Fund HumInt CP
Text: The USFG should substantially boost the HUMINT budget.
Solves the Aff – their only internal link to HUMINT is a resource tradeoff. We resolve that.
et al; Andrew R. Koch is the Senior Vice President for Defense and Homeland Security issues at Scribe. An expert on communications and the media, as well as market assessments for domestic and international defense clients, he leads Scribe’s practice in providing such services as development and implementation of strategic communications planning, media outreach support, as well as evaluation of defense companies and related government programs. Scribe is a Strategic Advising firm. Article Title: “Chronic HUMINT under funding blamed for security failures” - Jane’s Defence Weekly - vol. 36, no. 12, 37153, p. 4
In the aftermath of the carnage in New York and Washington DC (September 11, 2001) hundreds of questions will be asked as to how such an audacious and co-ordinated attack could have happened. This latest act of terrorism, although the most horrific to date, is not the first time that the US Government has been caught unaware. Indeed the subject of 'asymmetric warfare' - the use of terrorist methods to strike at weaknesses in the societies of western countries - has been a worry of strategic planners in the US for most of the 1990's. One possible contributing factor to this failure of the intelligence and security system could be the lack of resources the US has devoted to human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities throughout the past decade. While national technical means continued to receive high levels of funding for surveillance satellites, signals intelligence flights and other eavesdropping technologies, human-based intelligence capabilities have withered. Areas such as analysis, linguistic skills, cultivation of agent networks, and 'tradecraft' were all of paramount importance during the Cold War, particularly before the advent of space-based intelligence assets, but have suffered a lack of resources of late. This shortfall has been exacerbated by the growing demand that increased technical intelligence has placed on people who must process the vast amounts of resulting data and prioritise it. The US intelligence community must work to close the gap between the amount of raw intelligence it can gather and the quantity it can process, analyse, and disseminate.
( ) Counter-bias – their epistemology’s more flawed. Excess fear of surveillance means Aff scholarship’s MORE of an exaggeration than ours.
(Shannon McDonough – Instructor in Social Sciences at Allen University. The author holds a B.A. in Sociology from Miami University, Ohio and an M.A. Sociology from The University of South Carolina. This article is co-authored by Mathieu Deflem – a Professor at the University of South Carolina in the Department of Sociology. His research areas include law, policing, terrorism, popular culture, and sociological theory. “The Fear of Counterterrorism: Surveillance and Civil Liberties Since 9/11” – From the Journal: Society - February 2015, Volume 52, Issue 1, pp 70-79 – obtained via the Springer database collection).
Civil liberties organizations as well as a number of academic scholars have routinely criticized post-9/11 counterterrorism initiatives as unconstitutional and major threats to civil liberties and privacy. Harmonizing with the claims from civil liberties groups are contributions in the popular and scholarly discourse on surveillance and counterterrorism that lament the purported negative impact of governmental policies and related surveillance and intelligence activities on personal rights and liberties. The revelations by former security contractor Edward Snowden in June 2013 concerning alleged spying practices by the National Security Agency (NSA) greatly reinvigorated these debates. We investigate here if there is any counter-evidence to the alarmist statements that are often made in the popular and scholarly discourse on civil liberties and surveillance. Against the background of academic scholarship on surveillance and criticisms from civil liberty and privacy groups, we rely on archival sources, government documents, and media reports to examine a variety of claims made concerning civil liberties violations by security agencies. Our analysis reveals that at least a sizeable number of claims raised against counterterrorism practices are without objective foundation in terms of any actual violations. As an explanation for this marked discrepancy, we suggest that, as various survey data show, there is a relatively distinct, albeit it uneven and not entirely stable, culture of privacy and civil liberties in contemporary American society which independently contributes to a fear of counterterrorism, rather than of terrorism. These specific cultural sensitivities bring about an increase in the amount of civil rights allegations independent of actual violations thereof.
( ) Rights can’t be absolute – as they sometimes conflict with other “rights”. If some rights were absolute, privacy wouldn’t be one of them.
Kenneth - Associate Professor of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University. The author holds JD and PhD and was formerly a Lecturer at the University of Washington in Department of Philosophy, the Information School, and the Law School. “Privacy vs. Security: Why Privacy is Not an Absolute Value or Right”. San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 859, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=994458
It is perhaps worth noting that absolutist conceptions are not limited to privacy rights. Some people take the position that the moral right to life is absolute; on an absolutist conception of the right to life, it is never justified to take the life of a person—and this rules out not only the death penalty, but the use of deadly force in defense of the lives of innocent others from a culpable attack. Many people take an absolutist view with respect to something they call a “right to information,” holding that there should be no restrictions of any kind, including legal protection of intellectual property rights, on the free flow of information. As this view has most famously, and idiosyncratically, been put by John Perry Barlow, “information wants to be free.”5 When it comes to rights, absolutist talk among theorists, lawyers, and ordinary folk is not at all uncommon these days. Indeed, some people seem to think that rights are, by nature, absolute and hence that it is a conceptual truth that all rights are absolute. Consider the following quote from Patrick Murphy, a Democrat who ran for Congress in 2006: I am also very concerned about the erosion of constitutional rights and civil liberties over the past few years. I taught Constitutional Law at West Point, and it makes me so angry to see our elected leaders in Washington—specifically the White House and the Republican leadership in Congress—pushing policies that erode the foundation of this country. The equal protection clause of the constitution is absolute. The right to privacy is absolute. The right to assemble is absolute. Yet time and time again, the administration has supported, and the Congressional leadership has supported nominees and policies that do not follow the constitution. With my background, I can add to this debate. And I’m not afraid to take a stand for what’s right.6 As Murphy explains it, every right in the Constitution is absolute and hence utterly without exception. As there is nothing in the Constitution or any legal instrument or norm that suggests or entails that constitutional rights are absolute, it is reasonable to think that Murphy believes, as many people do, that it is part of the very meaning of having a right that it can never justifiably be infringed. This is why debates about political issues are frequently framed in terms of whether there is some right that protects the relevant interests; rights provide the strongest level of moral or legal protection of the relevant interests. It is certainly true that rights provide a higher level of protection than any other considerations that are morally relevant, but it is not because rights are, by nature, absolute. Rights provide robust protection of the relevant interests because it is a conceptual truth that the infringement of any right cannot be justified by an appeal of the desirable consequences of doing so. No matter how many people it might make happy, it would be wrong to intentionally kill an innocent person because her right to life takes precedence over the interests of other people in their own happiness. As Ronald Dworkin famously puts this conceptual point, rights trump consequences.7 But this conceptual truth about rights does not imply rights are, by nature, absolute. The claim that rights trump consequences implies only that some stronger consideration than the desirable consequences of infringing a right can justify doing so. This latter claim leaves open the possibility that there is some such consideration that would justify infringing some rights. One such candidate, of course, is the existence of other more important rights. It is commonly thought that at least some rights are commensurable and can be ranked in a hierarchy that expresses the relative weight each right in the hierarchy has with respect to other rights. For example, one might think that the right to life is at the top of the hierarchy of commensurable rights, and that property rights are in this hierarchy also. This would explain the common intuition that one may use deadly force when necessary to defend innocent lives from culpable attack, but not when necessary only to defend property rights from violation. If, as seems clear from this example, it is possible for two rights to conflict and for one to outweigh the other, it follows that rights are not, by nature, absolute. What may explain the mistaken view that rights are necessarily absolute is confusion about the relationship of various terms that flesh out the status, origin, and contours of moral rights and obligations. For example, rights are frequently described as “inviolable,” meaning that a right can never be justifiably violated. This, of course, is a conceptual truth; to say that a right is violated is to say that its infringement is without justification. But this does not imply that rights can never be justifiably infringed; a person’s right to life can be justifiably infringed if he (they) culpably shoots at an innocent person and there is no other way to save that person’s life except through use of lethal force in defense of his life. Rights are also thought, by nature, to be supreme, relative to some system of norms—moral, social, or legal—in the sense that they cannot be defeated by other kinds of protections; moral rights are thought to be supreme over all other kinds of considerations, including social and legal rights. But this does not imply that rights are absolute because it says nothing about the relative importance of one right to another; it simply asserts that, by nature, rights outweigh all other relevant considerations. Supremacy and inviolability are part of the very nature of a right, but these properties do not entail that rights are, by nature, absolute. Of course, the negation of the claim that all rights are absolute does not imply that no rights are absolute. The possibility of conflicts between any two rights does not preclude there being one right that wins every conflict because it is absolute, and hence, without exception. A moral pacifist, for example, takes this view of the moral right to life and holds that intentional killing of a human being is always wrong. Moreover, if there are two rights that do not come into conflict with each other and win in conflicts with all other rights, those two rights might be absolute. One might think, for example, that the rights to privacy and life can never conflict and that both are absolute. I am somewhat skeptical that any right is absolute in this strong sense, but if there are any, it will not be privacy. As we will see in more detail, privacy is commensurable with other rights, like the right to life, which figures into the right to security. It seems clear that privacy rights and the right to life can come into conflict. For example, a psychologist might be justified in protecting a patient’s privacy interests even though doing so includes information that might prevent that person from committing a minor property crime of some kind, but she would not be justified in protecting that information if the psychologist knows its disclosure is necessary to prevent a murder. In any event, I will discuss these kinds of examples in more detail below.
( ) Assessing Utilitarian consequences are good. Putting ethics in a vacuum is morally irresponsible.
(Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)
Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness, it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
( ) Alt cause – corporate privacy infringements are far worse and the public readily accepts it.
James Andrew Lewis is a senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., where he writes on technology, security, and the international economy. Before joining CSIS, he worked at the US Departments of State and Commerce as a Foreign Service officer and as a member of the Senior Executive Service. His diplomatic experience included negotiations on military basing in Asia, the Cambodia peace process, and the five-power talks on arms transfer restraint. Lewis received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. “Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate” - CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES - STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM – December - http://csis.org/publication/underestimating-risk-surveillance-debate
Some of the unhappiness created by the Edward Snowden leaks reflects the unspoken recognition that online privacy has changed irrevocably. The precipitous decline in privacy since the Internet was commercialized is the elephant in the room we ignore in the surveillance debate. America’s privacy laws are both limited in scope and out of date. Although a majority of Americans believe privacy laws are inadequate, the surveillance debate has not led to a useful discussion of privacy in the context of changed technologies and consumer preferences. Technology is more intrusive as companies pursue revenue growth by harvesting user data. Tracking online behavior is a preferred business model. On average, there are 16 hidden tracking programs on every website. The growing market for “big data” to predict consumer behavior and target advertising will further change privacy. Judging by their behavior, Internet users are willing to exchange private data for online services. A survey in a major European country found a majority of Internet users disapproved of Google out of privacy concerns, but more than 80 percent used Google as their search engine. The disconnect between consumer statements and behavior reduces the chances of legislating better protections.
( ) No Privacy violation – safeguards from FISC check abuse
(et al; JOYCE R. BRANDA, Acting Assistant Attorney General, BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEES - Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama – before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. “Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in this context - is legal reference to the Reporters Committee – October 2nd - https://www.eff.org/document/governments-smith-answering-brief)
Plaintiff provides no plausible explanation for how the program could cause that distress. She does not contend that there is any reasonable likelihood that government personnel would actually review metadata about her calls that the government may have acquired under the Section 215 program. That likelihood is particularly remote if “[n]one of her communications relate to international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” Pl Br. 4. Again, information in the Section 215 database is subject to substantial protections and limits on access imposed by orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Those orders do not permit indiscriminate access to or review of the metadata; instead, there must be an advance judicial finding (or, in cases of emergency, an advance finding by government officials and judicial approval after the fact) that a given selector is suspected of association with terrorism, and only the small fraction of metadata responsive to queries using such suspected-terrorist selectors—that is, within two steps of the judicially approved selector—may be reviewed.