ended. We published this conceptualization in "A Public Peace Process," which laid out a five-stage process of systematic dialogue to change relationships caught up in deep-rooted human conflicts.

3. It would apply that five-stage process in one of the conflicts that had broken out on the territory of the former Soviet Union as perhaps the first experience for U.S. and Russian citizens to undertake a joint peacemaking mission. It chose Tajikistan.
THE TAJIKISTAN DIALOGUE CONSULTATION EXPERIMENT WAS ABLE TO COOPERATE EFFECTIVELY WITH ALL SIDES
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

The Inter-Tajikistani Dialogue within the framework of the Dartmouth Conference has become, among other important things, a live experience in Russian-U.S. cooperation in the Near Abroad. This dialogue began under Russian-U.S. cochairmanship in March 1993 and, by the end of 1996, had held 17 meetings at generally regular intervals. It has become the longest and most persistent public dialogue of this type among conflicting parties in the former Soviet republics, creating a unique public forum where people of sharply different and sometimes opposing political persuasions have learned to listen to each other, to think together, and finally to work out common proposals. The participants in the dialogue submitted their proposals to the Tajikistani government and its opposition at official negotiations mediated by an emissary of the U.N. secretary-general. Individual participants also started their own NGOs as a beginning of civil society in Tajikistan.


THE TAJIKISTAN DIALOGUE CONSULTATION EXPERIMENT HAS SUCCEEDED IN REDUCING CONFLICTS AND CREATING TRUE USA-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP -- IT SHOULD BE EXPANDED
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

The Inter-Tajik Dialogue demonstrated an ability to produce constructive ideas aimed at conflict resolution and peace-building as well as an ability to present these ideas to individuals and groups that can make them a reality.

Now entering the phase of post-conflict peace-building, participants are acutely aware that these efforts are essential in preventing a new outbreak of civil war. The extended in-depth experience in practical cooperation among the citizens of Russia and the United States working together in the Near Abroad also suggests that new modes of cooperation are possible provided the two sides develop a full understanding of each other's intentions and ways of working.
THE REGIONAL CONFLICTS TASK FORCE AND INTER-TAJIK DIALOGUE SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO USA-RUSSIA FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

Building on the experience of Soviet-U.S. political dialogues during the Cold War and on the more recent experience of dialogue groups such as the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts Task Force and its Inter-Tajik Dialogue, it would be desirable both to proliferate the experience of citizens working together in areas of common concern and to "reinvent" a larger Russian-U.S. political dialogue. By this we mean not a mere resumption of the meetings on problems of peace and security that existed between the two countries during the Cold War, but an opening of a fresh political dialogue that would reflect new global realities as well as new sets of national priorities in both Russia and the United States. Such a dialogue may help to develop a more mature partnership between the two countries in the years to come -- one that is freer of illusions, false expectations, and new fears.


THE BEST SYSTEM IS TO CREATE A NETWORK OF DIALOGUES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE USA EMBRACING ALL AREAS OF TENSION AND DISAGREEMENT
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

Those insights from individual dialogues should be brought together as the agenda for a dialogue network on the state of the relationship. Two main points should be kept in mind when creating such a network of dialogues:

The first point is that Russia and the United States need a complex of dialogues on particular aspects of the relationship. Some of these are already underway; others are not. Both Russia and the United States will continue to learn much about their overall relationship by investigating the friction-generating interactions of the two countries in specific places, such as the Near Abroad. Those frictions tell a lot about the tension between objective interests and about tension among the interests and intentions as perceived or misperceived by citizens of the two countries. They reveal the underlying dynamics of the overall relationship.
THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION SYSTEM WOULD BE EASY TO IMPLEMENT THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

This article is not intended to recommend a particular agenda or mode of operation for a revitalized Russian-U.S. dialogue, but to make the case for one. Suffice it to say that the era of electronic communication would make possible the kind of communication described here at costs that could be managed. What is required is acceptance of the need for such focus on the overall relationship -- acceptance both by participants and by potential funders. It is not common to think in those terms, yet the need for such a focus is critical.


SUCCESS IN ONE BIALOGUE AREA WILL CREATE NEW UNDERSTANDING IN OTHER AREAS AND IN THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP
Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99

The dialogue on the Near Abroad demonstrates how dialogue and experience in Russian-U.S. interaction in one area can lead to deeper insight into the dynamics of the relationship. That insight into the evolving relationship, kept constantly fresh through sustained dialogue focusing on the overall relationship, is the first essential step toward preventing renewed conflict.

THE SOONER CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION BEGIN THE BETTER
THE WORLD’S FUTURE DEMANDS THAT WE CREATE A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA NOW
Paula J. Dobriansky; Council on Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT acs-VT99

First, we need to articulate an intellectually compelling explanation of the strategic importance of our relations. Russia remains a key player in Europe and, as its economy and political stability improve, is likely to become even more influential. Also, Russia's democratic path matters to us and to the future of Europe. What happens there will ultimately have political, economic, and security consequences for its neighbors and us. Consequently, what ought to be done now is to lay a solid foundation for a constructive relationship with Russia for decades to come.


THE SOONER THE USA TRIES TO ENGAGE RUSSIA IN FULL COOPERATION THE BETTER THINGS WILL BE IN ALL SCENARIOS
F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. X, acs-VT99

There are thus strong incentives for the United States to try to engage Russia sooner rather than later. The longer the United States waits, the more complicated and messy Russian politics is likely to become and the more Russian policy is likely to be influenced by domestic factors-above all the succession issue-over which the United States has little control. Even if the U.S. effort to engage the Russians fails, the United States would be in a better position to repair relations later if it tries to engage Russia now than if it does not try at all .


WE CAN CONSULT AND COOPERATE WITHOUT AGREEING ON EVERYTHING
COOPERATION WITH DISAGREEMENT IS VERY VEASIBLE
Igor Shchegolev, TASS, May 12, 1998, HEADLINE: Russia must remain a great power with growing influence // acs-VT99

In relations between Russia and United States, a period of "some illusions and heightened expectations" is over and these relations are now rising to a level of equitable interaction. It is necessary to maintain positive dynamics in relations with America without at the same time bowing to it. It is necessary to make clear patiently and in the spirit of cooperation "our position on those questions where differences exist in principle in our views," the president added.


THE VALUE OF A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USA OUTWEIGHS ALL AVAILABLE INCENTIVES TO COOPERATE TOO CLOSELY WITH THE ENEMIES OF THE USA
Daniel Williams; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune, November 22, 1997, Pg. 7, HEADLINE: Russia's Balancing Act; How to Stand Up to U.S. but Avoid Conflict acs-VT99

So far, however, the economic stakes in keeping good relations with Washington appear to outweigh such dealings. The United States is a potential source of high technology and investments. Expectations of loans from the World Bank and help from the International Monetary Fund also depend on good relations with Washington, Russian observers contend.


IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR THE USA AND RUSSIA TO FIND COMMON SOLUTIONS IF THEY WORK TOGETHER
Stephen Sestanovich; Ambassador at, U.S. Department of State, Heritage Foundation , April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: THE STATE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA; OPENING STATEMENT acs-VT99

The question before us is whether Russian interests inevitably clash with our own. The issues that I have described so far offer cases of disagreement -- sometimes major disagreements. But they also provide powerful evidence of common interests and of our ability to find common solutions.


CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION IMPROVE USA FOREIGN POLICY AT ALL LEVELS
THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH RUSSIA IS TO CONSULT AND COOPERATE WITH IT WHENEVER POSSIBLE
Abram Chayes, Prof. Law Harvard, 1997; MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: Russian and American Perspectives, p. 536 , acs-VT99

The most intelligent way of addressing the realities and complexities that continue to beset the area of the former Soviet Union would be to engage Russia in a truly cooperative enterprise for dealing with external and domestic controversies through the major international organizations. In some cases, the task is straightforward-for example helping to strengthen the OSCE both financially and politically. in others, the United States must face complex issues and competing objectives-such as NATO expansion. With respect to the European Union, the United States may have limited influence. Most important is the energetic, imaginative, and sensitive joint involvement in the daily activities of these organizations. Hardest of all is that in such a venture the United States may have to accept the unaccustomed role of equal or perhaps junior partner when it is more appropriate for another country or group of countries to take the lead.


USA POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA MUST INVOLVE CREATING COMMUNICATION LINKS WITH MANY PARTS OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY
F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 54, acs-VT99

In a broader sense, given the uncertain state of Yeltsin's health, the United States needs to begin looking beyond the Yeltsin era and develop lines of communication to all major political forces. In particular, Washington needs to establish more intensive contacts with regional leaders. Many regions are already beginning to conduct their own foreign policy, especially in the economic field' This trend is likely to intensify, as the process of decentralization gains greater momentum, and means that Moscow will be less able to dominate both foreign and domestic politics. Hence developing good ties to regional centers of power in Russia will become more important.


RUSSIA NEEDS TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THE USA AS A PARTNER
Interfax news agency, Moscow, in Russian 0801 gmt 12 May 982, BBC Summary of World , May 13, 1998, SECTION: PART 1 Former USSR; YELTSIN ADDRESS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY; HEADLINE: Russia should not "prostrate itself" before USA in its foreign policy // acs-VT99

President Boris Yeltsin has spoken of the need for Russia to maintain the positive trend in relations with the USA, but " not to prostrate itself" before that country. He was delivering a speech to senior members of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The president said that, "after a period of some illusions and exaggerated expectations, the Russian Federation and the USA are working together as equals" .

In Yeltsin's opinion, one should patiently and in a spirit of cooperation explain Moscow's position on the issues on which there is principled disagreement with Washington.


ENCOURAGING POWERS LIKE RUSSIA TO BE INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY SOLVES IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND ENHANCES THE PRESTIGE OF THE USA
Michael O'Hanlon & Julien Hartley, Brookings Institution, The Washington Post, December 16, 1997, Pg. A27, HEADLINE: Why Not Let Russia Play a Role? acs-VT99

Letting countries such as Russia and France occasionally play a greater role on the world stage is a sign not of U.S. weakness but of wisdom and indeed of confidence. It can help the United States manage an array of thorny issues ranging from NATO expansion to U.N. reform to nuclear arms control and nonproliferation efforts. Right now we suffer much more from a perception that we are overbearing and domineering than from one that we are weak or rudderless. Washington's influence in the Mideast region is not fragile, nor are Primakov's maneuverings at cross purposes with core American interests.


IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN ENGAGING RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADERS WHEN THEY EMERGE
Paula J. Dobriansky; Council on Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT acs-VT99

Developing Relations with Russia's Emerging Democratic Leaders

While some progress in this area has been made, we have not taken full advantage of numerous opportunities to bolster the growth and institutionalization of democracy in Russia and to forge better ties with Russia's democratic leaders. For example, our routine contacts and assistance have been limited to a relatively small number of senior Moscow-based officials. Not enough has been done at the local and regional level, despite numerous opportunities to forge strong ties between American local and state governments and their Russian counterparts. The federal government can and should be a catalyst for such efforts.
NATO EXPAMPLE SHOWS THAT ESTABLISHING A CONSULTATION PROCESS IS PRODUCTIVE, BUT IT NEEDS TO GO FURTHER
THE AGREEMENT TO MAKE RUSSIA A CONSULTANT TO NATO DID NOT DETERMINE WHICH SCENARIO WILL HAPPEN IN RUSSIA, BUT THE CONSULTATION WITH RUSSIA HELPED EASE TENSIONS A LITTLE.
Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington 0 Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99

Has the agreement, the Founding Act of Mutual Relations signed in Paris last May, given a definite answer to the question of which scenario Russia will eventually choose? I am afraid the answer is no. The agreement has not removed the numerous problems inherent in NATO expansion. Despite solemn declarations at the time, the accord merely mirrors vitally important disagreements. Some NATO commitments are shallow and Russia's role remains rather undetermined; Russia was playing a weak hand. Under these circumstances, however, the mere fact that NATO reached an agreement with Russia and took into account its interests was a step in the right direction.


EVENTS IN THE IRAQI GULF WAR SHOWDOWN SHOWED THAT RUSSIA NEEDS TO BE CONSULTED AND CONSIDERED
THE IRAQI CRISIS PROVES THAT RUSSIA WANTS TO BE CONSIDERED A PLAYER IN WORLD AFFAIRS. THE US NEEDS TO TREAT THEM AS IF THEY MATTER
JAMES MEEK, February 11, 1998 [Journal of Commerce. SECTION: EDITORIAL/OPINION; Pg. 6A HEADLINE: Russia's spasmodic decline \\ jan]VT99

Boris Yeltsin's recent ""world war" outburst in Moscow and the role Russia's shuttling diplomats are playing in the latest round of the Saddam Hussein saga raises the nagging question of how much the bedraggled former superpower matters in the world today.

The Russian president's comments appear to have been based on a widespread belief in Moscow that the United States is threatening first use of nuclear weapons against Iraq. Rather than suggesting Russia might bring its own nuclear arsenal into play, Mr. Yeltsin was expressing genuine anger and bewilderment that Washington is still thinking in terms of force, when Russia believes it has enabled a breakthrough in negotiations with the Iraqis.

They claimed that last time, and the breakthrough became a breakdown. Yet then, as now, there was a sense that Washington valued Moscow's role as an intermediary significant enough to come up with a compromise if America felt unsure about a military strike.

From mighty power to go-between: A humiliating fall for those, like Russia's communists or the radical nationalists of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's far- right party, who think of Russia as a creature which must be either strong or beaten.

How far this attitude extends to the public as a whole is increasingly debatable. Asked how Russia should respond to the Iraq crisis, a revealing public-opinion poll held in Moscow in recent days showed 44 percent against any Russian involvement, 23 percent for Russia acting as an honest broker, and a surprising 7 percent calling for Moscow to join the United States in getting rid of Saddam. Only 6 percent said Russia should help the Iraqi dictator.


RUSSIA IS STANDING UP TO THE US IN IRAQ BECAUSE THEY WANT TO ILLUSTRATE THAT THEY ARE STILL A MAJOR WORLD PLAYER
James Meek, February 10, 1998 [The Scotsman SECTION: Pg. 13. HEADLINE: Russia might be desperate but it is no partner in crime \\ jan]VT99

So what are Russia's motives in trying to avert a US strike against Iraq now? They have nothing to do with mutual love.

Russians have no special affection for Iraqis: indeed recent developments in the Caucasus have heightened their sense of cultural separation from the Islamic world. The Iraqis don't like the Russians either, remembering the arrogance of Soviet military instructors in days gone by. Russia is struggling to make peace in Baghdad, at the risk of ending up looking foolish, for two reasons. One is to show a high-handed United States that it still counts for something in world diplomacy. It is trying to prove that Washington does not have complete freedom of action on the world stage.
IRAQ ILLUSTRATES THAT RUSSIA UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR AND THE US INTERESTS WILL NOT ALWAYS BE CONSISTENT BUT THAT THEY WANT THEIR INTERESTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
Alexey K. Pushkov, March 5, 1998 [Pushkov is a foreign affairs columnist at the Nezavissimaya Gazeta in Moscow. The Daily Yomiuri. SECTION: Pg. 5. HEADLINE: Russia-U.S. ties enter new stage as 'controlled rivalry' appears \\ jan]VT99

Does this mean that by opposing the military option, Russia wants to subvert U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East? No, but it does mean that Russia will not necessarily agree with the ways the United States chooses to defend its interests. It also means that Russia wants its own interests to be taken into account. Russia does agree that Iraq should be deprived of any means to fabricate weapons of mass destruction. It does agree with the United States that all U.N. resolutions should be fulfilled to the letter, But it does not think that the use of military force is the best way to solve the crisis.


NUCLEAR POLICY AFFIRMATIVE
The end of the Cold War has taken our attention away from a very serious problem. The United States and Russia stand on the precipice of an all-out nuclear exchange. Therefore, my partner and I stand resolved: that the United States should substantially change its foreign policy towards Russia.
OBSERVATION 1: RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VERY FRAGILE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP.
SUBPOINT A. THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE IS VERY REAL.
USA IS DEVELOPING A WIDE NEW ARRAY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
William M. Arkin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 21, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: What's "new"? new US nuclear weapons plans defy antinuclear rhetoric acs-VT99

No new nukes, huh? Despite promises from Clinton, a host of new weapons--warheads, missiles, and more--are in the pipeline.

Variations on the U.S. pledge to build "no new nuclear weapons"--a post-Cold War catechism--have now been recited by President Bill Clinton, the military, Energy Department officials, and the head of Strategic Command. But despite their assorted pledges, a wide variety of new nuclear weapons are under development.
RUSSIA IS FOCUSING ON CREATION OF NEW LONG RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya's defense and security affairs editor, The Moscow Times, October 30, 1997, HEADLINE: ICBMs Won't Boost Reform acs-VT99

This comprehensive nuclear defense doctrine is already being actively implemented. Two weeks ago, Sergeyev told me that he had "amassed" all currently available Defense Ministry procurement funds to begin immediate mass production of a new intercontinental strategic nuclear missile, or ICBM, called Topol-M or SS-27. "The first Topol-M regiment (a Russian regiment has 10 ICBMs) will be fully operational before Jan. 1, 1998," he said. This decision also means there will be no conventional defense procurement for the time being.


THE US AND RUSSIA ARE STILL ON HAIR TRIGGER POSTURE. NUKES COULD BE LAUNCHED WITHIN A MATTER OF MINUTES
Pavel Felgenhauer, February 19, 1998 [Pavel Felgenhauer is defense and national security affairs editor for Segodnya. The Moscow Times HEADLINE: DEFENSE DOSSIER: U.S. as Rogue Superpower.\\jan]VT99

The Americans were saying that Congress and the administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton are too slow and basically uninterested in scrapping nuclear weapons. Great opportunities to move forward quickly in disarmament were lost in the early '90s. Russian goodwill was squandered. So today the United States and Russia are still in a hair-trigger position - with nuclear arms aimed at each other and ready to launch at a minute's notice.


SUBPOINT B. RUSSIAN DEFENSE DOCTRINE IS NOW FAVORING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OVER CONVENTIONAL MEANS.
RUSSIA'S ARMED FORCES ARE IN DISARRAY SO THEIR IS A LIKELIHOOD THAT THEY WILL INCREASE THEIR RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE. THIS COULD CAUSE AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH BECAUSE MUCH OF THEIR EARLY WARNING SYSTEM WAS LOST WHEN THE SOVIET UNION BROKE UP
Ambassador James Woolsey, FEBRUARY 12, 1998 served as the President's first CIA director., Federal News Service. HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE. SUBJECT: THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY\\jan]VT99

One of the most serious aspects of the current situation in Russia is that the degree of corruption and the physical problems of the Russian State have created a very poor state of moral, pay and behavior inside the Russian military forces. The conventional forces most of them are in worse shape, but even the strategic rocket forces are not immuned to these problems. And, there are some uncertainties that the general staff and the strategic rocket forces face with respect to nuclear weapons. First of all because their conventional forces are in such poor shape, the Russian's are moving toward a doctrine of potential first use of nuclear weapons and a much higher reliance on nuclear weapons than they had before. Tongue-in-cheek, I might say, they are adopting the views of the earlier Kissinger circa late 1950's earlier 1960's with respect to reliance on nuclear weapons. They have lost some important warning systems that are outside of Russia that were in the Soviet Union but are not in Russia. And it is quite troubling to contemplate what might happen in some crisis if there were a misunderstanding such as there might have been impart with respect to the famous recent innocent of the Norwegian sounding rocket.


SUBPOINT C. THE START II NUCLEAR WEAPONS TREATY PROCESS HAS LITTLE HOPE OF SURVIVING IN THE STATUS QUO.
YELTSIN IS UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE DUMA TO GET START-2 PASSED
Alexei Bausin, Russian Press Digest, May 28, 1998, HEADLINE: Warhead Will Not Be Counted Before Autumn, SOURCE: OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, p. 6, acs-VT99

The executive authorities regard ratification as a priority objective. This especially applies to the Defense and Foreign Ministries. Fortunately, the Defense Ministry is headed by a man who has a good command of the issues involved and understands the importance of the Treaty for Russia. But the President and his staff are unwilling to enter into political negotiations with the Duma in the belief that they have a monopoly on foreign policy and security matters. Judging by Yeltsin's position in the past years, he does not regard ratification of the START-2 Treaty as one of his priority concerns.


START-2 IS NOW DEAD IN THE RUSSIAN DUMA
John F. Harris; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), May 5, 1998, Pg. 1 HEADLINE: Clinton Under Pressure to Test Bond With Yeltsin // acs-VT99

Some Russia specialists say passage of START-2 is even less likely after the NATO vote and after Mr. Yeltsin had to expend vast amounts of political capital in Parliament last month to install a new prime minister, Sergei Kiriyenko.


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