Brooks, et al, 13 [Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment Stephen G. Brooks (bio), G. John Ikenberry (bio) and William C. Wohlforth (bio), Stephen G. Brooks; G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, International Security ¶ Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012, p. Project Muse]
¶ Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement¶ Even if deep engagement's costs are far less than retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the strategy's major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States' security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy—an interaction relatively unexplored by international relations scholars.¶ A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far[End Page 33] more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States' overseas presence gives it the leverageto restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitmentsalso deter states with aspirations to regional hegemonyfrom contemplating expansion and make its partnersmore secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. Thecontention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the "American Pacifier" is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecastsdangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regionalrivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war.72¶ How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia's security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge.¶ The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions.73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected [End Page 34] costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia's major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier.¶ Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays.74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.¶ What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington—notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region's prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and [End Page 35] Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.75¶ The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism's sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism's optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives.76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case.77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices.¶ To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in thesecurity environment in at least some of the world's key regions. We have already [End Page 36] mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolaritycompletewith associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclearproliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may bebeyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generateintensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war).¶ Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world's core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels ofinterstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regionalproxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States.¶ Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose tocreate nuclear forces.78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressurelocally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem.79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate [End Page 37] over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned aboutthe destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have trulysurvivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows.80 Moreover, the risk of "unforeseen crisis dynamics" that could spin out ofcontrol is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome.¶ The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and "pass the buck" to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century.¶ The problem is that China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, "The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves."81 [End Page 38] Therefore, unless China's rise stalls, "the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War."82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia—just what the United States is doing.83¶ In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult.¶ Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world's key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners fromramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States' formidable military machine maydeter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powershave shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the "focused enmity" [End Page 39] of the United States.84 All of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America's alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking.85¶ In the end, therefore, deep engagement reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States. This in turn makes it easier to sustain the policy over the long term.¶ The Wider Benefits of Deep Engagement¶ The case against deep engagement overstates its costs and underestimates its security benefits. Perhaps its most important weakness, however, is that its preoccupation with security issues diverts attention from some of deep engagement's most important benefits: sustaining the global economy and fostering institutionalized cooperation in ways advantageous to U.S. national interests.¶ Economic Benefits¶ Deep engagement is based on a premise central to realist scholarship from E.H. Carr to Robert Gilpin: economic orders do not just emerge spontaneously; they are created and sustained by and for powerful states.86 To be sure, the sheer size of its economy would guarantee the United States a significant role in the politics of the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the fact that it is the leading military power and security provider also enables economic leadership. The security role figures in the creation, maintenance, and expansion of the system. In part because other states—including all but one of the world's largest economies—were heavily dependent on U.S. security protection during the Cold War, the United States was able not only to foster the economic order but also to prod other states to buy into it and to support plans for its progressive expansion.87 Today, as the discussion in the [End Page 40] previous section underscores, the security commitments of deep engagement support the global economic order by reducing the likelihood of security dilemmas, arms racing, instability, regional conflicts and, in extremis, major power war. In so doing, the strategy helps to maintain a stable andcomparatively open world economy—a long-standing U.S. national interest.¶ In addition to ensuring the global economy against important sources of insecurity, the extensive set of U.S. military commitments and deployments helpsto protect the "global economic commons."One key way is by helping to keep sea-lanes and other shipping corridors freely available for commerce.88 A second key way is by helping to establish and protect property/sovereignty rights in the oceans. Although it is not the only global actor relevant to protecting the global economic commons, the United States has by far the most important role given its massive naval superiority and the leadership role itplays in international economic institutions. If the United States were to pull back from the world, protecting the global economic commons would likely be much harder to accomplish for a number of reasons: cooperating with other nations on these matters would be less likely to occur; maintaining therelevant institutional foundations for promoting this goal would be harder; and preserving access to bases throughout the world—which is needed to accomplish this mission—would likely be curtailed to some degree.¶ Advocates of retrenchment agree that a flourishing global economy is an important U.S. interest, but they are largely silent on the role U.S. grand strategy plays in sustaining it.89 For their part, many scholars of international political [End Page 41] economy have long argued that economic openness might continue even in the absence of hegemonic leadership.90 Yet this does not address the real question of interest: Does hegemonic leadership make the continuation of global economic stability more likely? The voluminous literature contains no analysis that suggests a negative answer; what scholars instead note is that the likelihood of overcoming problems of collective action, relative gains, and incomplete information drops in the absence of leadership.91 It would thus take a bold if not reckless leader to run a grand experiment to determine whether the global economy can continue to expand in the absence of U.S. leadership.¶ Deep engagement not only helps to underwrite the global economy in a general sense, but it also allows the United States to structure it in ways that serve the United States' narrow economic interests. Carla Norrlof argues persuasively that America disproportionately benefits from the current structure of the global economy, and that its ability to reap these advantages is directly tied to its position of military preeminence within the system.92 One way this occurs is via "microlevel structuring"—that is, the United States gets better economic bargains or increased economic cooperation on some specific issues than it would if it did not play such a key security role. As Joseph Nye observes, [End Page 42] "Even if the direct use of force were banned among a group of countries, military force would still play an important political role. For example, the American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."93 Although Nye is right that such linkage will generally be implicit, extensive analyses of declassified documents by historians shows that the United States directly used its overseas security commitments and military deployments to convince allies to change their economic policies to its benefit during the Cold War.94¶ The United States' security commitments continue to bolster the pursuit of its economic interests. Interviews with current and past U.S. administration officials reveal wide agreement that alliance ties help gain favorable outcomes on trade and other economic issues. To the question, "Does the alliance system pay dividends for America in nonsecurity areas, such as economic relations?," the typical answer in interviews is "an unequivocal yes."95 U.S. security commitments sometimes enhance bargaining leverage over the specific terms of economic agreements and give other governments more general incentives to enter into agreements that benefit the United States economically—two recent examples being the 2012 Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and the United States-Australia FTA (which entered into force in 2005).96 Officials across administrations of different parties stress that the desire of Korea and Australia to tighten their security relationships with the United States was a core reason why Washington was able to enter into free [End Page 43] trade agreements with them and to do so on terms favorable to U.S. economic interests. As one former official indicates, "The KORUS FTA—and I was involved in the initial planning—was attractive to Korea in large measure because it would help to underpin the US-ROK [South Korea] alliance at a time of shifting power in the region."97 Korean leaders' interest in maintaining a strong security relationship with the United States, another former official stressed, made them more willing to be flexible regarding the terms of the agreement because "failure would look like a setback to the political and security relationship. Once we got into negotiations with the ROK, look at how many times we reneged even after we signed a deal. . . . We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses and the Koreans took it all."98¶ U.S. security leverage is economically beneficial in a second respect: it can facilitate "macrolevel structuring" of the global economy. Macrolevel structuring is crucial because so much of what the United States wants from the economic order is simply "more of the same"—it prefers the structure of the main international economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund; it prefers the existence of "open regionalism" 99; it prefers the dollar as the reserve currency; and so on. U.S. interests are thus well served to the extent that American allies favor the global economic status quo rather than revisions that could be harmful to U.S. economic interests. One reason they are often inclined to take this approach is because of their security relationship with the United States. For example, interviews with U.S. officials stress that alliance ties give Washington leverage and authority in the current struggle over multilateral governance institutions in Asia. As one official noted, "On the economic side, the existence of the security alliance contributes to an atmosphere of trust that enables the United States and Japan to present a united front on shared economic goals—such as open markets and transparency, for example, through APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]."100 Likewise, Japan's current interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important long-term economic initiative in East Asia, is widely understood to be shaped less by specific Japanese [End Page 44] economic interests than by the belief of Yoshihiko Noda's administration that it will strengthen alliance ties with the United States.101 As one former administration official stressed, this enhanced allied interest in supporting U.S. favored economic frameworks as a means of strengthening security ties with the United States helps to ensure against any shift to "a Sino-centric/ nontransparent/more mercantilist economic order in Asia."102¶ The United States' security leverage over its allies matters even if it is not used actively to garner support for its conception of the global economy and other economic issues. This is perhaps best illustrated by the status of the dollar as the reserve currency, which confers major benefits on the United States.103 For many analysts, the U.S. position as the leading superpower with worldwide security commitments is an important reason why the dollar was established as the reserve currency and why it is likely to retain this status for a long time.104 In the past, Washington frequently used direct security leverage to get its allies to support the dollar.105 There are a number of subtler mechanisms, however, through which the current U.S. geopolitical position serves the same end. First, Kathleen McNamara builds on the logic of focal points to argue that the U.S. global military role bolsters the likelihood that the dollar will long continue to be the currency that actors converge upon as the "'natural' dominant currency."106 Second, Norrlof emphasizes the significance of a mechanism that U.S. officials also stress: the United States' geopolitical position gives it the ability to constrain certain forms of Asian regionalism that, if they were to eventuate, could help to promote movement away from the dollar. 107 Third, Adam Posen emphasizes that the EU's security dependence on the United States makes it less likely that the euro countries will develop a true [End Page 45] global military capacity and thus "that the dollar will continue to benefit from the geopolitical sources of its global role" in ways that the euro countries will never match.108¶ In sum, the United States is a key pillar of the global economy, but it does not provide this service for free: it also extracts disproportionate benefits. Undertaking retrenchment would place these benefits at risk.¶ Institutional Benefits¶ What goes for the global economy also applies to larger patterns of institutionalized cooperation. Here, too, the leadership enabled by the United States'grand strategy fosters cooperation thatgenerates diffuse benefits for many states but often disproportionately reflects U.S. preferences. This basic premise subsumes three claims.¶ First, benefits flow to the United States from institutionalized cooperation to address a wide range of problems. There is general agreement that a stable, open, and loosely rule-based international order serves the interests of the United States. Indeed, we are aware of no serious studies suggesting that U.S. interests would be better advanced in a world that is closed (i.e., built around blocs and spheres of influence) and devoid of basic, agreed-upon rules and institutions. As scholars have long argued, under conditions of rising complex interdependence, states often can benefit from institutionalized cooperation.109¶ In the security realm, newly emerging threats arguably are producing a rapid rise in the benefits of such cooperation for the United States. Some of thesethreats are transnational and emerge from environmental, health, and resource vulnerabilities, such as those concerning pandemics. Transnational nonstate groups with various capacities for violence have also become salient in recent decades, including groups involved in terrorism, piracy, andorganized crime.110 [End Page 46] As is widely argued, these sorts of nontraditional, transnational threats can be realistically addressed only throughvarious types of collective action.111 Unless countries are prepared to radically restrict their integration into an increasingly globalized world system, the problems must be solved through coordinated action. 112 In the face of these diffuse and shifting threats, the United States is going to find itself needing to work with other states to an increasing degree, sharing information, building capacities, and responding to crises.113¶ Second, U.S. leadership increases the prospects that such cooperation will emerge in a manner relatively favorable to U.S. interests. Of course, the prospects for cooperation are partly a function of compatible interests. Yet even when interests overlap, scholarsof all theoretical stripes haveestablished that institutionalized cooperation does not emerge effortlessly: generating agreement on the particular cooperative solution can often be elusive. And when interests do not overlap, the bargaining becomes tougher yet: not just how, but whether cooperation will occur is on the table. Many factors affect the initiation of cooperation, and under various conditions states can and have cooperated without hegemonic leadership.114 As noted above, however, scholars acknowledge that the likelihood of cooperation drops in the absence of leadership.¶ Finally, U.S. security commitments are an integral component of this leadership. Historically, as Gilpin and other theorists of hegemonic order have shown, the background security and stability that the United States provided facilitated the creation of multilateral institutions for ongoing cooperation across policy areas.115 As in the case of the global economy, U.S. security provision [End Page 47] plays a role in fostering stability within and across regions, and this has an impact on the ability of states to engage in institutional cooperation. Institutional cooperation is least likely in areas of the world where instability is pervasive. It is more likely to flourish in areas where states are secure and leaders can anticipate stable and continuous relations—where the "shadow of the future" is most evident. And because of the key security role it plays in fostering this institutional cooperation, the United States is in a stronger position to help shape the contours of these cooperative efforts.¶ The United States' extended system of security commitments creates a set of institutional relationships that foster political communication. Alliance institutions are in the first instance about security protection, but they are also mechanisms that provide a kind of "political architecture" that is useful beyond narrow issues of military affairs. Alliances bind states together and create institutional channels of communication. NATO has facilitated ties and associated institutions—such as the Atlantic Council—that increase the ability of the United States and Europe to talk to each other and do business.116 Likewise, the bilateral alliances in East Asia also play a communication role beyond narrow security issues. Consultations and exchanges spill over into other policy areas.117 For example, when U.S. officials travel to Seoul to consult on alliance issues, they also routinely talk about other pending issues, such as, recently, the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This gives the United States the capacity to work across issue areas, using assets and bargaining chips in one area to make progress in another. It also provides more diffuse political benefits to cooperation that flow from the "voice opportunities" created by the security alliance architecture.118 The alliances provide channels and access points for wider flows of communication—and [End Page 48] the benefits of greater political solidarity and institutional cooperation that follow.¶ The benefits of these communication flows cut across all international issues, but are arguably enhanced with respect to generating security cooperation to deal with new kinds of threats—such as terrorism and health pandemics—that require a multitude of novel bargains and newly established procedures ofshared responsibilities among a wide range of countries. With the existing U.S.-led security system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it otherwise would be to strike bargains and share burdens of security cooperation in such areas. The challenge of rising security interdependence is greater security cooperation. That is, when countries are increasingly mutually vulnerable to nontraditional, diffuse, transnational threats, they need to work together to eradicate the conditions that allow for these threats and limit the damage. The U.S.-led alliance system is a platform with already existing capacities and routines for security cooperation. These assets can be used or adapted, saving the cost of generating security cooperation from scratch. In short, having an institution in place to facilitate cooperation on one issue makes it easier, and more likely, that the participating states will be able to achieve cooperation rapidly on a related issue.119¶ The usefulness of the U.S. alliance system for generating enhanced non-security cooperation is confirmed in interviews with former State Department and National Security Council officials. One former administration official noted, using the examples of Australia and South Korea, that the security ties "create nonsecurity benefits in terms of support for global agenda issues," such as Afghanistan, Copenhagen, disaster relief, and the financial crisis. "This is not security leverage per se, but it is an indication of how the deepness of the security relationship creates working relationships [and] interoperability that can then be leveraged to address other regional issues." This official notes, "We could not have organized the Core Group (India, U.S., Australia, Japan) in [End Page 49] response to the 2004 tsunami without the deep bilateral military relationships that had already been in place. It was much easier for us to organize with these countries almost immediately (within forty-eight hours) than anyone else for a large-scale humanitarian operation because our militaries were accustomed to each other."120¶ The United States' role as security provider also has a more direct effect of enhancing its authority and capacity to initiate institutional cooperation in various policy areas. The fact that the United States is a security patron of Japan, South Korea, and other countries in East Asia, for example, gives it a weight and presence in regional diplomacy over the shape and scope of multilateral cooperation not just within the region but also elsewhere. This does not mean that the United States always wins these diplomatic encounters, but its leverage is greater than it would be if the United States were purely an offshore great power without institutionalized security ties to the region.¶ In sum, the deep engagement strategy enables U.S. leadership, which results in more cooperation on matters of importance than would occur if the United States disengaged—even as it pushes cooperation toward U.S. preferences.