A. consequentialism

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Mark Woods


Consequentialists claim that the morally relevant features of any action are the consequences of that action. When deliberating about what to do, consequentialists will tell us to maximize good consequences or attempt to achieve a balance of good consequences over bad consequences. Consequentialists must spell out what makes a consequence good or bad.

Utilitarianism is the most common consequentialist moral theory. Utilitarians spell out good and bad consequences in the following ways:

  1. In terms of pleasures and pains. Actions are right insofar as they produce pleasure over pain for all beings affected by such actions. The British philosopher Jeremy Bentham is famous for creating a theory of utilitarianism based on maximizing pleasures.

  2. In terms of happiness or unhappiness. Actions are right insofar as they produce happiness over unhappiness for all beings affected by such actions. The British philosopher John Stuart Mill is famous for creating a theory of utilitarianism based on maximizing happiness. Sometimes called the principle of utility, Mill says: “Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the opposite of happiness.”

  3. In terms of the satisfaction of preferences. Actions are right insofar as they satisfy preferences for all beings affected by such actions.

Bentham’s preference utilitarianism and Mill’s happiness utilitarianism collectively are called “hedonistic utilitarianism.” By spelling out the good consequences of actions in terms of pleasures, happiness, or the satisfaction of preferences, utilitarians claim that the only things that have intrinsic moral value in the world are pleasure, happiness, or the satisfaction of preferences. That is, the good of anything can be reduced to the amount of pleasure or happiness it brings, or in terms of the preferences it satisfies.
Utilitarians sometimes make a distinction between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarians must morally deliberate about each anticipated action and determine the right thing to do based on whether each action will maximize good consequences over bad consequences for all beings affected. It can be very time consuming to do this. Rule utilitarians claim that we can establish general rules that typically maximize good consequences over bad consequences for all beings affected. An example of this is a rule against stealing: because stealing usually maximizes bad consequences over good consequences for all beings affected, we can formulate a general rule against stealing. Of course, in some circumstances an act of stealing might maximize good consequences over bad consequences for all beings affected, so breaking the rule against stealing might be the morally right thing to do. In such a case, rule utilitarianism might collapse into act utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism appeals to many people. Even if you don’t consider yourself a utilitarian, you probably have used utilitarian moral reasoning at some points in your life. This reasoning is somewhat similar to economic cost-benefit analysis, which is another reason why utilitarianism appeals to many people. Many institutions and government bodies use utilitarian reasoning to establish policies and to make decisions.
Some common objections to utilitarianism are:

  1. It might require too much of us. Because most (if not all) of our actions can result in good or bad consequences (in terms of pleasure, happiness, or the satisfaction of preferences), utilitarians might have to morally deliberate about everything they do in life.

  2. It can be hard to measure utility in terms of pleasures, happiness, or the satisfaction of preferences. Can all consequence of your actions be reduced to pleasures, happiness, or the satisfaction of preferences?

  3. Consequences are difficult to predict. Utilitarians constantly must be making predictions about consequences to decide what to do.

  4. Specific relationships we have to each other might be ignored. Parents, for example, supposedly have special obligations to their own children. Utilitarians might have nothing to say about such obligations, except to say that good consequences should be maximized over bad consequences for all beings affected by a particular action. This might require parents to neglect their own children to benefit other children and more people.

  5. There are distribution problems involved in trying to maximize good consequences over bad consequences. Should we create a large aggregate amount of happiness for a small amount of people, or should we ensure that everyone––a large group of people––is moderately happy? That is, do we want a small number of people to be very happy, or do we want a large number of people to be moderately happy?

  6. Good ends supposedly might justify bad means. That is, it doesn’t matter what you do, as long as good consequences over bad consequences are maximized. This might justify killing one person to harvest her or his organs in order to provide organ transplants for five other people.

Utilitarians have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.

Deontologists claim that the morally relevant features of actions are the motives behind such actions and whether or not such actions correspond to norms, rules, laws, maxims, etc. ‘Deon’ means “binding or law-like,” and deontological moral theories spell out objective standards that obligate us to act in certain ways. When deliberating about what to do, deontologists tell us to do the right thing for the right reason. There are no generic deontological moral theories. There are five important types of deontological moral theories.
1. Divine Command Theory:
Divine command theorists tell us that deontological moral standards come from the will of God (or from gods). God commands us to perform certain types of actions, and such actions are morally right if they are done in accordance with God’s will. The Ten Commandments are a famous type of divine command theory: we follow these commandments because God told us to follow them.
How do we determine God’s will? Most divine command theorists rely upon divine scriptures or divine revelation.
Some common objections to divine command theory are:

  1. It might be hard to determine God’s will. Scriptures are open to interpretation, and it can be very difficult to establish that God spoke directly to you to tell you what to do.

  2. There are many different religions. The gods of these different religions might give different commands or have different wills. For example, the God of Christianity and Allah from Islam might have different wills.

  3. Many people are agnostic and doubt the existence of any one god. Many people are atheists and doubt the existence of any god. These kinds of people have trouble with divine command theories, and it’s difficult to see how a divine command theorist can talk to agnostics and atheists about the right thing to do.

  4. Divine command theories can appear arbitrary. Is something wrong simply because it goes against God’s will? If so, then God’s will seems to be arbitrary. Or does God command us not to do something because it really is wrong? If so, God’s commands might be unnecessary because we can establish that something is wrong independent of what God says.

Divine command theorists have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.
2. Kant’s Moral Theory:

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant tells us that deontological moral standards come from reason itself. The only thing in the world that has intrinsic moral value is a good will. A good will is autonomous, can recognize duty, and can act out of a sense of duty. It is necessary to act out of a sense of duty in order to make moral decisions. Reason tells you what your duty is.

According to reason, the central feature of moral actions is universalizability. That is, our actions must be universalizable so that everyone in relevantly similar circumstances can perform the same actions for the same reasons. Kant discusses universalizability in terms of what he calls the “categorical imperative.” To say that something is imperative is to say that it must be done––we are commanded to do it. To say that an imperative is categorical is to say that something must be done regardless of the consequences, the rule or maxim that it expresses admits of no exceptions, and the imperative is absolutely binding. Kant calls the categorical imperative a “moral law.”
There are several formulations of the categorical imperative. The first formulation is based on universalizability: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” A maxim is a principle of action. Here’s how to use Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative. Suppose you are trying to decide what to do––in this case you are trying to decide whether or not to cheat on an upcoming exam because you have not adequately studied for it. Your thought is: “I should cheat on this exam because I have not adequately studied for it.” Now turn this into a maxim: “I should cheat on exams whenever I have not adequately studied for them.” Now turn this maxim into a universal law that could apply to everyone: “Everyone should cheat on exams whenever they have not adequately studied for their exams.” Can we will that this should become a universal law? Kant would say no. Because you cannot will cheating as a universal law, you should not cheat on your upcoming exam. Think of the first formulation of the categorical imperative as an empty formula governed by universalizability. If you can plug actions as maxims into this formula without problems, such actions are the right things to do; if you can’t, they are the wrong things to do.
Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative is a bit less abstract: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.” This is sometimes called the respect for persons formulation of the categorical imperative, and it works in the following manner. The only thing that has intrinsic moral value for Kant is a good will. Good wills come attached to rational, autonomous persons. Thus, such persons are ends in themselves. As ends they must be respected and not used merely as means for someone else’s ends. Using the second formulation of the categorical imperative, slavery would be wrong because it treats persons only as means for someone else’s ends. In contrast, working for wages is not wrong as long as the wage worker agrees to work for a set amount of money; in this case the employer is using another person as a means, but because the wage worker has freely entered into this relationship and is being paid for her or his services, this person is not being treated “simply as a means.” Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative is very similar to a principle of respect for autonomy.
Some common objections to Kant’s moral theory are:

  1. It’s too abstract, especially the first formulation of the categorical imperative. Morality becomes nothing more than a bare form of universalizability. It can be very difficult to formulate possible actions as maxims to use this formulation.

  2. Consequences might morally matter. According to Kant, consequences do not morally matter. What matters only is whether an action is done from sense of duty and whether an action fits into the form of the categorical imperative. Kant claims that it’s never right to lie, because lying cannot be willed to be a universal law. If you were harboring Jewish people in your attic in Nazi-occupied Belgium during World War Two and the Gestapo came knocking on your door asking if any Jewish people were present, would it be right to lie? Kant seems to say no, under no circumstances.

  3. There can be a conflict of moral duties. According to Kant, we act out of a sense of duty by plugging actions into the formulations of the categorical imperative. As an emergency room physician, you might have both a duty to attend a very important staff meeting and a duty to treat an emergency room patient. Both duties can be willed to be a universal law, but you can’t fulfill both duties at once. What should you do?

  4. It doesn’t seem to cover non-rational and/or non-autonomous people. Recall that only rational and autonomous people have intrinsic moral value. Are fetuses rational and autonomous? Are comatose people rational and autonomous? It might be difficult to use Kant’s theory to discuss issues such as abortion and forms of non-voluntary euthanasia.

Kantians have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.
3. Natural Law Theory:

Natural law theorists tell us that deontological moral standards come from natural laws. We all know what natural physical laws are, such as the law of gravity. Natural physical laws set limits on what is physically possible. In a similar manner, natural law theorists believe that there are natural moral laws that are a part of nature and that set limits on what we should and should not do. That is, natural moral laws are objective truths discovered in the nature of things by reason and reflection. The obvious difference between natural physical laws and natural moral laws is that the former cannot be violated, whereas the latter can.

The Roman Catholic Church follows a famous version of natural law theory. There are three important features of natural law theory as used by the church. First, moral laws are supposedly self-evident and are discovered by using reason. Second, these moral laws follow from natural functions and natural inclinations. The natural function and inclination of sex, for example, is reproduction. This is why Catholics believe that birth control is wrong––because it thwarts the natural function and inclination of sex. Likewise, homosexuality is unnatural and thus is wrong. Third, the Catholic Church invokes God as the source of natural moral laws.
Some common objections to natural law theories are:

  1. It’s not clear that there are natural moral laws, akin to natural physical laws. Natural physical laws cannot be broken, and this is why they are natural laws––because they are part of nature. Natural moral laws can be broken, and because of this, it’s difficult to see why we should call them “natural laws.”

  2. It’s not clear that natural moral laws are self-evident. Morality is rife with disagreement, and appealing to self-evidence that only some people can see may not be helpful.

  3. Are there natural functions and natural inclinations? Take sex. If someone doesn’t have a natural inclination to have sex for the purpose of reproduction, is there something wrong with that person? Further, does something like sex have only one primary natural function?

  4. If we claim that God is the source of natural moral laws, then some of the problems raised above concerning divine command theory might also apply to natural law theory.

Natural law theorists have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.
4. Social Contract Theory:
Social contract theorists tell us that deontological moral standards come from social contracts. The central idea is that morality is a set of norms, principles, rules, etc. that people agree to in social settings so that they can get along with each other. Most social contract theorists postulate a state of nature––real or logical––that must have existed prior to present social, moral, and political arrangements. People form contracts––implicit or explicit––to get out of a state of nature.
A famous contemporary social contract theory is John Rawls’ theory of justice. Rawls asks us to imagine people in a state of nature––what he calls the “original position.” Imagine that you are in such a pre-societal state, you don’t know anything specific about who you are and are behind a “veil of ignorance” (e.g., you don’t know how wealthy you are, you don’t know if you have any physical handicaps, you don’t know your gender, etc.), and you have to formulate principles of justice to design and evaluate social and political institutions so that such institutions are fair for all people. Rawls claims that in such a position we would formulate two principles of justice:

  1. “Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.”

  2. “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).”

The first principle has priority and guarantees a system of equal liberties for everyone. The second principle stipulates that everyone should have equal opportunities, and it governs the distribution of goods other than basic liberties, such that differences in distribution are permissible only if everyone benefits.
There are many other social contract theories beyond Rawls’ theory. As moral theories they tell us where morality comes from––a social contract, and as political theories they tell us how to have just societies and just governments.
Some common objections to social contract theories are:

  1. Social contracts appear arbitrary. Morality seems to be nothing more than a contract a group of people happen to agree to follow.

  2. Why would you agree to follow a social contract in the first place? Because you made a contract to do so. But before the contract is in place, why would you follow a social contract? There is a regress problem here.

  3. Did you ever agree to a social contract? If not, is the social contract nothing more than a fiction? Can you break the social contract?

  4. Is there any such thing as a state of nature or, as Rawls says, an original position? Does it make sense to think of ourselves as pre-social beings before the existence of a social contract?

Social contract theorists have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.
5. Intuitional Moral Theory:
Intuitionists tell us that deontological moral standards come from moral intuitions. We know moral intuitions in a manner similar to how we know feelings––through direct self-experience. Intuitions are pre-rational, although they may be reflected upon rationally. Intuitions tell us what our duties are. We simply recognize what these duties are.
W.D. Ross gives us a famous moral theory based on intuitions. According to Ross, we have seven types of moral duties, which give rise to moral rules:

  1. Duties of fidelity 5. Duties of beneficence

  2. Duties of reparation 6. Duties of self-improvement

  3. Duties of gratitude 7. Duties of nonmaleficence

  4. Duties of justice

Ross claims that these seven types of duties are prima facie duties. “Prima facie” literally means at first sight, and prima facie duties are duties you ought to perform, other things being equal. But other things are rarely equal, and Ross makes a distinction between prima facie duties and actual duties. Prima facie duties may be overridden by each other, and in real life your actual situation will help you determine which duty is more important. For example, you might have a duty not to lie––a duty of fidelity, but this duty might be overridden by a duty to help someone else––a duty of beneficence. You must use your intuitions and an evaluation of particular circumstances to guide conflicts among duties.
Ross’ intuitional moral theory gets around some of the problems of Kant’s moral theory. Recall that Kant doesn’t account for what to do when duties conflict; Ross tells us that some duties will be more binding, depending upon particular circumstances. This allows Ross to account for consequences, something Kant wants to ignore. For Ross, consequences matter as they help guide your choice of duties. Ross’ theory is really a hybrid of consequentialist and deontological moral theories.
Some common objections to intuitional moral theories are:

  1. It’s difficult to know what our intuitions tell us about moral duties. Intuitions are something we simply grasp, and not everyone seems to grasp the same intuitions. This problem is similar to the problem of self-evident moral laws from natural law theory.

  2. How ultimately do we decide what to do when our moral intuitions seem to conflict? Recall that Ross claims that we must grasp what our actual duties are, from a list of prima facie duties. In practice it seems very difficult to do this.

  3. Lists of duties that intuitionists come up with, such as Ross’ list of seven types of duties, seem incomplete and perhaps even arbitrary. Further, is this all there is to morality?

Intuitionists have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.


Virtue ethicists tell us that the morally relevant features of actions are the character traits of the person performing the actions. Good people perform good actions for the right reasons, and this leads to good consequences. Virtue theorists give accounts of good virtues we should have and how we can go about acquiring such virtues. Good people avoid vices. When deliberating about what to do, virtue theorists tell us to be good people.

Virtues are good character traits to possess. The Greeks (namely Plato and Aristotle) claimed that there were four central virtues:

  1. Fortitude: the strength of mind and body to persevere in the face of adversity. Fortitude is sometimes called courage: knowing how to regulate fear.

  2. Temperance: the control of all unruly appetites, especially appetites associated with drink, food, and sex.

  3. Prudence: practical wisdom and the ability to make the right choice in specific situations.

  4. Justice: fairness, honesty, lawfulness, and the ability to keep one’s promises.

Christianity added three more theological virtues to this list:

  1. Faith 7. Charity

  2. Hope

There are other lists of virtues from different virtue theories.
Good people learn virtues beginning at an early age by having role models of virtuous persons and by living in good societal arrangements. Virtues become a central part of your overall character. Rather than learning virtues as you might learn something in this college course, you acquire virtues through moral development and through practice. Like a good sports player, the virtuous person consistently plays a good game of life by living the virtues.
Desires, feelings, and motives all play important roles in the development and inculcation of virtues. The virtuous (good) person has the right desires, the right feelings, and the right motives. Think of virtue theory as a package deal. It is a more holistic theory than consequentialist and deontological moral theories. Morality becomes a central part of who you are––your character––and does not involve merely following rules or deliberating about the consequences of actions.

Bad people develop vices rather than virtues. Because virtue theorists stress moral development, especially moral development in children, vicious (bad) people might have difficulty overcoming vices and becoming virtuous (good) people. Thus, if you had a bad childhood, from a moral standpoint, you might have a bad life overall throughout adulthood.

Some common objections to virtue-based approaches to ethics are:

  1. Because it is an approach that is not based on principles or rules, it seems difficult to spell it out. It is difficult to talk about what virtues are and how precisely they are acquired. Some people claim that if we do not first have deontological and/or consequentialist standards, a list of virtues will be arbitrary.

  2. Are we really stuck with our character, particularly our character as shaped and developed in childhood? Is it really that difficult to change from being a bad to a good person, or vice-versa?

  3. What role does society play in shaping our character? Aristotle claimed that slavery and women’s subordination to men are both natural and justified, and accordingly, slaves and women could not be virtuous people in his account. If your particular society plays such an important role in who you are as a moral person, is virtue theory a form of ethical relativism?

Virtue theorists have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.
Rights talk is an increasingly important area of moral discourse, particularly in the international arena when we talk about universal human rights. The idea that we have moral rights arose importantly from several deontological moral theories, particularly natural law theory, Kant’s moral theory, and social contract theory.
Moral rights should be distinguished from legal rights. The latter are established by particular legal bodies, in particular governments. U.S. citizens have certain legal rights as established by the Bill or Rights and subsequent Amendments. In contrast, moral rights transcend particular legal bodies, and supposedly all people have moral rights, regardless of when and where they live. Moral rights stem from universal human features such as rationality, freedom, autonomy, human dignity, etc. Moral rights and legal rights may overlap, such as the legal and moral right to life.
Some common features of moral rights are:

  1. Rights inform us of our obligations to other people. These obligations cannot be impossible; e.g., no one in our class has a right to all the free oxygen in the classroom.

  2. Rights establish duties that we owe to other people and that other people owe to us.

  3. Rights are relationships between people. Rights always have reference to actors and agents in relationships.

  4. Rights have a special overriding character. They take precedence over other considerations, moral or otherwise.

Many people make a distinction between positive rights and negative rights. Negative rights create obligations to refrain from doing certain things. For example, the right to life is a negative right; it creates an obligation not to kill and take away a person’s life. Negative rights typically are formulated as omissions: you cannot kill me, you cannot tell me what to say, etc. In contrast, positive rights create obligations to do certain things. For example, the right to health care is a positive right; it creates an obligation on the part of some entity (usually some governmental body) to provide you with health care. Positive rights typically are formulated as commissions: you should provide me with health care, you should provide me with an adequate education, etc. Some people, especially libertarians, believe that only negative rights exist.

Some common objections to moral rights are:

  1. It’s not clear that there are things such as moral rights. Some people in non-western countries claim that rights are fictions and that there are no universal moral rights that all people share.

  2. What do all people have in common that might give rise to moral rights? If you pick some feature such as autonomy, you will exclude at least some people who might lack autonomy (fetuses, young babies, comatose people, people suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, etc.). On the other hand, if you try to pick some feature that all people have in common, you might end up including some non-human animals who also possess that feature.

Moral rights theorists have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.


Some people believe that morality stems from sentiments or emotions. Recall that ethical subjectivists claim that because morality stems from emotions, and because we supposedly cannot give a rational account of emotions (precisely because they are emotions that arise independent of reason), we cannot give a rational account of morality. Some people, however, believe we can give a rational account of morality, even if morality ultimately stems from emotions.

Perhaps the most famous sentiment-based approach to ethics is from David Hume. Hume argues that morality is grounded in the feeling of sympathy, wherein we express approval of actions that promote happiness, joy, and pleasure, and we express disapproval of actions that promote unhappiness, sorrow, or suffering. Reason only can instruct us in the tendencies of our actions (tell us whether they are likely to lead to happiness or unhappiness, joy or sorrow, or pleasure or suffering) and tell us what will likely happen if we do this or that.
Hume claims that we express approval or disapproval of actions by using moral concepts found in our shared languages. We begin with primitive emotional responses we have about the world, with sympathy being the most important such response. We talk about these primitive responses using shared languages. Embedded in all shared languages are concepts that are used to evaluate the morality of actions. While these evaluative concepts ultimately stem from primitive responses, these concepts arise from the context of a shared language, and a shared language, in turn, gives meaning to these concepts. We then translate evaluative concepts into reasons that can be used to justify actions as morally acceptable/permissible or morally unacceptable/impermissible. Reasons become good reasons if they are sufficiently appropriate and sufficiently strong. We use reasons in moral communities to assess our actions. Thus, according to Hume, morality stems from sentiments, but reason plays an important role in morality.
Some common objections to sentiment-based approaches to ethics are:

  1. It’s not clear that all people share the same sentiments. Hume thought that all people naturally have the sentiment of sympathy, but many people seem to be missing this sentiment.

  2. While there can be a role for reason to play in sentiment-based approaches, morality centrally concerns feelings. Because feelings seem to be pre-rational or beyond rationality, it’s difficult to evaluate sentiment-based moral theories using rational reasons. Morality is grounded in feelings, which, in the absence of reason, can appear arbitrary.

Sentiment theorists have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.
All of the above approaches to ethics typically are cashed out in terms of theories. Some of these theories are constructed from one or more ethical principals. Ethical principalists skip the theory stage of ethics and instead argue that morality stems from ethical principles. Morality simply consists of following ethical principles. A principles approach to ethics is similar to a deontological approach to ethics, in that morality consists of following a set of standards, in this case a set of ethical principles.
Here are seven important ethical principles:

  1. Principle of Nonmaleficence: This principle creates negative duties to avoid causing harm and enjoins us to act in ways that do no cause needless harm or injury to others. This principle is violated by directly causing harm, negligence, accidents over which you had some significant control, and putting others at risk.

  2. Principle of Beneficence: This principle creates positive duties to act in ways that are good or beneficial to others and enjoins us to act in ways that promote the welfare of others. Some people question whether we really have positive obligations to help others, although this is an important principle for health care professionals.

  3. Principle of Utility: This principle is used to adjudicate between harming and benefiting others and enjoins us to act in ways that achieve a balance of benefits over harms. It is similar or identical to the principle of utility that underlies utilitarianism. It also is a principle that helps mediate following both the principle of nonmaleficence and the principle of beneficence.

  4. Principle of Justice: The formal version of this is that “equals must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated unequally.” The substantive question is what counts as relevant characteristics for equal or unequal treatment? This question typically is cashed out in terms of asking what is fair or what benefits and burdens people deserve. Benefits and burdens can be distributed according to a number of things such as:

a. Your needs. d. Your merit. g. Your gender

b. Your effort. e. Your money. h. Your nationality

c. Your contribution. f. Your race or ethnicity i. Full equality

The principle of justice typically underlies social contract theories.

  1. Principle of Respect for Autonomy: Autonomy is the ability to govern oneself and make one’s own decisions. We are importantly constituted in part by our autonomy, and when we do not allow others to think and act autonomously, we have violated the principle of respect for autonomy. This principle is similar to the respect for persons formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative.

  2. Principle of Informed Consent: In order to act autonomously we must be able to freely give consent for what we want done to us. This involves (a) competence––we must be able to perform tasks such as being able to reason; (b) voluntariness––we must be able act with our own self-directed intentionality, have genuine and not merely undesirable options, and not be under the influence of other’s coercion or manipulation; (c) disclosure––all relevant information about what could happen to us once we chose a course of action must be disclosed by experts; and (d) understanding––we must be able to understand the disclosed information.

  3. Principle of the Sanctity of Life: This principle enjoins us not to kill because life itself has some form of intrinsic or inherent value or worth. Most people restrict this principle to human life. We must then stipulate what it is about humans that give them intrinsic or inherent value or worth. Typical candidates for such value or worth include possession of a soul or mental qualities such as rationality, self-consciousness, or the ability to form an overall conception of one’s own life. The principle of the sanctity of (human) life might not apply to some people with diminished mental qualities, and this principle might apply to some animals that possess these mental qualities.

Many people today argue that the principle of respect for autonomy is the most important of these principles. However, it might be morally justifiable to override this principle in certain circumstances. So called “liberty-limiting principles” spell out when the principle of respect for autonomy can be overridden:

  1. Harm Principle: We can override someone’s liberty to prevent that person from harming others. This is a case of the principle of nonmaleficence overriding the principle of respect for autonomy. Thus, I can stop you from beating up another student.

  2. Offense Principle: We can override someone’s liberty to prevent that person from offending––causing shame, embarrassment, or discomfort––to someone else. This also is a case of the principle of nonmaleficence overriding the principle of respect for autonomy. Thus, I can stop you from insulting someone else and their religious beliefs.

  3. Principle of Weak Parentalism: We can override someone’s liberty to prevent that person from harming herself or himself. In the past “parentalism” was called “paternalism” in reference to the influence a father has over his children; because mothers can exercise that same influence, “paternalism” is best referred to as “parentalism.” The principle of weak parentalism also is a case of the principle of nonmalificence overriding the principle of respect for autonomy. Thus, I can stop you from committing suicide.

  4. Principle of Strong Parentalism: We can override someone’s liberty in order to benefit that person. This is a case of the principle of beneficence overriding the principle of respect for autonomy. Thus, I can stop make you write a paper in order to make you a smarter person.

  5. Principle of Legal Moralism: We can override someone’s liberty in order to prevent that person from acting immorally. Thus, I can stop you from driving a sport utility vehicle (SUV) because of the bad (immoral) consequences that follow from you driving such a vehicle.

  6. Welfare Principle: We can override someone’s liberty in order to benefit other persons. This is a case of the principle of utility overriding the principle of respect for autonomy. Thus, I can kill you in order to harvest your organs for six other people who will die without receiving such organs.

Some common objections to a principled approach to ethics are:

  1. Where do these principles come from? Many people believe that these principles are embodied in various moral theories, but it’s difficult to divorce the principles from the theories.

  2. Grounding morality in these principles is akin to a deontological approach to ethics. Consequentialists, virtue theories, rights theorists, and sentiment-based theorists question a deontological approach to ethics and instead argue for other approaches.

  3. What do we do when these principles conflict? This is a problem similar to the problem of conflicting duties for intuitional moral theories.

Ethical principalists have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.

Feminists provide critiques of the above approaches to ethics and offer some alternative approaches to ethics. Moral considerations are built into the notion of feminism itself. All feminists typically believe that some version of the following statements is true:

  1. Part of the structure of the world has been and still is patriarchy––a system where men have more power than women and where men have more access to what societies esteem.

  2. Under patriarchy, sexist oppression occurs. (Such oppression is sometimes called domination or subordination.)

  3. Sexist oppression is morally wrong.

  4. Sexist oppression should be eliminated, and we should work toward a non-patriarchal (or post-patriarchal or post-feminist) world.

There is much disagreement over what oppression is, how and why it occurs, and how it should be eliminated. Oppression can be based on the intersections of gender differences in a variety of different social realms: political, economic, familial, psychological, sexual, environmental, racial, ethnic, and physical.
One form of oppression feminists have identified is in the moral realm. All of the above types of different moral theories (consequential, deontological virtue-based, sentiment-based, and moral rights) historically have treated women as inferior to men in a variety of ways. For example, women have been labeled as less rational than men; thus, women are not as capable as men are of following moral rules based on reason. One important task of feminist ethics is to reveal sexist biases built into moral theories.
One of the reasons such biases exist might be due to the fact that historically all of the above types of moral theories were formulated by men. Some feminists argue that because of this, these moral theories are built around men’s experiences of the world. We thus need to identify, discuss, and respect women’s moral experiences.
Carol Gilligan argues that when we examine women’s moral experiences in general, they tend to differ from those of men. Men tend to focus on abstract notions such as justice, duties, rules, and rights. Women on the other hand tend to focus on concrete relationships and responsibilities, especially those based on care. Gilligan doesn’t believe that women are genetically predisposed to have an ethics based on care; rather, women historically have been socially conditioned to focus on concrete relationships of care more than men, just as men historically have been socially conditioned to focus on abstract ethical notions more than women.
Some feminist ethicists such as Nel Noddings have followed Gilligan and developed ethical approaches based on care. Annette Baier has developed an ethics of love and responsibility based on trust. Virginia Held and Sara Ruddick have developed a maternal approaches to ethics based on the psychological traits and moral virtues that are traditionally associated with women who mother. Collectively all of these approaches to ethics sometimes are called “care-based ethics” or “feminine ethics” because these approaches are based on care or care-related features that traditionally are considered to be feminine. Most of these feminists who develop such approaches agree with what Gilligan says about moral orientation stemming from social conditioning. Some, however, argue that the differences between men’s and women’s moral orientation is based on genetic or other biological differences between men and women.
Other feminists have developed what are sometimes called “power-based approaches to ethics.” These approaches tend to blend ethics and politics. The traditional distinction between ethics and politics is that the former concerns personal relationships we have as individuals to other individuals, and the latter concerns social relationships we have as individuals and groups to public institutions such as governments and markets. Because the same types of oppressive relationships exist in both these personal and public spheres, we cannot address personal morality without at the same time addressing public politics. The slogan “The personal is the political” captures this idea.
There are a variety of different feminist power-based approaches to ethics, many of which overlap. The common thread between them is that they provide moral critiques of actions and practices that perpetuate women’s oppression, they prescribe morally justifiable ways for resisting such actions and practices, and they develop morally desirable alternatives that will promote the emancipation of women and all other oppressed peoples (and animals and the environment for ecofeminists).
Some common objections to feminist ethics are:

  1. Feminine ethical approaches are based on traits such as care that historically have been associated with women. Cultures such as our own that ascribe such traits to women have been and still are sexually oppressive toward women. An ethics based on care may still embody this sexual oppression.

  2. Are women essentially more caring than men? Some feminine approaches to ethics are based on genetic or biological differences between men and women, and it’s not clear that morality follows from genetic or biological differences.

  3. There is much disagreement over what sexist oppression is, and there is much debate between feminists over how to address this oppression. Accordingly, some power-based approaches to ethics are incompatible with each other. Are there any distinctively feminist approaches to ethics?

  4. There are similarities between some feminist ethics and some of the non-feminist ethical approaches outlined above, especially sentiment-based approaches to ethics. Some people believe that feminists are merely reinventing already existing approaches to ethics.

  5. Because men and male children can be and often are oppressed in a variety of ways, some people question the “feminist” label.

Feminists have responses that attempt to refute all of these objections.
* * *
There are other important approaches to ethics beyond those outlined in this handout.
Many people claim that ethics arise directly out of religions, such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc. This might be true, but most western religious ethics correspond to one or more of the approaches to ethics outlined in this handout. A discussion of world religions is beyond the scope of this handout.
While many philosophers claim allegiance to only one of the approaches outlined in this handout, many people find themselves drawn to more than one approach (or different theory in the case of deontology). Such an approach is called “moral pluralism.” This approach certainly has merits. The main problem with it is that there are numerous incompatibilities between these different approaches to ethics, and following two or more of them might give us conflicting ideas about what to do.
Reflect upon your own type of ethical reasoning. Does it correspond to any of the approaches outlined in this handout? Why or why not? If it does, do you find yourself drawn to one or to several different approaches? Why? If your ethical reasoning does not correspond to any of the approaches outlined in this handout, how would you characterize and describe your reasoning?
The moral approaches outlined in this handout traditionally have applied only to people. One question you should begin to ask yourself is whether or not we can get a sufficiently good environmental ethic by following one or more of these traditional moral theories. Some environmental ethicists argue that these traditional approaches can give us sufficiently good environmental ethics; some environmental ethicists argue the opposite and claim that we need to reject traditional (human) approaches and come up with altogether new environmental ethics. Think hard about this issue––it will be with us all semester.

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