( ) New Freedom Act is sufficient to solve US’s global credibility gap.
Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. “Strengthen the USA Freedom Act” - May 19, 2015 - http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/19/strengthen-usa-freedom-act
As the Senate considers the USA Freedom Act this week, policymakers should strengthen it by limiting large-scale collection of records and reinforcing transparency and carrying court reforms further. The Senate should also take care not to weaken the bill, and should reject any amendments that would require companies to retain personal data for longer than is necessary for business purposes. It has been two years since the National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower Edward Snowden unleashed a steady stream of documents that exposed the intention by the United States and the United Kingdom to “collect it all” in the digital age. These revelations demonstrate how unchecked surveillance can metastasize and undermine democratic institutions if intelligence agencies are allowed to operate in the shadows, without robust legal limits and oversight. On May 13, the US House of Representatives approved the USA Freedom Act of 2015 by a substantial margin. The bill represents the latest attempt by Congress to rein in one of the surveillance programs Snowden disclosed—the NSA’s domestic bulk phone metadata collection under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. The House vote followed a major rebuke to the US government by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled on May 7 that the NSA’s potentially nationwide dragnet collection of phone records under Section 215 was unlawful. Section 215 is set to expire on June 1 unless Congress acts to extend it or to preserve specific powers authorized under the provision, which go beyond collection of phone records. Surveillance reforms are long overdue and can be accomplished while protecting US citizens from serious security threats. Congress and the Obama administration should end all mass surveillance programs, which unnecessarily and disproportionately intrude on the privacy of hundreds of millions of people who are not linked to wrongdoing. But reforming US laws and reversing an increasingly global tide of mass surveillance will not be easy. Many of the programs Snowden revealed are already deeply entrenched, with billions of dollars of infrastructure, contracts, and personnel invested. Technological capacity to vacuum up the world’s communications has outpaced existing legal frameworks meant to protect privacy. The Second Circuit opinion represents an improvement over current law because it establishes that domestic bulk collection of phone metadata under Section 215 of the Patriot Act cannot continue. Section 215 allows the government to collect business records, including phone records, that are “relevant” to an authorized investigation. The court ruled that the notion of “relevance” could not be stretched to allow intelligence agencies to gather all phone records in the US. However, the opinion could be overturned and two other appeals courts are also considering the legality of the NSA’s bulk phone records program. The opinion also does not address US surveillance of people not in the US. Nor does it question the underlying assumption that the US owes no privacy obligations to people outside its territory, which makes no sense in the digital age and is inconsistent with human rights law requirements. Even if the Second Circuit opinion remains good law, congressional action will be necessary to address surveillance programs other than Section 215—both domestic and those affecting people outside the US—and to create more robust institutional safeguards to prevent future abuses. The courts cannot bring about reforms to increase oversight and improve institutional oversight on their own. Human Rights Watch has supported the USA Freedom Act because it is a modest, if incomplete, first step down the long road to reining in the NSA excesses. Beyond ending bulk records collection, the bill would begin to reform the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court, which oversees NSA surveillance, and would introduce new transparency measures to improve oversight. In passing the bill, the House of Representatives also clarified that it intends the bill to be consistent with the Second Circuit’s ruling, so as to not weaken its findings. The bill is no panacea and, as detailed below, would not ensure comprehensive reform. It still leaves open the possibility of large-scale data collection practices in the US under the Patriot Act. It does not constrain surveillance under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act nor Executive Order 12333, the primary legal authorities the government has used to justify mass surveillance of people outside US borders. And the bill does not address many modern surveillance capabilities, from mass cable tapping to use of malware, intercepting all mobile calls in a country, and compromising the security of mobile SIM cards and other equipment and services. Nonetheless, passing a strong USA Freedom Act would be a long-overdue step in the right direction. It would show that Congress is willing and able to act to protect privacy and impose oversight over intelligence agencies in an age when technology makes ubiquitous surveillance possible. Passing this bill would also help shift the debate in the US and globally and would distance the United States from other countries that seek to make mass surveillance the norm. On a global level, other governments may already be emulating the NSA’s approach, fueling an environment of impunity for mass violations of privacy. In the last year, France, Turkey, Russia, and other countries have passed legislation to facilitate or expand large-scale surveillance. If the USA Freedom Act passes, it would be the first time Congress has affirmatively restrained NSA activities since the attacks of September 11. Key supporters of the bill have vowed to take up reforms to other laws next, including Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.
( ) Turn – US Cred bad. Others countries fill US vacuum. Plan reverses that – allows the US to spoil privacy norms that go beyond the Aff. Better to drag the US along.
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law – From the essay: “Internet at a Crossroads: How Government Surveillance Threatens How We Communicate” - http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/essays/internet-crossroads
The Snowden revelations have launched a global debate about modern surveillance, national security, and human rights. Privacy is now on the agenda of a range of states and international institutions for the first time. Several major UN human rights institutions have begun to examine modern surveillance practices. In March 2014, the Human Rights Committee, an international expert body and authoritative interpreter of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—a global treaty to which the US is party—called on the US to ensure all surveillance is necessary and proportionate to achieving legitimate objectives regardless of the nationality or location of individuals who are affected. In July 2014, the UN’s top human rights official, then-High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, issued a groundbreaking report on privacy in the digital age that directly challenges US and UK arguments for secret mass surveillance. Pillay notably concluded that mass surveillance was “emerging as a dangerous habit rather than an exceptional measure.” She said unchecked snooping could harm a range of human rights, including freedom of expression and association. The onus was on governments, she said, to demonstrate that their practices were necessary and proportionate to their security aims. In other words, spying on everyone because you can does not mean you should. The high commissioner’s report followed sustained action from privacy advocates and a group of countries, led by Germany and Brazil, to press the US and UK to stop mass surveillance and safeguard the privacy of people around the world. Stepping into the leadership vacuum, Germany and Brazil, along with Austria, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland, led the passage of the December 2013 UN General Assembly resolution calling for the high commissioner’s report. In the face of inaction by the US, the UK, and their closest allies, these UN institutions have begun to lay out a principled approach to surveillance and human rights in the digital age, grounded in widely accepted standards of international human rights law. Several critical themes emerging from this work directly challenge the defenses of mass surveillance: Surveillance harms a range of rights beyond privacy, including freedom of expression, association, and movement, as well as the right to counsel. If individuals cannot go online without fear of undue monitoring, the power of digital technologies to enable rights will be deeply undermined. Journalists cannot protect their sources, lawyers cannot ensure the confidentiality of their communications with clients, and human rights defenders cannot do their work safely. States have obligations to safeguard the privacy rights of users outside their borders. In our globally networked age, it is untenable to argue that the right to privacy stops at the border while surveillance is borderless. Mass surveillance is by nature indiscriminate and it is presumptively illegal. Article 17 of the ICCPR requires that any interference with privacy be proportionate and narrowly tailored. Just because mass surveillance and bulk data collection might yield some information that may one day be useful, it cannot justify the invasion of everyone’s privacy. States should recognize that privacy and other rights are harmed when they collect private data, regardless of whether that data is used. Knowing that the government can acquire data about your communications and online activities can chill freedom of expression and association, even if the data collected is never misused. States should impose meaningful limits on when data can be collected, as well as on how data may be used and how long it is retained. States should increase transparency and oversight over surveillance and intelligence gathering powers. There are legitimate reasons for secrecy when addressing national security threats. But such powers must be subject to oversight to prevent overreach and abuse, including through judicial and parliamentary bodies. The private sector has a responsibility to respect rights when asked to facilitate surveillance or data collection. Where Internet or telecommunications companies turn over user data or assist with surveillance without adequate safeguards, they risk complicity in resulting violations. The Way Ahead While the Snowden controversy has focused on the US and UK, as noted above, there is no reason to assume that other governments’ laws or practices are better. Most privacy regimes were put in place during the Internet’s infancy, before social media or smart phones existed, and they are now falling short in providing meaningful protection for rights. And, of course, there are those governments like Ethiopia, China, and Russia who routinely engage in abusive surveillance as a matter of policy and design. Thanks to Brazil and Germany, there is international momentum to develop norms and guidance and establish institutions to ensure that privacy still has meaning in the digital age. As part of this effort in the coming months, Human Rights Watch will support the creation of a new special rapporteur on the right to privacy at the UN Human Rights Council—an independent expert tasked with scrutinizing state surveillance practices in a sustained and systematic way. At time of writing, however, there is still a desire to secure buy-in from the US and UK as mass surveillance debates play out at these international venues. The instinct to treat the US and UK with diplomatic kid gloves is not surprising, given their technological capacity and political power. But ultimately, this approach may be counterproductive. In the short term, they are more likely to play the role of spoilers rather than promoters of principled standards. This was certainly true during the debate that led to the December 2013 UN General Assembly resolution on privacy in the digital age, when the US and UK pushed, somewhat successfully, to water down the text behind the scenes, and again in November 2014, with respect to the follow-on resolution on the same topic. Of course, we must continue to press for reforms in the US and UK and urge these governments to extend privacy protections to those outside their borders. But we should not allow political paralysis in the US and UK to hamper development of international privacy norms. A process of broad international engagement, including with strategic allies, can facilitate the US and UK’s eventual acceptance and internalization of strong international standards over time. When other nations and international institutions lead by example and establish strong human rights standards, they will bring the US and UK along.
Alt cause - “Kill-switch” policies for a cyber-incident hurt image of US support for internet freedom.
(et al; Richard Fontaine graduated summa cum laude with a B.A. in International Relations from Tulane University. He also holds a M.A. in International Affairs from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, and he attended Oxford University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has been an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He is currently the President of President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). “Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age” – June, 2011 - http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_InternetFreedom_FontaineRogers_0.pdf)
The perception that the U.S. government could restrict traffic over large portions of the Internet in the event of a cyber emergency could also complicate its efforts to promote online freedom. Congress debated a bill last year that would authorize greater government control over the U.S. digital infrastructure in the event of a nationwide cyber attack.142 Though many media reports about a so-called Internet “kill switch” are erroneous (and a newly introduced version explicitly prohibits any government employee from shutting down the Internet), the bill nevertheless raised concerns that such authority would undermine Internet freedom. While interpretations of the bill vary widely, an expert with the Electronic Frontier Foundation warned, “The president would have essentially unchecked power to determine what services can be connected to the Internet or even what content can pass over the Internet in a cyber security emergency.”143 The bill’s sponsors dispute this interpretation and note that the president’s powers could be exercised only in extreme emergencies and pursuant to limitations. The U.S. government must establish precise, widely understood scenarios under which it could declare an emergency and the powers it could then exercise. Failing to clearly define what constitutes a national “cyber emergency” that would give national leaders emergency powers to restrict Internet activity could set a precedent by which authoritarian regimes justify shutting off the Internet during their own “cyber emergency” – such as widespread anti-government protests. Again, there is a distinct difference between a presidential order to restrict some forms of Internet traffic in the face of a cyber attack on America’s critical infrastructure and President Mubarak’s decision to shut down his nation’s Internet during the democratic revolt in Egypt. In drafting legislation intended to protect the nation’s cyber systems and infrastructure, the U.S. government must tread carefully and quash perceptions that it is acceptable to use a “national cyber emergency” to trample on freedom of expression.
( ) Domestic not key. Plan can’t stop US surveillance on other countries. That’s vital to credibility.
Lauren McCauley, staff writer for Common Dreams. Previously, while writing for Newsweek, Lauren was nominated for the 2008 GLAAD Media Award for Digital Journalism, Common Dreams, 6-27-2013 https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/06/27-7
However, the international community has reacted to the disclosures with alarm. Revelations that the NSA has been tapping the phone and internet communications of foreign individuals and governments has spurred world leaders to denounce the global superpower as a 'hypocrite' and, in a number of instances, offer asylum or assistance to Snowden.¶ "The Prism-gate affair is itself just like a prism that reveals the true face and hypocritical conduct regarding Internet security of the country concerned," said Chinese Ministry of National Defense Spokesperson, Colonel Yang Yujun.¶ Sir Tim Berners-Lee, one of the five individuals who is credited as being a 'father of the internet' agreed telling the London Times newspaper that the 'insidious' spying by the United States was hypocritical in light of the US government's frequent 'policing' of other states.¶ "In the Middle East, people have been given access to the Internet but they have been snooped on and then they have been jailed," he said. "It can be easy for people in the West to say 'oh, those nasty governments should not be allowed access to spy.' But it's clear that developed nations are seriously spying on the Internet."¶ "It can be easy for people in the West to say 'oh, those nasty governments should not be allowed access to spy.' But it's clear that developed nations are seriously spying on the Internet." –Sir Tim Berners-Lee¶ The dramatic international backlash is a clear indication of the importance and severity of the leaked information and, in the interest of insuring that these revelations are not eclipsed by more distracting headlines, below is a summary of what we know so far about the NSA's spy program.¶ Forbes columnist Andy Greenberg offers this run-down of leaked documents published so far (bolding his own):¶ The publication of Snowden’s leaks began with a top secret order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) sent to Verizon on behalf of the NSA, demanding the cell phone records of all of Verizon Business Network Services’ American customers for the three month period ending in July. [...]¶ In a congressional hearing, NSA director Keith Alexander argued that the kind of surveillance of Americans’ data revealed in that Verizon order was necessary to for archiving purposes, but was rarely accessed and only with strict oversight from Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judges. But another secret document published by the Guardian revealed the NSA’s own rules for when it makes broad exceptions to its foreign vs. U.S. persons distinction, accessing Americans’ data and holding onto it indefinitely. [...]¶ Another leaked slide deck revealed a software tool called Boundless Informant, which the NSA appears to use for tracking the origin of data it collects. The leaked materials included a map produced by the program showing the frequency of data collection in countries around the world. While Iran, Pakistan and Jordan appeared to be the most surveilled countries according to the map, it also pointed to significant data collection from the United States.¶ A leaked executive order from President Obama shows the administration asked intelligence agencies to draw up a list of potential offensive cyberattack targets around the world. The order, which suggests targeting “systems, processes and infrastructure” states that such offensive hacking operations “can offer unique and unconventional capabilities to advance U.S. national objectives around the world with little or no warning to the adversary or target and with potential effects ranging from subtle to severely damaging.” [...]¶ Documents leaked to the Guardian revealed a five-year-old British intelligence scheme to tap transatlantic fiberoptic cables to gather data. A program known as Tempora, created by the U.K.’s NSA equivalent Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has for the last 18 months been able to store huge amounts of that raw data for up to 30 days. Much of the data is shared with the NSA. [...]¶ Another GCHQ project revealed to the Guardian through leaked documents intercepted the communications of delegates to the G20 summit of world leaders in London in 2009. [...]¶ Snowden showed the Hong Kong newspaper the South China Morning Post documents that it said outlined extensive hacking of Chinese and Hong Kong targets by the NSA since 2009, with 61,000 targets globally and “hundreds” in China. [...]¶ The Guardian’s Glenn Greenwald has said that Snowden provided him “thousands” of documents, of which “dozens” are newsworthy. And Snowden himself has said he’d like to expose his trove of leaks to the global media so that each country’s reporters can decide whether “U.S. network operations against their people should be published.” So regardless of where Snowden ends up, expect more of his revelations to follow.¶ Further, on Thursday journalists Glenn Greenwald and Spencer Ackerman revealed in a new Guardian exclusive that for ten years the US had conducted bulk collections of internet metadata, amassing information akin to 'reading one's diary' on both domestic and foreign individuals.¶ And, in their own cataloging of 'what we know so far,' Pro Publica poses the question, "Is all of this legal?"¶ Recently leaked court orders reveal how the Department of Justice, "through a series of legislative changes and court decisions," have evolved the parameters of the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, enabling the expansive spy program.¶ They write:¶ By definition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court decides what it is legal for the NSA to do.¶ But this level of domestic surveillance wasn’t always legal, and the NSA has been found to violate legal standards on more than one occasion. Although the NSA’s broad data collection programs appear to have started shortly after September 11, 2001, the NSA was gradually granted authority to collect domestic information on this scale through a series of legislative changes and court decisions over the next decade. See this timeline of loosening laws. The Director of National Intelligence says that authority for PRISM programs comes from section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Verizon metadata collection order cites section 215 of the Patriot Act. The author of the Patriot Act disagrees that the act justifies the Verizon metadata collection program.¶ In March 2004, acting Attorney General James Comey ordered a stop to some parts of the secret domestic surveillance programs, but President Bush signed an order re-authorizing it anyway. In response, several top Justice Department officials threatened to resign, including Comey and FBI director Robert Mueller. Bush backed down, and the programs were at least partially suspended for several months.¶ In 2009, the Justice Department acknowledged that the NSA had collected emails and phone calls of Americans in a way that exceeded legal limitations.¶ In October 2011, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled that the NSA violated the Fourth Amendment at least once. The Justice Department has said that this ruling must remain secret, but we know it concerned some aspect of the "minimization" rules the govern what the NSA can do with domestic communications. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court recently decided that this ruling can be released, but Justice Department has not yet done so.¶ Civil liberties groups including the EFF and the ACLU dispute the constitutionality of these programs and have filed lawsuits to challenge them.¶ And regarding the aforementioned international backlash, Pro Publica responds to the question "What if I'm not American?"¶ All bets are off. There do not appear to be any legal restrictions on what the NSA can do with the communications of non-U.S. persons. Since a substantial fraction of the world’s Internet data passes through the United States, or its allies, the U.S. has the ability to observe and record the communications of much of the world’s population. The European Union has already complained to the U.S. Attorney General.
Countries don’t model U.S. policy – it’s a myth.
Andrew - Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, January 31, 2005, Newsweek, “Dream On, America,” lexis
Not long ago, the American dream was a global fantasy. Not only Americans saw themselves as a beacon unto nations. So did much of the rest of the world. East Europeans tuned into Radio Free Europe. Chinese students erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. You had only to listen to George W. Bush's Inaugural Address last week (invoking "freedom" and "liberty" 49 times) to appreciate just how deeply Americans still believe in this founding myth. For many in the world, the president's rhetoric confirmed their worst fears of an imperial America relentlessly pursuing its narrow national interests. But the greater danger may be a delusional America--one that believes, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the American Dream lives on, that America remains a model for the world, one whose mission is to spread the word. The gulf between how Americans view themselves and how the world views them was summed up in a poll last week by the BBC. Fully 71 percent of Americans see the United States as a source of good in the world. More than half view Bush's election as positive for global security. Other studies report that 70 percent have faith in their domestic institutions and nearly 80 percent believe "American ideas and customs" should spread globally. Foreigners take an entirely different view: 58 percent in the BBC poll see Bush's re-election as a threat to world peace. Among America's traditional allies, the figure is strikingly higher: 77 percent in Germany, 64 percent in Britain and 82 percent in Turkey. Among the 1.3 billion members of the Islamic world, public support for the United States is measured in single digits. Only Poland, the Philippines and India viewed Bush's second Inaugural positively. Tellingly, the anti-Bushism of the president's first term is giving way to a more general anti-Americanism. A plurality of voters (the average is 70 percent) in each of the 21 countries surveyed by the BBC oppose sending any troops to Iraq, including those in most of the countries that have done so. Only one third, disproportionately in the poorest and most dictatorial countries, would like to see American values spread in their country. Says Doug Miller of GlobeScan, which conducted the BBC report: "President Bush has further isolated America from the world. Unless the administration changes its approach, it will continue to erode America's good name, and hence its ability to effectively influence world affairs." Former Brazilian president Jose Sarney expressed the sentiments of the 78 percent of his countrymen who see America as a threat: "Now that Bush has been re-elected, all I can say is, God bless the rest of the world." The truth is that Americans are living in a dream world. Not only do others not share America's self-regard, they no longer aspire to emulate the country's social and economic achievements. The loss of faith in the American Dream goes beyond this swaggering administration and its war in Iraq. A President Kerry would have had to confront a similar disaffection, for it grows from the success of something America holds dear: the spread of democracy, free markets and international institutions--globalization, in a word. Countries today have dozens of political, economic and social models to choose from. Anti-Americanism is especially virulent in Europe and Latin America, where countries have established their own distinctive ways--none made in America. Futurologist Jeremy Rifkin, in his recent book "The European Dream," hails an emerging European Union based on generous social welfare, cultural diversity and respect for international law--a model that's caught on quickly across the former nations of Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In Asia, the rise of autocratic capitalism in China or Singapore is as much a "model" for development as America's scandal-ridden corporate culture. "First we emulate," one Chinese businessman recently told the board of one U.S. multinational, "then we overtake."
( ) Internet freedom is not a silver bullet solution for human rights and democracy.
Tarun Wadhwa is a researcher with the Hybrid Reality Institute. Formerly, he was a Research Fellow at Singularity University and a Senior Research Associate with the Think India Foundation. He is also the author of the book: Identified: Why They Are Getting To Know Everything About Us – which is about the global rise of digital identification systems. He holds a BA in Political Science from George Washington University and EPD11 from Singularity University’s Graduate Studies Program in Policy, Law and Ethics - “NSA Surveillance May Have Dealt Major Blow To Global Internet Freedom Efforts” - Forbes – 6-13-13 - http://www.forbes.com/sites/tarunwadhwa/2013/06/13/with-nsa-surveillance-us-government-may-have-dealt-major-blow-to-global-internet-freedom-efforts/
The internet has never been a perfect tool for advancing democracy and human rights. Despite the most optimistic techno-utopian projections, the internet has yet to set us free and rid the world of dictators. Critics have been right to warn us of the dangers of a single-minded approach — we should be careful not to overlook the deep historical, economic, and cultural factors that shape the world we live in today. At the same time, it is true that the internet has revolutionized the way we are able to connect with each other. We are no longer limited to our culture and geography, we can now unite around shared interests and values.
( ) Democracy doesn’t cause peace – statistical models are wrong.
(Michael – Professor IR Koç University, “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy” International Studies Quarterly, p 1-12)
Model 2 presents new knowledge by adding the control for economic type. To capture the dyadic expectation of peace among contract-intensive nations, the variable Contract- intensive EconomyL (CIEL) indicates the value of impersonal contracts in force per capita of the state with the lower level of CIE in the dyad; a high value of this measure indicates both states have contract-intensive economies. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.80) is negative and highly significant. This corroborates that impersonal economy is a highly robust force for peace. The coefficient for DemocracyL is now at zero. There are no other differences between Models 1 and 2, whose samples are identical, and no prior study corroborating the democratic peace has considered contractintensive economy. Therefore, the standard econometric inference to be drawn from Model 2 is the nontrivial result that all prior reports of democracy as a force for peace are probably spurious, since this result is predicted and fully accounted for by economic norms theory. CIEL and DemocracyL correlate only in the moderate range of 0.47 (Pearson’s r), so the insignificance of democracy is not likely to be a statistical artifact of multicollinearity. This is corroborated by the variance inflation factor for DemocracyL in Model 2 of 1.85, which is well below the usual rule-of-thumb indicator of multicollinearity of 10 or more. Nor should readers assume most democratic dyads have both states with impersonal economies: While almost all nations with contract-intensive economies (as indicated with the binary measure for CIE) are democratic (Polity2 > 6) (Singapore is the only long-term exception), more than half—55%—of all democratic nation-years have contract-poor economies. At the dyadic level in this sample, this translates to 80% of democratic dyads (all dyads where DemocracyBinary6 = 1) that have at least one state with a contract-poor economy. In other words, not only does Model 2 show no evidence of causation from democracy to peace (as reported in Mousseau 2009), but it also illustrates that this absence of democratic peace includes the vast majority—80%—of democratic dyad-years over the sample period. Nor is it likely that the causal arrow is reversed—with democracy being the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economy and peace. This is because correlations among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: Coefficients show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are kept constant at their mean levels. If it was democracy that caused both impersonal economy and peace, then there would be some variance in DemocracyL remaining, after its partial correlation with CIEL is excluded, that links it directly with peace. The positive direction of the coefficient for DemocracyL informs us that no such direct effect exists (Blalock 1979:473–474). Model 3 tests for the effect of DemocracyL if a control is added for mixed-polity dyads, as suggested by Russett (2010:201). As discussed above, to avoid problems of mathematical endogeneity, I adopt the solution used by Mousseau, Orsun and Ungerer (2013) and measure regime difference as proposed by Werner (2000), drawing on the subcomponents of the Polity2 regime measure. As can be seen, the coefficient for Political Distance (1.00) is positive and significant, corroborating that regime mixed dyads do indeed have more militarized conflict than others. Yet, the inclusion of this term has no effect on the results that concern us here: CIEL ()0.85) is now even more robust, and the coefficient for DemocracyL (0.03) is above zero.7 Model 4 replaces the continuous democracy measure with the standard binary one (Polity2 > 6), as suggested by Russett (2010:201), citing Bayer and Bernhard (2010). As can be observed, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.83) remains negative and highly significant, while DemocracyBinary6 (0.63) is in the positive (wrong) direction. As discussed above, analyses of fatal dispute onsets with the far stricter binary measure for democracy (Polity = 10), put forward by Dafoe (2011) in response to Mousseau (2009), yields perfect prediction (as does the prior binary measure Both States CIE), causing quasi-complete separation and inconclusive results. Therefore, Model 5 reports the results with DemocracyBinary10 in analyses of all militarized conflicts, not just fatal ones. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyBinary10 ()0.41), while negative, is not significant. Model 6 reports the results in analyses of fatal disputes with DemocracyL squared (after adding 10), which implies that the likelihood of conflict decreases more quickly toward the high values of DemocracyL. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyL 2 is at zero, further corroborating that even very high levels of democracy do not appear to cause peace in analyses of fatal disputes, once consideration is given to contractintensive economy. Models 3, 4, and 6, which include Political Distance, were repeated (but unreported to save space) with analyses of all militarized interstate disputes, with the democracy coefficients close to zero in every case. Therefore, the conclusions reached by Mousseau (2009) are corroborated even with the most stringent measures of democracy, consideration of institutional distance, and across all specifications: The democratic peace appears spurious, with contract-intensive economy being the more likely explanation for both democracy and the democratic peace.