Advantage answers Privacy

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Advantage answers


1nc – privacy advantage

Overwhelming corporate and government tracking is inevitable – the aff is a meaningless half-measure

Schneier, 15 - fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Chief Technology Officer at Resilient Systems, Inc (Bruce, Data and Goliath: the Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World, Introduction)//AK
There’s a whole industry devoted to tracking you in real time. Companies use your phone to track you in stores to learn how you shop, track you on the road to determine how close you might be to a particular store, and deliver advertising to your phone based on where you are right now.

Your location data is so valuable that cell phone companies are now selling it to data brokers, who in turn resell it to anyone willing to pay for it. Companies like Sense Networks specialize in using this data to build personal profiles of each of us.

Phone companies are not the only source of cell phone data. The US company Verint sells cell phone tracking systems to both corporations and governments worldwide. The company’s website says that it’s “a global leader in Actionable Intelligence solutions for customer engagement optimization, security intelligence, and fraud, risk and compliance,” with clients in “more than 10,000 organizations in over 180 countries.” The UK company Cobham sells a system that allows someone to send a “blind” call to a phone—one that doesn’t ring, and isn’t detectable. The blind call forces the phone to transmit on a certain frequency, allowing the sender to track that phone to within one meter. The company boasts government customers in Algeria, Brunei, Ghana, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the United States. Defentek, a company mysteriously registered in Panama, sells a system that can “locate and track any phone number in the world … undetected and unknown by the network, carrier, or the target.” It’s not an idle boast; telecommunications researcher Tobias Engel demonstrated the same thing at a hacker conference in 2008. Criminals do the same today.

All this location tracking is based on the cellular system. There’s another entirely different and more accurate location system built into your smartphone: GPS. This is what provides location data to the various apps running on your phone. Some apps use location data to deliver service: Google Maps, Uber, Yelp. Others, like Angry Birds, just want to be able to collect and sell it.

You can do this, too. HelloSpy is an app that you can surreptitiously install on someone else’s smartphone to track her. Perfect for an anxious mom wanting to spy on her teenager—or an abusive man wanting to spy on his wife or girlfriend. Employers have used apps like this to spy on their employees.

The US National Security Agency (NSA) and its UK counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), use location data to track people. The NSA collects cell phone location data from a variety of sources: the cell towers that phones connect to, the location of Wi-Fi networks that phones log on to, and GPS location data from Internet apps. Two of the NSA’s internal databases, code-named HAPPYFOOT and FASCIA, contain comprehensive location information of devices worldwide. The NSA uses the databases to track people’s movements, identify people who associate with people of interest, and target drone strikes.

The NSA can allegedly track cell phones even when they are turned off. I’ve just been talking about location information from one source—your cell phone— but the issue is far larger than this. The computers you interact with are constantly producing intimate personal data about you. It includes what you read, watch, and listen to. It includes whom you talk to and what you say. Ultimately, it covers what you’re thinking about, at least to the extent that your thoughts lead you to the Internet and search engines. We are living in the golden age of surveillance.

Sun Microsystems’ CEO Scott McNealy said it plainly way back in 1999: “You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.” He’s wrong about how we should react to surveillance, of course, but he’s right that it’s becoming harder and harder to avoid surveillance and maintain privacy.

Surveillance is a politically and emotionally loaded term, but I use it deliberately. The US military defines surveillance as “systematic observation.” As I’ll explain, modern-day electronic surveillance is exactly that. We’re all open books to both governments and corporations; their ability to peer into our collective personal lives is greater than it has ever been before.

The bargain you make, again and again, with various companies is surveillance in exchange for free service. Google’s chairman Eric Schmidt and its director of ideas Jared Cohen laid it out in their 2013 book, The New Digital Age. Here I’m paraphrasing their message: if you let us have all your data, we will show you advertisements you want to see and we’ll throw in free web search, e-mail, and all sorts of other services. It’s convenience, basically. We are social animals, and there’s nothing more powerful or rewarding than communicating with other people. Digital means have become the easiest and quickest way to communicate. And why do we allow governments access? Because we fear the terrorists, fear the strangers abducting our children, fear the drug dealers, fear whatever bad guy is in vogue at the moment. That’s the NSA’s justification for its mass surveillance programs; if you let us have all of your data, we’ll relieve your fear.

No privacy intrusion – legal restraints prevent data collection of non-targets

De 14 - General Counsel, National Security Agency (Rajesh, “The NSA and Accountability in an Era of Big Data”, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY, 2014, p.6-8//DM)
False Myth: #2: NSA is spying on Americans at home and abroad with questionable or no legal basis.

This false myth reflects both deep philosophical distrust of the secretive NSA by some, and the reality that signals intelligence activities, unlike some other intelligence activities, inevitably implicate the privacy rights of U.S. persons. It also reflects more recent controversy over so-called “warrantless wiretapping” under the President’s Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). Without getting into details about the TSP (the authorization for which ended in 2007, but much of which is still classified and the subject of litigation) or FISA (an intricate statutory scheme), I would like to make a few general points about our current operations to help dispel this myth.

First, without an individualized determination of probable cause by a federal judge, NSA does not target the communications of any unconsenting U.S. person anywhere in the world when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes in the United States (note that pursuant to statute and regulation, under certain emergency scenarios the Attorney General can make an initial finding of probable cause, but if within the purview of FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court must subsequently make that determination). One point worth highlighting in particular is that, amidst the controversy over the recent amendments made to FISA in 2008 and reauthorized in 2012, an important change was made: targeting a U.S. person abroad now requires a probable cause finding by a federal judge, whereas previously it could be approved by the Attorney General alone under Executive Order 12333.

Second, under even one of the more controversial provisions of the recent FISA amendments, Section 702, where no individualized probable cause finding is required, express limits were enacted:

● Section 702 may only be used to target non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.

Section 702 may not be used to intentionally target any person in the United States or a U.S. person outside the United States.

● Section 702 may not be used to conduct “reverse targeting” – i.e., targeting of a person outside the United States if the purpose is to target a particular, known person inside the United States.

● Section 702 may not be used to intentionally acquire a “wholly-domestic communication” – i.e., a communication where all communicants are inside the United States.

● Section 702 must be implemented in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

2nc – corporate surveillance inevitable

Corporate surveillance is inevitable and they’ll willingly provide data to the government

Schneier, 15 - fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Chief Technology Officer at Resilient Systems, Inc (Bruce, Data and Goliath: the Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World, Introduction)//AK
Corporate surveillance and government surveillance aren’t separate. They’re intertwined; the two support each other. It’s a public-private surveillance partnership that spans the world. This isn’t a formal agreement; it’s more an alliance of interests. Although it isn’t absolute, it’s become a de facto reality, with many powerful stakeholders supporting its perpetuation. And though Snowden’s revelations about NSA surveillance have caused rifts in the partnership—we’ll talk about those in Chapter 14—it’s still strong. The Snowden documents made it clear how much the NSA relies on US corporations to eavesdrop on the Internet. The NSA didn’t build a massive Internet eavesdropping system from scratch. It noticed that the corporate world was already building one, and tapped into it. Through programs like PRISM, the NSA legally compels Internet companies like Microsoft, Google, Apple, and Yahoo to provide data on several thousand individuals of interest. Through other programs, the NSA gets direct access to the Internet backbone to conduct mass surveillance on everyone. Sometimes those corporations work with the NSA willingly. Sometimes they’re forced by the courts to hand over data, largely in secret. At other times, the NSA has hacked into those corporations’ infrastructure without their permission.

This is happening all over the world. Many countries use corporate surveillance capabilities to monitor their own citizens. Through programs such as TEMPORA, the UK’s GCHQ pays telcos like BT and Vodafone to give it access to bulk communications all over the world. Vodafone gives Albania, Egypt, Hungary, Ireland, and Qatar—possibly 29 countries in total—direct access to Internet traffic flowing inside their countries. We don’t know to what extent these countries are paying for access, as the UK does, or just demanding it. The French government eavesdrops on France Télécom and Orange. We’ve already talked about China and Russia in Chapter 5. About a dozen countries have data retention laws—declared unconstitutional in the EU in 2014—requiring ISPs to keep surveillance data on their customers for some months in case the government wants access to it. Internet cafes in Iran, Vietnam, India, and elsewhere must collect and retain identity information of their customers.

Similar things are happening off the Internet. Immediately after 9/11, the US government bought data from data brokers, including air passenger data from Torch Concepts and a database of Mexican voters from ChoicePoint. US law requires financial institutions to report cash transactions of $10,000 or larger to the government; for currency exchangers, the threshold is $1,000. Many governments require hotels to report which foreigners are sleeping there that night, and many more make copies of guests’ ID cards and passports. CCTV cameras, license plate capture systems, and cell phone location data are being used by numerous governments.

By the same token, corporations obtain government data for their own purposes. States like Illinois, Ohio, Texas, and Florida sell driver’s license data, including photos, to private buyers. Some states sell voter registration data. The UK government proposed the sale of taxpayer data in 2014, but public outcry has halted that, at least temporarily. The UK National Health Service also plans to sell patient health data to drug and insurance firms. There’s a feedback loop: corporations argue for more government data collection, then argue that the data should be released under open government laws, and then repackage the data and sell it back to the government.

The net result is that a lot of surveillance data moves back and forth between government and corporations. One consequence of this is that it’s hard to get effective laws passed to curb corporate surveillance—governments don’t really want to limit their own access to data by crippling the corporate hand that feeds them.

The government can just ask for or buy the data – surveillance unnecessary

Turner, 15 - Brad Turner is a graduate of Duke Law School and a practicing attorney in Ohio. (“When Big Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should Apply United States v. Jones to Protect People's Data” 16 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 377, January, lexis)
The government can obtain second-hand data from private parties in a variety of ways. First, the government can simply ask for it. According to Google, nearly 1% of requests for its user data from law enforcement are emergency requests. n185 A bill that has been proposed in Congress, called the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act ("CISPA"), might dramatically increase this percentage. CISPA would make it legal for the government to ask companies for data about their customers and then protect those companies from lawsuits related to the handing over of that data, "notwithstanding any other provision of law." n186

Second, the government can demand the data with a subpoena. A subpoena need not be reviewed or pre-approved by a court to be valid and enforceable. n187 Google says that 68% of its data requests from the government are in the form of a subpoena. n188 Subpoenas can request any information or documents that are at all relevant to an investigation. Relevance is defined very broadly and includes any information or documents that "might have the potential to lead to relevant information." n189 So long as a subpoena meets this very lenient standard, a court will deem the subpoena valid to the extent that the subpoena's demands are not overbroad or unduly burdensome. n190

Third, the government can demand the information with a court order, which, by definition, does require prior approval by a [*411] court. n191 Google says that 22% of its requests for data by the government are from warrants, and another 6% are from court orders. n192 The NSA collects much of its data by using secret FISA court orders, collecting huge sums of data from U.S. telephone companies, including AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint, and Internet service-providers like Facebook, Apple, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and AOL. n193 Statutes regulate these data-collection efforts. n194

Fourth, the government can purchase the information. Big Data is valuable and companies are willing to sell. n195 For the right price, [*412] government can access the same rich data-troves held by private organizations. For example, the federal government recently started buying access to a private database maintained by the credit bureau Equifax, called "The Work Numbers." n196 The database contains 54 million active salary and employment records and more than 175 million historical records from approximately 2,500 U.S. employers. n197 Equifax also sells this same data to credit card issuers, property managers, and auto lenders. n198

Can’t solve privacy – private sector and foreign government collection

Lewis 5/28 – Director and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program (James Lewis, “What Happens on June 1?”, CSIS Strategic Technologies Program,, 5/28/2015)//MBB
Privacy itself will not increase. The privacy battle was lost years ago when extracting your personal data became the business model of the internet. Americans have far less privacy than they did in 1995 and NSA has nothing to do with this. There are several ironies in this situation, not the least being that NSA collection operated under far more rules than private sector or foreign government collection, and many of the immense private sector databases are likely accessible to foreign governments (if they decide they can use them).

Economic incentives for corporate surveillance overwhelm the plan on a massive scale

Schneier, 15 - fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Chief Technology Officer at Resilient Systems, Inc (Bruce, Data and Goliath: the Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World, Introduction)//AK
Historically, surveillance was difficult and expensive. We did it only when it was important: when the police needed to tail a suspect, or a business required a detailed purchasing history for billing purposes. There were exceptions, and they were extreme and expensive. The exceptionally paranoid East German government had 102,000 Stasi surveilling a population of 17 million: that’s one spy for every 166 citizens, or one for every 66 if you include civilian informants.

Corporate surveillance has grown from collecting as little data as necessary to collecting as much as possible. Corporations always collected information on their customers, but in the past they didn’t collect very much of it and held it only as long as necessary. Credit card companies collected only the information about their customers’ transactions that they needed for billing. Stores hardly ever collected information about their customers, and mail-order companies only collected names and addresses, and maybe some purchasing history so they knew when to remove someone from their mailing list. Even Google, back in the beginning, collected far less information about its users than it does today. When surveillance information was expensive to collect and store, corporations made do with as little as possible.

The cost of computing technology has declined rapidly in recent decades. This has been a profoundly good thing. It has become cheaper and easier for people to communicate, to publish their thoughts, to access information, and so on. But that same decline in price has also brought down the price of surveillance. As computer technologies improved, corporations were able to collect more information on everyone they did business with. As the cost of data storage became cheaper, they were able to save more data and for a longer time. As big data analysis tools became more powerful, it became profitable to save more information. This led to the surveillance-based business models I’ll talk about in Chapter 4.

Government surveillance has gone from collecting data on as few people as necessary to collecting it on as many as possible. When surveillance was manual and expensive, it could only be justified in extreme cases. The warrant process limited police surveillance, and resource constraints and the risk of discovery limited national intelligence surveillance. Specific individuals were targeted for surveillance, and maximal information was collected on them alone. There were also strict minimization rules about not collecting information on other people. If the FBI was listening in on a mobster’s phone, for example, the listener was supposed to hang up and stop recording if the mobster’s wife or children got on the line.

As technology improved and prices dropped, governments broadened their surveillance. The NSA could surveil large groups—the Soviet government, the Chinese diplomatic corps, leftist political organizations and activistsnot just individuals. Roving wiretaps meant that the FBI could eavesdrop on people regardless of the device they used to communicate with. Eventually, US agencies could spy on entire populations and save the data for years. This dovetailed with a changing threat, and they continued espionage against specific governments, while expanding mass surveillance of broad populations to look for potentially dangerous individuals. I’ll talk about this in Chapter 5.

The result is that corporate and government surveillance interests have converged. Both now want to know everything about everyone. The motivations are different, but the methodologies are the same. That is the primary reason for the strong public-private security partnership that I’ll talk about in Chapter 6.

All personal information is freely available – the aff is a meaningless gesture

Schneier, 15 - fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Chief Technology Officer at Resilient Systems, Inc (Bruce, Data and Goliath: the Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World, Introduction)//AK
The result of this declining cost of surveillance technology is not just a difference in price; it’s a difference in kind. Organizations end up doing more surveillance—a lot more. For example, in 2012, after a Supreme Court ruling, the FBI was required to either obtain warrants for or turn off 3,000 GPS surveillance devices installed in cars. It would simply be impossible for the FBI to follow 3,000 cars without automation; the agency just doesn’t have the manpower. And now the prevalence of cell phones means that everyone can be followed, all of the time.

Another example is license plate scanners, which are becoming more common. Several companies maintain databases of vehicle license plates whose owners have defaulted on their auto loans. Spotter cars and tow trucks mount cameras on their roofs that continually scan license plates and send the data back to the companies, looking for a hit. There’s big money to be made in the repossession business, so lots of individuals participate—all of them feeding data into the companies’ centralized databases. One scanning company, Vigilant Solutions of Livermore, California, claims to have 2.5 billion records and collects 70 million scans in the US per month, along with date, time, and GPS location information.

In addition to repossession businesses, scanning companies also sell their data to divorce lawyers, private investigators, and others. They sometimes relay it, in real time, to police departments, which combine it with scans they get from interstate highway onramps, toll plazas, border crossings, and airport parking lots. They’re looking for stolen vehicles and drivers with outstanding warrants and unpaid tickets. Already, the states’ driver’s license databases are being used by the FBI to identify people, and the US Department of Homeland Security wants all this data in a single national database. In the UK, a similar government-run system based on fixed cameras is deployed throughout the country. It enforces London’s automobile congestion charge system, and searches for vehicles that are behind on their mandatory inspections.

Expect the same thing to happen with automatic face recognition. Initially, the data from private cameras will most likely be used by bounty hunters tracking down bail jumpers. Eventually, though, it will be sold for other uses and given to the government. Already the FBI has a database of 52 million faces, and facial recognition software that’s pretty good. The Dubai police are integrating custom facial recognition software with Google Glass to automatically identify suspects. With enough cameras in a city, police officers will be able to follow cars and people around without ever leaving their desks. This is mass surveillance, impossible without computers, networks, and automation. It’s not “follow that car”; it’s “follow every car.” Police could always tail a suspect, but with an urban mesh of cameras, license plate scanners, and facial recognition software, they can tail everyone—suspect or not.

Similarly, putting a device called a pen register on a suspect’s land line to record the phone numbers he calls used to be both time-consuming and expensive. But now that the FBI can demand that data from the phone companies’ databases, it can acquire that information about everybody in the US. And it has.

In 2008, the company Waze (acquired by Google in 2013) introduced a new navigation system for smartphones. The idea was that by tracking the movements of cars that used Waze, the company could infer real-time traffic data and route people to the fastest roads. We’d all like to avoid traffic jams. In fact, all of society, not just Waze’s customers, benefits when people are steered away from traffic jams so they don’t add to them. But are we aware of how much data we’re giving away?

For the first time in history, governments and corporations have the ability to conduct mass surveillance on entire populations. They can do it with our Internet use, our communications, our financial transactions, our movements … everything. Even the East Germans couldn’t follow everybody all of the time. Now it’s easy.

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