Advantage 1 privacy (short version)



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2AC A-to “Cplan - Fund HUMINT”



( ) Perm – do both



( ) Modest amounts of data’s key. Cplan won’t solve, doesn’t cut back on data overload.


Press ‘13

Gil - Managing Partner at gPress, a marketing, publishing, research and education consultancy. Previously held senior marketing and research management positions at NORC, DEC and EMC. Most recently he was a Senior Director, Thought Leadership Marketing at EMC, where he launched the Big Data conversation with the “How Much Information?” study (2000 with UC Berkeley) and the Digital Universe study. He is also contributes on computing technology issues as a guest writer at Forbes Magazine – “The Effectiveness Of Small Vs. Big Data Is Where The NSA Debate Should Start” – Forbes – 6-12-13 - http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/06/12/the-effectiveness-of-small-vs-big-data-is-where-the-nsa-debate-should-start/



Most of the discussion around the revelations about the data collection activities of the NSA has been about the threat to our civil rights and the potential damage abroad to U.S. political and business interests. Relatively little has been said, however, about the wisdom of collecting all phone call records and lots of other data in the fight against terrorism or other threats to the United States. Faith in the power (especially the predictive power) of more data is of course a central tenet of the religion of big data and it looks like the NSA has been a willing convert. But not everybody agrees it’s the most effective course of action. For example, business analytics expert Meta Brown: “The unspoken assumption here is that possessing massive quantities of data guarantees that the government will be able to find criminals, and find them quickly, by tracing their electronic tracks. That assumption is unrealistic. Massive quantities of data add cost and complexity to every kind of analysis, often with no meaningful improvement in the results. Indeed, data quality problems and slow data processing are almost certain to arise, actually hindering the work of data analysts. It is far more productive to invest resources into thoughtful analysis of modest quantities of good quality, relevant data.”

No solvency — focus on metadata will still exist — they’ll use metadata before Humint data.



Funding alone is not enough — divisional focus must be diverted for Humint.


Gallington 06 — Daniel Gallington, Adjunct Professor of National Security Law at the University of Illinois, senior policy and program adviser at the George C. Marshall Institute, LL.M. from the University of Michigan Law School, J.D. from the University of Illinois, 2006 (“What hope for HUMINT?,” Washington Times, May 8th, accessible online at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/8/20060508-091537-5575r/?page=all, accessed on 6-30-15)

Assuming Mike Hayden is confirmed as the new director, basic CIA “housecleaning” should continue — happening at the same time will be significant budgetary shifts from high-tech “remote-sensing” intelligence operations, to human-intelligence collection, the traditional CIA mission. Because the entrenched CIA senior bureaucracy remains resistant to change, it’s also fair to ask if the CIA can improve its human-intelligence collection even if we spend a lot more money on it. The answer in the shorter term — three to 10 years — is probably “no,” and whether we can do it for the longer term is not at all clear yet. Why such a negative assessment? Looking at how we have done in the past with human intelligence provides at least an indicator of our probable success: Our archenemy for 50 years, the Soviet Union, proved very hard to collect against using human sources. And, for most of the Cold War we seemed oblivious to this: Many sources we used were double agents and “played us like an organ,” as the expression goes. A primary way to get human intelligence — pay for it — can too often become the only way, because it is simply easier. And, we have probably paid a lot of money over the years for bad information — much of it planted with us by double agents. Traditionally, we have been unable to develop long-term, well-placed sources in other countries. The reason is that the time required — sometimes 20 years — seems beyond our comprehension and the ability of our government to fund and keep secret for sustained periods. Too often, our idea of “cover” for our agents was something your mother — let alone the KGB — could have figured out in about 30 seconds. We have the wrong kind of people doing the work: Despite being the most culturally diverse free nation in the world, we seem to send blond-haired, blue-eyed people to do intelligence field work. They simply can’t do the mission in today’s world — however, they seem to rise to leadership positions without difficulty. What should we do? (1) We have to take a very critical look at ourselves. This cannot be done objectively by the CIA and the other agencies because their primary focus is on the very short term — getting more money to spend. The president — consulting with the Intelligence Committees in Congress — should call together a group of experts, including counterintelligence experts, and chart out a long-term HUMINT collection strategy. We should get their guidance, Congress should fund it and the president carry it out. (2) It isn’t written in stone that the traditional HUMINT roles, missions and collection authorities of the various intelligence agencies should stay the same. In fact, everything should be on the table and no agency should expect its traditional HUMINT mission will remain intact. On paper at least, the new director of national intelligence (DNI) would seem empowered to direct this kind of reallocation of mission. (3) Too often, our intelligence collections overseas are based on second- and third-hand reports, and often obtained from host or other nations’ intelligence services. As these reports are analyzed and similarities are seen and written about, it’s easy to see how we can be misled by “group speak” reporting, mostly controlled by sources we have no way of assessing. Spying is spying: We should do more of it on our own throughout the world and get our own, firsthand information. (4) Most HUMINT collections should be controlled centrally: Local authorities overseas — including the U.S. ambassador in the country concerned and the regional military commander — should not, ordinarily, be “in the loop” for such activities. (5) There has been way too much emphasis on “open source” reporting, and it’s become a crutch for a number of agencies. Many so-called “open sources” are manipulated by those opposed to us, whether we consider them our “friends” or not. And, way too often, “open source” reporting just means someone reading a foreign newspaper — then writing an “intelligence” report on it. Will these recommendations work? We don’t have any choice: We are simply not getting the critical information we need to be responsive to the ever-broadening spectrum of threats from terrorism. And, unless we can penetrate terrorist organizations, including their planning and financing, we’ll simply be unable to prevent more terrorist attacks against us around the world and at home. Nevertheless, even if we do all these things — and do them right — we may be 15 or 20 years away from developing a true “world class” HUMINT collection capability: as good, for example as some of our key adversaries have had against us for years. But let’s make sure we stay on task and do it right — not just fling our money in a different direction for a few years.

Bulk domestic surveillance erodes meaningful checks on inappropriate government officials. It spills beyond national security into many policy issues.


Brown ‘14

Bruce Brown - Counsel of Record. BRIEF OF THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND 17 MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT - The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is an unincorporated association of reporters. The Reporters Committee has provided representation, guidance and research in First Amendment and Freedom of Information Act litigation since 1970.Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama – before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. “Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in this context - is legal reference to the Reporters Committee – Sept 9th - https://www.eff.org/document/rcfp-smith-amicus-brief

In a report that former Washington Post executive editor Leonard Downie Jr. wrote for the Committee to Protect Journalists, numerous journalists said surveillance programs and leak prosecutions deter sources from speaking to them. Comm. To Protect Journalists, The Obama Administration and the Press: Leak Investigations and Surveillance in Post-9/11 America 3 (Oct. 10, 2013), http://bit.ly/1c3Cnfg. In the report, Associated Press senior managing editor Michael Oreskes commented: “There’s no question that sources are looking over their shoulders. Sources are more jittery and more standoffish, not just in national security reporting. A lot of skittishness is at the more routine level.” Id. Washington Post national security reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran said: “One of the most pernicious effects is the chilling effect created across government on matters that are less sensitive but certainly in the public interest as a check on government and elected officials.” Id. Discussing the NSA surveillance programs, New York Times investigative reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize winner David Barstow stated, “I have absolutely no doubt whatsoever that stories have not gotten done because of this.” Jamie Schuman, The Shadows of the Spooks, The News Media and the Law, Fall 2013, at 9.

Building more accountable government – not sweeping rejecting it – is vital to check a laundry list of existential risks.


Eckersley ‘4

Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, “The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty”, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books, pp. 3-8



While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation, I seek to draw attention to the positive role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who somehow seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation.10 As Bull argued, given that the state is here to stay whether we like it or not, then the call to get "beyond the state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it.""¶ In any event, rejecting the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global ecological governance. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and, where possible, seek to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to ecological sustainability would seem to be compelling.¶ Of course, it would be unhelpful to become singularly fixated on the redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance. States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change. Nonetheless, while the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains, the political power concentrated in the state "is a momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities, for establishing, shaping and maintaining all broader and more durable collectivities."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism. Every one of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis. Given that the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed without the active support of states. While it is often observed that states are too big to deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world."13 In short, it seems to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state power.¶ Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its ends* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16 In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event, whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and accountable ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings. The coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade privacy. It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of corporate power, and protect the environment. In short, although the political autonomy of states is widely believed to be in decline, there are still few social institution that can match the same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect societies and economies along more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems such as global warming and pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. States—particularly when they act collectively—have the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global economy. There are therefore many good reasons why green political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system. While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17

Conditionality is voter – time skew, strat skew, dispo solves your offense



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