A bibliography1

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Epstein, Lee. 1985. Conservatives in Court. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Epstein, Lee. 1991. Courts and Interest Groups. In John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson, eds., American Courts. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

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Erikson, Robert S., James A. Stimson, and Michael MacKuen. 2002. The Macro Polity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Esterling, Kevin M. Forthcoming 2005. The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Evans, Diana M. 1986. PAC Contributions and Roll-call Voting: Conditional Power. In Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics. 2d ed., Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

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Evans, Lawrence C. 1995. Committees and Health Jurisdictions in Congress. In Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, eds., How Congress Shapes Health Policy. Washington: AEI/ Brookings.

Evans, Lawrence C. 1999. Legislative Structure: Rules, Precedents and Jurisdictions. Legislative Studies Quarterly 24: 605–42.

Evans, Lawrence C., and Walter J. Oleszek. 1991. Congressional Tsunami? The Politics of Committee Reform. In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. eds., Congress Reconsidered. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

Fama, Eugene. 1970. Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. Journal of Finance 25: 383–417.

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Farkas, Suzanne. 1971. Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena. New York: New York University Press.

Feeley, T. Jens, Bryan D. Jones, Heather Larsen. 2001. Public Agendas: Annualized Most Important Problem Polling Data, 1939–2001. Seattle, WA: Center for American Politics and Public Policy, University of Washington.

Feeley, T. Jens. 1999a. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Exploring the Influences of Committee Competition, Party Control and Issue Salience on U.S. Science and Technology Policy. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 15–17.

Feeley, T. Jens. 1999b. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Toward an Understanding of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 1949–1993. Paper presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, September 2–5.

Feldstein, Paul J., and Glenn Melnick. 1984. Congressional Voting Behavior on Hospital Legislation: An Exploratory Study. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 8: 686–701.

Fenno, Richard F. Jr. 1966. The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown.

Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.

Finifter, Ada, ed. 1983. Political Science: The State of the Discipline. Washington: American Political Science Association.

Finifter, Ada, ed. 1993. Political Science: The State of the Discipline II. Washington: American Political Science Association.

Finkel, Seven E., Edward N. Muller, and Karl-Dieter Opp. 1989. Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action. American Political Science Review 83: 885–903.

Finnemore, Martha. 1996. Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism. International Organization 50 (2): 325–47.

Finucan, H. M. 1963. A Note on Kurtosis. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, ser. B. 26: 111–12.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fleisher, Richard. 1993. PAC Contributions and Congressional Voting on National Defense. Legislative Studies Quarterly 18: 391–409.

Flemming, Roy B., B. Dan Wood, and John Bohte. 1999. Attention to Issues in A System of Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy Agendas. Journal of Politics 61 (1): 76–108.

Flemming, Roy B., John Bohte, and B. Dan Wood. 1997. One Voice Among Many: The Supreme Court’s Influence on Attentiveness to Issues in the United States, 1947–92. American Journal of Political Science 41 (4): 1224–50.

Forst, Brian. 2004. Errors of Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Foster, Mary Lecrone. 1977. Speaking of Energy. Berkeley: Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley. Unpublished paper.

Fowler, James H. and Sangick Jeon. 2005. The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent: A Network Analysis. Mimeo. University of California, Davis.

Fowler, Linda L., and Ronald G. Shaiko. 1987. The Grass Roots Connection: Environmental Activists and Senate Roll Calls. American Journal of Political Science 31: 484–510.

Frank, David John, Ann Hironaka, and Evan Shofer. 2000. The Nation-State and the Natural Environment over the Twentieth Century. American Sociological Review 65 (February): 96–116.

Freeman, J. Leiper. 1955. The Political Process. Garden City: Doubleday.

Freeman, J. Leiper. 1965. The Political Process: Executive Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations. Rev. ed. New York: Random House.

Freeman, Jo. 1975. The Politics of Women’s Liberation. New York: McKay.

Frendreis, John P., and Richard W. Waterman. 1985. PAC Contributions and Legislative Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation. Social Science Quarterly 66: 401–12.

Fritschler, A. Lee. 1975. Smoking and Politics. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Furlong, Scott R. 1998. The Lobbying Disclosure Act and Interest Group Lobbying Data: Two Steps Forward and One Step Back. VOXPOP: Newsletter of the Political Organizations and Parties Section of the American Political Science Association 17 (3): 4–6.

Futrell, Robert Frank. 1974. Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907–1964. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University.

Gabaix. Xavier. 1999. Zipf’s Law for Cities: An Explanation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 3 (August): 739–767.

Gabaix. Xavier. 1999. Zipf’s Law and the Growth of Cities. American Economic Review 89, 2 (May): 129–132.

Gais, Thomas L. 1996. Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Gais, Thomas L., and Jack L. Walker, Jr. 1991. Pathways to Influence in American Politics. In Mobilizing Interest Groups in America, by Jack L. Walker Jr. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Gamm, Gerald and Kenneth Shepsle. 1989. Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810–1825. Legislative Studies Quarterly 14 (February): 39–66.

Gamson, William and David S. Meyer. 1996. Framing Political Opportunity. In Douglas McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gamson, William. 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest. 2d ed. Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing.

Garson, G. David. 1974. On the Origins of Interest-Group Theory: A Critique of a Process. American Political Science Review 68: 1505–19.

Garson, G. David. 1978. Group Theories of Politics. Beverly Hills: Sage

Gaventa, John. 1980. Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Gell-Mann, Murray. 1995. The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex. New York: W. H. Freeman.

General Accounting Office. 1996. Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, (GAO/GGD-96-118). Washington: Government Printing Office.

Gerber, Alan, and Donald Green. 1999. Misperceptions about Perceptual Bias. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 189–210.

Gerber, Elizabeth R. 1999. The Populist Paradox. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gerber, Elizabeth R., and John E. Jackson. 1993. Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions. American Political Science Review 87 (September): 639–56.

Gilliam, Franklin D., Jr., and Shanto Iyengar. 2000. Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public. American Journal of Political Science 44, 3 (July): 560–573.

Gimpel, James G., and James R. Edwards, Jr. 1999. The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Ginsberg, Benjamin, and John C. Green. 1986. The Best Congress Money Can Buy: Campaign Contributions and Congressional Behavior. In Benjamin Ginsberg and Alan Stone, eds., Do Elections Matter? Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

Gist, John R. 1982. “Stability” and “Competition” in Budgetary Theory. American Political Science Review 76: 859–72.

Gittenger, Ted. 1997. Vietnam: The Early Decisions. Austin TX: University of Texas Press.

Gladwell, Malcom. 2000. The Tipping Point. New York: Little, Brown, and Co.

Gladwell, Malcom. 2005. Blink. New York: Little, Brown, and Co.

Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Golden, Marissa Martino. 1995. Interest Groups in the Rulemaking Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard? Paper presented at the Third National Public Management Conference, Lawrence, Kansas, October 5–7.

Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane, eds. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Goldstein, Judith. 1993. Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Goldstein, Kenneth M. 1995. Seeding the Grass Roots: Mobilization and Contacting Congress. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Goldstein, Kenneth M. 1999. Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goodin, Robert E. 1984. Itinerants, Iterations and Something in-between. British Journal of Political Science 14: 129–32.

Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology 78: 1360–80.

Granovetter, Mark S. 1978. Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. American Journal of Sociology 83: 1420–43.

Granovetter, Mark S. 1983. The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. Sociological Theory 1: 201–233.

Granovetter, Mark S. 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91: 481–510.

Granovetter, Mark S., and Roland Soong. 1983. Threshold Models of Diffusion and Collective Behavior. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 9: 165–79.

Granovetter, Mark S., and Roland Soong. 1988. Threshold Models of Diversity: Chinese Restaurants, Residential Segregation, and the Spiral of Silence. Sociological Methodology 18: 69–104.

Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1993a. The Diversity of State Interest Group Systems. Political Research Quarterly 46: 81–97.

Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1993b. Stability and Change in State Interest Group Systems: 1975 to 1990. State and Local Government Review 25: 87–96.

Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1994. Interest Group System Density and Diversity: A Research Update. International Political Science Review 15: 5–14.

Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1995. The Demography of Interest Organization Communities: Institutions, Associations, and Membership Groups. American Politics Quarterly 23: 3–32.

Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Greenberg, George D., Jeffrey A. Miller, Lawrence B. Mohr, and Bruce C. Vladeck. 1977. Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research. American Political Science Review 71: 1532–43.

Greene, William H. 1993. Econometric Analysis, 2d ed. New York: Macmillan.

Greenstein, Fred I., and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. 1975. Handbook of Political Science. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Greenstone, J. David. 1975. Group Theories. In Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 2: Micropolitical Theory. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Pp. 243–318.

Greenwood, Justin. 1997. Representing Interests in the European Union. New York: St. Martins Press.

Grenzke, Janet M. 1989. PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex. American Journal of Political Science 33: 1–24.

Griffin, Larry J., Joel A. Devine, and M. Wallace. 1982. Monopoly Capital, Organized Labor, and Military Expenditures in the U.S., 1949–1976. American Journal of Sociology 88: 113–153.

Griffith, Ernest S. 1939. The Impasse of Democracy. New York: Harrison-Hilton.

Grisham, John. 2006. The Innocent Man. New York: Doubleday.

Groeneveld, Richard A. 1998. A Class of Quintile Measures for Kurtosis. American Statistician 51: 325–29.

Groseclose, Tim, Steve Levitt, and Jim Snyder. 1999. Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress. American Political Science Review 93: 33–50.

Groseclose, Tim. 1994. Testing Committee Composition Hypotheses for the U.S. Congress. Journal of Politics 56: 440–458.

Grossman, Emiliano, and Sabine Saurugger. 2006. Les groupes d’intérêt. Paris: Armand Colin.

Guiraudon, Virginie. 2000. European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-Making as Venue Shopping. Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (2): 251–71.

Guiraudon, Virginie. 2000. Les politiques d’immigration en Europe: Allemagne, France, Pays-Bas. Paris: L’Harmattan.

Gujarati, Damodar N. 1988. Basic Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization 46: 1–35.

Hager, George. 1998. House Passes Spending Bill. The Washington Post. October 21, Section A, p. 1.

Haider, Donald H. 1974. When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying. New York: Free Press.

Haider-Markel, D. P., and M. R. Joslyn. 2001. Gun Policy, Opinion, Tragedy, and Blame Attribution: The Conditional Influence of Issue Frames. Journal of Politics 63 (2): 520–43.

Haig, Alexander. 1981. Relationship of Foreign and Defense Policies. Current Policy number 302.

Hakman, Nathan. 1966. Lobbying the Supreme Court: An Appraisal of “Political Science Folklore.” Fordham Law Review 35: 15–50.

Hall, Billy. 1997. A Legal Solution to Government Gridlock. New York: Garland.

Hall, Peter A. 1986. Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hall, Peter A. 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25: 275–96.

Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44: 936–57.

Hall, Peter A., ed. 1989. The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hall, Richard L. 1996. Participation in Congress. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hall, Richard L., and Bernard Grofman. 1990. The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias. American Political Science Review 84 (4): 1149–66.

Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees. American Political Science Review 84: 797–820.

Hamilton, Richard F. 1996. The Social Misconstruction of Reality. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hammond, Thomas, and Gary J. Miller. 1987. The Core of the Constitution. American Political Science Review 81: 1155–74.

Handler, Joel. 1978. Social Movements and the Legal System. New York: Academic Press.

Hansen, John Mark. 1985. The Political Economy of Group Membership. American Political Science Review 79: 79–96.

Hansen, John Mark. 1991. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919–1981. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hardin, Charles M. 1952. The Politics of Agriculture. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.

Hardin, John W. 1994. Congressional Activity on National Health Insurance Proposals: How Political Change Influences Legislative Organization. Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Hardin, John W. 1998. Advocacy versus Certainty: The Dynamics of Committee Jurisdiction Concentration. Journal of Politics 60 (2): 374–97.

Hardin, John W. 1998. An In-Depth Look at Congressional Committee Jurisdictions Surrounding Health Issues. Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law 23: 517–550.

Hardin, Russell. 1982. Collective Action. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Harlow, Ralph V. 1917. The History of Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1835. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Harper, Donald. 1982. Transportation in America. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.

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Hasbrouck, Paul. 1927. Party Government in the House of Representatives. New York: Macmillan.

Hayes, Michael T. 1978. The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups. Journal of Politics 40: 134–61.

Hayes, Michael T. 1992. Incrementalism and Public Policy. New York: Longman.

Heaney, Michael T. 2004. Outside the Issue Niche: The Multidimensionality of Interest Group Identity. American Politics Quarterly 32 (6): 1–41.

Heaney, Michael T. 2004. Reputation and Leadership inside Interest Group Coalitions. Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.

Heclo, Hugh. 1974. Modern Social Policies in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Heclo, Hugh. 1978. Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment. In Anthony King, ed. The New American Political System. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury. 1993. The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policymaking. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Henck, Fred and Bernard Strassberg. 1988. A Slippery Slope: The Long Road to the Breakup of AT&T. New York: Greenwood Press.

Herring, E. Pendleton. 1929. Group Representation Before Congress. Washington: Brookings.

Herring, E. Pendleton. 1936. Public Administration and the Public Interest. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Herring, E. Pendleton. 1967. Group Representation Before Congress. New York: Russell and Russell.

Hinckley, Barbara. 1975. Policy Content, Committee Membership and Behavior. American Journal of Political Science 19 (3): 543–557.

Hinich, Melvin, and Michael Munger. 1994. Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Hirshleifer, David. 1995. The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades. In The New Economics of Human Behavior, ed. Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli, 188–215. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hitch, Charles J., and Roland N. McKean. 1960. The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hojnacki, Marie, and David C. Kimball. 1996. Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.

Hojnacki, Marie, and David C. Kimball. 1998. Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress. American Political Science Review 92: 775–90.

Hojnacki, Marie, and David C. Kimball. 1999. The Who and How of Organizations’ Lobbying Strategies in Committee. Journal of Politics. In press.

Hojnacki, Marie. 1997. Interest Groups’ Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone. American Journal of Political Science. 41: 61–87.

Hojnacki, Marie. 1998. Organized Interests’ Advocacy Behavior in Alliances. Political Research Quarterly 51: 437–59.

Holland, John H. 1998. Emergence. New York: Basic Books.

Holland, John H. 1995. Hidden Order. New York: Basic Books.

Hosking, Jonathan R. M. 1990. L-Moments: Analysis and Estimation of Distributions Using Linear Combinations of Order Statistics. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. B 52: 105–124.

Hosking, Jonathan R. M. 1998. L-moments. In S. Kotz, C. Read and D. L. Banks, eds., Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences, update vol. 2. New York: Wiley. Pp. 357–362.

Howard, Christopher. 1997. The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hrebenar, Ronald J., and Clive S. Thomas, eds. 1987. Interest Group Politics in the American West. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Hrebenar, Ronald J., and Clive S. Thomas, eds. 1992. Interest Group Politics in the Southern States. Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press.

Hrebenar, Ronald J., and Clive S. Thomas, eds. 1993a. Interest Group Politics in the Midwestern States. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press.

Hrebenar, Ronald J., and Clive S. Thomas, eds. 1993b. Interest Group Politics in the Northeastern States. College Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press.

Huckfeldt, Robert, and John D. Sprague. 1992. Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure and the Party Canvass. American Political Science Review 86: 70–86.

Huckfeldt, Robert, and John D. Sprague. 1995. Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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