(A reading order suggestion: if interested in the present day possible action read first I/d and P a r t II; P a r t I is an historical sketch of the Balkans core disarmament idea.)
I n t r o d u c t i o n
P a r t I
I/a - The naive, purely diplomatic approach
I/b - Simultaneous diplomatic + military actions ("Disarmament storm")
I/c - The dissemination of the disarmament idea
I/d - Juxtaposition with the official diplomacy
P a r t II
R e f e r e n c e s
(Poljicka 12/D-419, HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia)
I n t r o d u c t i o n
This is not a story about the war in the Balkans in the nineties. It is a story of failed attempts at (and prospects for?) the Balkans disarmament.
The circle of my thinking about Balkans demilitarisation has been closed. The concomitant price paid by peoples hereabouts in blood and sorrow was (is) enormous. In point of fact I still have my doubts as to whether lasting peace could be achieved in the Balkans without a full-fledged demilitarisation (encompassing, of course, the disarmament). At the same time I am fully aware of the might within the military - government - industry - armsdealing complex.
This paper is not written in the usual academic style. Only the most pertinent references will be quoted. There are two parts.
In the first one the failed attempt to get any response whatsoever to the author's suggestions is described. Although for brevity the full texts will not be reproduced, it is hoped that the excerpts will give the reader the proper picture of the entirety.
The other, Part II, will deal with the present, changed circumstances, which may be summarised as follows:
1. The International Community (IC), whatever it meant, did eventually step in militarily and with the pressure-diplomacy into this quicksand "territory".
2. It (IC) has been checking/applying effective methods of political "command" ("carrot-and-stick"), and military supervision to keep some kind of peace.
3. A few stretches of "no-man's land" are now already in existence, and humble as they are they are also some kind of precedent.
I therefore propose again that, now with these new developments in mind, the diplomacy could launch a completely different phase by exploring the so far neglected grounds for negotiating a demilitarised Balkans-core-zone (as distinct from "stretches of land").
The individual initiative of the author will be thus juxtaposed to the official disarmament moves (see I/d and Part II).
P a r t I
The readers who would like to learn about the details of the prologue to the war(s) are advised to consult the nowadays-abundant history books on the subject. Suffice here to say that the end of 1990 and especially the beginning of 1991 have witnessed serious skirmishes between the military power of former Yugoslavia (+ the "subsidised" paramilitaries) and the poorly armed or unarmed units of local population in Slovenia and Croatia. The war proper seemed equally imminent to those who either believed it was inevitable or wished for it, and to those who thought there are still ways to escape the bloody conflict. Among the latter was the present author, supported somewhat at the beginning by a few friends, but later acting in "his individual capacity".
The idea seemed simple and straightforward: to pull the carpet underneath the first group, "the warriors", by inducing a stepwise process of complete disarmament in the Balkans. This basic approach was, of course, against the mainstream political and military reasoning (but see later!), or, some would prefer it - it was against common sense. However, what indeed is a common sense in a new situation? Here is briefly how the "soloist" idea developed.
I/a - The naive, purely diplomatic approach
(The full texts A-E can be obtained from the author upon request.)
A - "A few ideas how to stop the conflict, to avoid civil war and turn the tide in Yugoslavia - from disaster towards prosperity"
This was meant in mid-1991 to be a more realistic, stepwise and so to say a milder version derived with the colleagues from the Democratic Opposition Forum (DOF) from the basic approach by S.M. (see next, B).
B - "Thesis for a Balkans demilitarised zone"
(Written by S.M., as member of the DOF, but "in purely personal capacity".) Documents A and B did mention international involvement without describing the operational modes, with document B stressing the final aim of creating an internationally initiated and guaranteed disarmed zone in the Balkans.
C - "Costa Rica in the Balkans?"
Was written (by S.M.) in March 1992, before the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with the feeling of its imminence, and stressing the necessity of an immediate international involvement in a two-phase diplomatic process for disarmament. Alas, most of the negative predictions proved to be correct as the war gained momentum while the western diplomacy did not learn much from every previous failure.
In March 1992 the BBC World Programme had an open telephone line on Sundays for one hour to put questions to the presidents of the new Easteuropean states. I suggested that some of the presidents could be asked the following questions:
Would you back up the initiation of a Balkans demilitarised zone by your country's a supportive treaty?
(2)Would you suggest the states that should i n i t i a t e a Balkans demilitarised (core) zone?
(3)Are you familiar with Costa Rica's unilateral demilitarisation since 1949?
I suggested these questions because some of the countries involved are directly part of the "hot" Balkans notwithstanding how much they have set foot in Europe.
If the reader has already judged it were a utopia let us refer again to question 3. Namely, Costa Rica is a country which decided unilaterally in 1949 to dissolve her military completely. For the past few years the political science literature contains occasionally treaties as to how long will Costa Rica "bear the burden" of living without an army, and "taking care" that the army be installed again.
For 45 years people in former SFR Yugoslavia have been building and upkeeping an army which has eventually become second by strength in Europe (- an outstanding "compliment" to have been heard at a session of one commission of the U.S. Congress!). And afterwards - an aggression by that very army has taken place within the borders it was supposed to defend only from outside aggression. Imagine a future of the peoples/states in Southeastern Europe for the next 45 years, like in Costa Rica - without an army whatsoever, but with the minimal police force?
The former JNA was compressed (in 1992) to half the size of "its" former territory becoming thus even more explosive. Before it "hatched" God knows what shades of legions with suicidal and criminal logic it seemed necessary to bring into international diplomacy a new approach - the demilitarisation of the Balkans. There appeared to be two interconnected aspects in the internationalisation of this disarmament process.
Firstly, the European or world powers must "invest" their might in a joint venture way within all the talks and in spite (?) of their differences. But above all and beforehand the de facto former JNA has to be given that status de iure, i.e. to become an army without its state, so that one can get started at making states without armies.
Should the alliance Serbia - Montenegro come into being as the legal successor of the SFRJ, the mentioned "JNA" will be compressed even more to the effect that a "Balkans atomic bomb" will replace the "Balkans gunpowder barrel". So much about this aspect of the argument in favour of engaging the international powers. Another aspect of the internationalisation was the "danger" along the borders of the new independent states (soon to be internationally recognised, too). My guessing was optimistic in exploring country by country the evidence in favour of a "cordon sanitaire" around the Balkans demilitarised core-zone.
It appeared to me possible to draw the following conclusion: irrespective of what kind of the "middle in the Balkans sandwich" there will be, Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Hungary, probably Rumania, too, and Bulgaria, Greece and Albania might do a great service to this cause by signing a mutual, collective treaty (or a declaration). It would contain guarantees to keep their borders as they were with former SFRJ, to refrain from use of force in whatever territorial disputes there may be with the new Balkans states, but all this under one condition - only if a firm demilitarised core-zone be formed by the new states. Such a conditional guarantee would be an important impetus at the very beginning of the Balkans demilitarisation without in fact any risk on the part of the signatories.
I then went on to describe two possible solutions. Regrettably, both comprised the "Balkans atomic bomb" though, with different time setting of the fuse.
The first alternative was seen as worse (and soon proven as such by the subsequent events): the former JNA stays in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The requests for international pressure towards the demilitarisation process would be of diminished chance for success. Under such conditions one could not expect, of course, that Croatia would be willing to join the action for demilitarisation. Neither would Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The other alternative I thought would be to delegitimize internationally the former SFRJ as soon as possible. That would mean de iure, too, that an army without its state has occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the fuse might still get off. However, if the legal consequence (o tempora, o mores, where has the law got lost!) of the SFRJ delegitimization ought to be for the army to pull out of Bosnia and Herzegovina the fence towards the demilitarization might be expected to be open. The entrance along that road would be clearly seen once Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia sign a treaty about their disarmament, but under the condition that Serbia and Montenegro will sign the treaty too. It goes without saying that such a treaty cannot become reality without international supervision.
I had thus come to the definition of a two-phase legal international process as a new approach to be applied in all the negotiations thence under way, or in new ones. Both phases should run simultaneously almost to a full synchronisation: first the encircling neighbours, then the Balkans core.
Oh, yes - but what about the potential of the former JNA? Well, if it will be defused on time, the question is one to be answered within the realm of commerce and social welfare. After all, the experiences of how to do it for the peoples' benefit have recently been accumulating in the developed world. Hence, long live Costa Rica!
I/b - Simultaneous diplomatic + military actions ("Disarmament storm")
D - "Costa Rica in the Balkans? - Second time, albeit too late! (Disarmament storm)"
was written on 22d September 1992 in consequence of the disastrous war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. No purely diplomatic action was thought appropriate any more. A NATO and USA air strike ("Disarmament storm") should precede diplomatic moves (ultimatum?) for complete disarmament, with simultaneous international court processing of the war criminals. Here is part of that text:
"This is not an appeal. This is a suggestion combining in a paradoxical way a six months old proposal for a peaceful two-phase diplomatic initiative with an immediate military action. The results of the past six months (apart from large-scale humanitarian aid but with concomitant aggravation of the aggression) seem to be appropriately summarised in (i) one statement and in (ii) one act of great personal integrity:
Radovan Karadzic, whom this time one can trust as he is both a psychiatrist and one of the "architects" of the murderous drama now taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, said awhile ago: "Carrington would have been very successful with normal people, but, unfortunately, we are not normal people."
A high-ranking State Department official from the "Yugoslav Section" has recently quitted his job because he regarded the U.S. policy towards "Yugoslavia" inadequate. In point of fact he suggested a storming military action to bring to a standstill the heavy weaponry which nowadays is still being used so indiscriminately in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
An army without its state has been mainly compressed to the territory of an internationally recognised state. Moreover, it has rapidly been transforming into a number of local forces under personal commands of who knows whom. There is no legitimacy in its actions, which therefore are just another aggression. Hence my proposal:
1. NATO and USA deploy a military ("storming") action on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of an immediate elimination of any bombardment, be it land to land, land to air or v.v., and air to air.
2. Concurrently, UN or EC (or both) offer to the legitimate governments involved a fair solution: a) signing of a disarmament treaty (along Costa Rica's unilateral precedent of 1949!) by Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia (and Macedonia) backed by an international declaration guaranteeing the existing borders with the surrounding states and providing for an efficient UN military force to supervise the disarmament. b) initiating the international court procedure to bring to the justice those responsible for the present war in the Balkans and/or for the committed atrocities and the deeds against humankind with publication of the first list of the accused according to the data of the international human rights associations."
E - "An ultimatum may not necessarily be an utopia"
was written (in Croatian) on November the 17th, 1992 in an attempt to show that classical diplomacy cannot escape the already obvious deadlock unless it moves outside its framework by combining military action (air strikes) with a simultaneous ultimatum dictating complete disarmament of all the warring parties involved (after the heavy weaponry had been brought to a standstill).
I/c - The dissemination of the disarmament idea
The documents (A to E), or their summaries were being mailed as letters, or faxed at a time the email was not so widespread as it is nowadays. Here is a summary of those attempts only to show that the proposals were not addressed only to the local public. There were several types of addressees.
OFFICIALS OF STATES OR ORGANIZATIONS: General Kosters of the EC Monitoring Mission in Zagreb; two members of the thence Presidency of the SFRY, and (on the same day) the "Troika Mission" while visiting Belgrade (during July 1991); on 16th April, 1992 - the Austrian Embassy in Zagreb, for the thence foreign secretary Mr Alois Mock.
MEDIA EDITORS (from 31st October 1991 till 31st March 1993): The TIME Office in Bonn, THE WORLD TODAY/London, LA NACION/San Jose - Costa Rica, the IT'S YOUR WORLD/BBC-London, THE INDEPENDENT/London.
The direct impetus to write to THE INDEPENDENT was the statement by Sir Karl Popper published in that newspaper on 18th March (1993). I said in my letter that I agree (but what does it matter?) with every word of Sir Karl, who wrote: "An ultimatum must be issued that the fighting has to stop at once, otherwise our air force will destroy any military installations: tanks, aeroplanes, airfields...and since this is now a war of aggression of state against state, we are committed under the existing treaties to interfere."
On the other hand, irrespective of whether there will be a military intervention, to which I would add full disarmament, or a new phase of continuing peace talks, my contention was that the demilitarised core-Balkans is nevertheless a worthy idea to explore. I took the liberty of adding to that letter to the INDEPENDENT also my last formulation of the disarmament idea of half a year ago.
At about that time (or somewhat later) there was also an interview on the BBC with Sir Karl, from which is this extract:
"BBC - Yugoslavia,… did not learn anything from democracy and yet they are killing each other.
Popper - It is sad. We should act very carefully: not put our troupes where one does not know who is a friend and who is an enemy. But we should exert as much pressure as we can on aggressive states to reverse their attitude ... and if promises are not kept we should begin bombing, first purely military installations of the aggressive power... "
PUBLIC FIGURES (from early September till the end of December, 1992): Mr. Gyoergey Konrad, President of the International PEN Club, Mr. Rodrigo Carraza, jun. through the UN University for peace in Escazu/Costa Rica, and Mr. George Kenney, formerly of the U.S. State Department.
Here are a few lines from my letter to Mr. George Kenney: "1. Out of deep conviction based on my life here I cannot expect a lasting peace in the Balkans as long as its core remains heavily armed. 2. True enough, my proposal meant and it still means (like yours!) breaking the fossilised diplomatic paradigm in use so far. 3. The complete disarmament may be used as a 'face saving device' for all parties concerned: the Serbian aggressor can say theirs is the victory because 'they disarmed' the others, whereas the victim(s) can say the aggressor has definitely been defeated. 4. I do suppose that the international community is not interested in creating a (new?) 'Mini cold war' area with a precarious balance of (small?) powers."
NGO's (from end of May 1992 till the beginning of November 1992): The War Resisters International/London-UK, Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights in Zagreb-Croatia, and the international "Citizens' and Municipal Peace Conference, held in Ohrid (Macedonia)".
PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPERS: Zagreb daily VJESNIK (16th September 1991), Zagreb weekly DANAS (4th April 1992), and, a few weeks later the Belgrade weekly VREME, and on 20th November 1992 the Croatian daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA.
Now, there was no response whatsoever to any of the mailings listed above, but also none to several ones mailed in the later years. What could be the reason for such an adamantly persistent behaviour of so varied kinds of addressees? Well, maybe all of them considered the texts just plain crazy. (For attaining one's own judgement the reader may request the full texts from the author.) However, the actual substance of the texts cannot be regarded as absolutely out of the thence-existing diplomatic concepts. Though, true enough, it did require a "change of the (fossilised) diplomatic paradigm".
At this point I find it irresistible to quote a reply of Sir Karl Popper in the mentioned interview: "BBC: Do you believe in evil?…Popper: No (a smile is discernible from the colour of his voice). But I do believe in stupidity."
I/d - Juxtaposition with the official diplomacy
The bizarre fact is that I (and my guess is the local public at large as well) was not aware at all of the "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)" . The UN involvement, a very sluggish one at that, was only too well known. Sweetman presented this part of the story .
For the present purpose we shall focus on the European scene. The CFE Treaty ("Peace of Paris") was signed in November 1990 by 21 nations, of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact member states. The neutral or non-aligned states (like ex-Yugoslavia) were not among the signatory states (nor have they taken part in the preparatory negotiations).
The First Review Conference of CFE was held in May 1996. The period covered exactly the war(s) on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. Within that period the treaty nations collectively reduced more than 50,000 conventional weapons--tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, fighters, and helicopters. Hundreds, if not thousands, of on-site inspectors monitored these reductions in accordance with the protocols of the treaty. Inspection standards were established and sustained across national borders. A rule of law was replacing the rule of force. The new rule of "law", as detailed in the CFE Treaty, was being enforced.
In Chapter 8 of "THE CFE TREATY: A DURABLE STRUCTURE FOR POST-COLD WAR EUROPE"  it is said that when the CFE Treaty was negotiated and signed in 1990, no one had anticipated the form or the extent of these joint East-West treaty implementation activities. Further, by the end of the reduction period in November 1995, the CFE Treaty was viewed widely across Europe as a valuable, legally binding agreement for reducing military armaments and for enhancing openness of military forces across national borders. Though, it was unknown to the general public in the new succession-states after the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia.
Well, then, the idea (of mine) about creation of a disarmed zone in the Balkans does not look so strange after all. In point of fact considering the whole manpower engaged in the CFE, the final aim of having a Balkans disarmed zone would not appear to be completely unfeasible.
However, this CFE large-scale diplomatic track ("from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains"!) did not take notice of the actual developments in the Balkans.
Quite independently of CFE one example stands out in a positive light. It is the initiative of the thence Austrian Foreign Minister Dr. Alois Mock. According to the "repackaged" news from the Austrian "Standard", a Zagreb daily - "Vecernji list" informed on 18/19/20 April 1992 (the Easter issue) in a commentary by Maroje Mihovilovic: "While the war on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia is still on, and there is no abatement of the Serbian aggression, it is not quite easy to talk about disarmament as a realistic option for the future. However the idea of the Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock of convening a disarmament conference on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia is certainly interesting, but it will not bear fruit immediately by calming down the conflicts here, though it could be expected to do so in the future." Unfortunately it was not mentioned in the local press anymore and my guess is that the Mock's initiative had no follow-up.
P a r t II
Still one year before the successful completion of the military actions by the Croatian army to regain all the territories of the state, I felt the context for discussing possible disarmament in the Balkans has begun to change considerably. Here is part of the letter I had the opportunity to hand over myself to the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, on 26th of August 1994:
"If, then, a lasting peace in the Balkans is desirable (for Europe, at least?) the approach towards creation of a demilitarised Balkans zone requires breaking the well-established paradigm of the diplomatic-military-armsdealing-humanitarian 'classical approach'. Could it be done by using money, one way or another? The proposal to buy out the arms (of the former JNA) through the EC, put at the negotiating table by the Croatian representative(s) at the YU-succession talks in Brussels last year were, in fact, instigated by western diplomats in order to see the reaction of the other delegations. Maybe it could be reconsidered now in the light of the presently existing warring parties, to be put on a firmer and more official footing. However, this means financial involvement solely on the part of the (European) governments. Perhaps a 'help' could be sought for from professional arms dealers. They must, of course, satisfy their own interests through re-selling the arms they buy, which means deaths at other places on this planet. On the other hand one demilitarised zone established even at such an expense may repay our civilisation 'in the long run'."
While the developments of CFE were still locally out of sight of the public eye, on November 17 1995 the equipment reductions were completed under the CFE Treaty and its limits took full effect. This is also a point in time (November 21 1995) when news about CFE  mention the DAYTON ACCORDS: "During a meeting in Dayton, Ohio, under the leadership of the United States, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is initiated by the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Croatia, and of Yugoslavia. Annexes 1-A and 1-B of the agreement provide for settlement of military and regional stabilisation issues. Annex 1-B obliges all parties to begin negotiations within 30 days to agree on numerical limits, along the lines of the CFE Treaty, on holdings of tanks, artillery, ACVs, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters."
Furthermore, on June 14 1996 the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Srpska sign(ed) the "Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control," limiting each state-party's holdings in the five CFE weapons classes (tanks, ACVs, artillery, combat aircraft, and helicopters) and establishing a two-phase, 16-month reduction period. The parties agree to annual data exchanges regarding holdings and to accept inspections to ensure compliance with the treaty.
Hence, are we now on the road I suggested b e f o r e the disastrous war(s)? The question mark is there because I am not aware to what extent CFE as such encompasses Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia (FR Yugoslavia is to be dealt with here at the end). Perhaps not at all, because these countries are not yet within the "Partnership for Peace". CFE is now under the auspices by OSCE (The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe - a name gotten on 5/6 December 1994 from the predecessor, Conference on Security and Cupertino in Europe, CSCE), and OSCE's personnel are present in the above mentioned states with wide access to the local media. However, my impression is that the citizens hereabouts still have little awareness about CFE (unless consulting the OSCE Web-page.)
On February 27, 1999 Alexander Lofthouse, a D(isarmament) F(or) D(emocracy) Correspondent from Washington, DC argued in his Report  that a major opportunity to enhance security in Europe is being squandered as the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the former Warsaw Pact focus on NATO expansion, while overlooking the option of major conventional force reductions through the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).
The Report, by the "Year 2000 Campaign to Redirect World Military Spending to Human Development"  is called "Contracting While Expanding":
"Can Dramatic Mutual Force Reductions under the CFE Negotiations be part of NATO Expansion? It assesses the negotiations to adapt the 1990 CFE Treaty, and proposes 50 percent across-the-board cuts in all categories of weapons and personnel covered by the Treaty. A reduction of this magnitude would eliminate well over 2.1 million troops and about 63,000 pieces of heavy weaponry, and could save the United States as much as $28 billion over ten years."
The report makes the case that deep cuts in force levels would be a sound investment in the restoration of co-operative relations with Russia, and could help defuse the dangerous arms race that is developing in Eastern Europe as a result of NATO expansion.
According to Alexander Lofthouse, the primary researcher for the report, CFE adaptation talks provide an unprecedented opportunity to bring Europe into the post-Cold War era. "The time seems ideal for major reductions in conventional forces deployed in Europe...In an era when most states are actively seeking to cut costs, it makes little sense to continue to deploy millions of personnel and spend billions of dollars preparing for a war that nobody expects to fight."
The last event about CFE was the OSCE Istanbul Summit 1999, on 17 to 19 November 1999, with its "Final Act of the Conference of the States parties to The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe". Among the 30 nations which participated the following could be more or less directly involved in establishing "lasting peace in the Balkans": Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Turkey. The most directly concerned ones, Albania, Macedonia, FR Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia were not participants at this meeting. Some of them are close to getting soon under the umbrella of NATO. Is there any hope for Lofthouse's idea to take ground in the ensuing near future? To quote a passage from the Istanbul Final Act: "Have noted with appreciation that in the course of the adaptation negotiations several States Parties have committed themselves to reducing their permitted levels of armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, thus reflecting the fundamental changes in the European security environment since the signing of the Treaty in November1990."
Let me say, for good measure, that there are also less optimistic voices concerned with the complications about CFE. However, there is a very balanced source one ought to take into account .
The book was produced by the Commission - Leo Tindemans, Chairman, Lloyd Cutler, Bronislaw Geremek, John Roper, Theo Sommer, Simone Veil, David Anderson -under the auspices of the "Aspen Institute Berlin" and the "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace". I took the liberty of borrowing that book's title for this discourse because it is so telling for my standpoint. Here are only a few samples of opinions from the book related to my arguments.
"In late 1995, the Western Alliance finally refused to tolerate the war in Bosnia any longer. The Commission hopes that this collective refusal can help to establish, as a more general principle of transatlantic policy, that war in Europe remains intolerable. But the principle cannot be taken for granted. There is a significant risk that within a year of the publication of this Report, here could be another war in the Balkans." (S.M.: See below about the NATO air strikes against FR Yugoslavia)
"Yet it is also true that ethnic relations, democracy, and Balkan co-operation will all be at risk unless and until a framework for peace and military security can be established. (S.M.: My proposal still is to create a disarmed Balkans zone.) Such a framework would require two dimensions: an intra-regional dimension of arms control, confidence-building, and collective security measures; but also - and probably more critically in the medium term - the extra-regional dimension of a continuing and coherent military engagement by NATO. (S.M.: On one hand my early proposal of a two-step diplomatic treaty establishing a 'cordon sanitaire' is fully congruent with this; on the other hand, this is directly related also to the Lofthouse's report on "Contracting while Expanding" .) The need is not so much for the collective defence guarantees that Visegrad countries and Baltic states seek from NATO, but for mechanisms of intra-regional stabilisation that could develop into a sub-regional collective security structure."
"Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement. . .commits Serbia and Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two constituent entities to "devising new forms of co-operation in the field of security aimed at building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the Parties' respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region."
"The Dayton Annex 1-B then set out three sets of measures: (1) for confidence- and security-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina; (2) for sub-regional arms control covering all three republics (S.M.: i.e. + FRYU, which on p.165 is referred to as "Serbia"); and (3) for the longer-term objective of a regional arms-control agreement involving the area in and around (S.M.: i.e. cordon sanitaire) former Yugoslavia." All the three sets of measures are to be taken up under the auspices of OSCE, whose forum on Security Co-operation now has a general responsibility for these matters throughout Europe.
I believe one may conclude there are nowadays in (or for) Europe parallel diplomatic actions surmising the disarmament in the Balkans. More precisely - disarmament on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. Several of my proposals appear to have been only premature or, more to the point - the international actions that have taken place in the meantime missed the right timing. The most recent case in point is the last-year (1999) air strikes against FR Yugoslavia by NATO. The positive outcome was withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Kosovo. However, it failed the expectation to bring about a democratic government in FR Yugoslavia. In that respect it was a good deal counterproductive. And the persistence of the present government (i.e. before the change in 2000) in FR Yugoslavia remains to be the stumbling block for diplomatic actions involving disarmament in this hot zone of Europe. A truly democratic change is necessary to occur in FR Yugoslavia. Considering my Document "D" and the outcome of the 1999 NATO action, the latter happens to be six and a half years "behind schedule" and missing the circumstances of 1992 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In spite of a favourable Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement, a disarmed zone of the Balkans appears to be more remote than in 1992 when the JNA was fully deploying its military power within the territory of an internationally recognised state - Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Are we faced with "too many a cook - a spoiled soup"? The "youngest cook" appeared in the kitchen as the Stability Pact for southeastern Europe, agreed in Cologne in June 1999. Its geography is quite precisely defined for the present context. According to the OSCE news from the Istanbul summit : ". . . On the defence side, work is progressing well on confidence-building measures, such as improved military to military contacts, as well as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, control of arms sales and reduction of small arms . . ."
One of its Working Tables is - Security, while the other two deal with Human Rights and Democracy, and Economic Reconstruction. The latter might well lead to financial sources (see above my suggestion to Mr. Klaus Kinkel) for the "stick-and-carrot" tactics in furthering the disarmament until its - completion.
In ref.  the Commission concludes with 57 principles. It seems very appropriate to conclude also this discourse of mine with one of those principles:
"#53 The Commission recommends the creation of a 'Balkan Association of Partnership for Peace', linked to NATO's wider structures, which could ensure - through a co-ordination office of NATO - that all members of NATO keep a continuing active interest in the security of the region." And leading to a disarmed Balkans zone - I would add, fully aware that "the devil is in the detail".
R e f e r e n c e s
 Derek Sweetman: "The Development of the International
Peacekeeping Regime and the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia".
Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 1.1 March 1998
 International Commission on the Balkans. UNFINISHED PEACE: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans. Foreword by Leo Tindemans. 1996, p. 224 ISBN 0-87003-118-X. The Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., U.S.A.; Plymbridge Distributors Ltd, Plimouth, U.K.
(First version finished 12th February 2000 and submitted to the ONLINE JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION; second version sent on 2nd March 2000., but not accepted for publication; this, final version with slight amendments was finished on 7 February 2001.)