2015 Section 702 Aff 1ac 2 Observation 1: Inherency 3 Thus the plan 5



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2015 Section 702 Aff



1AC 2

Observation 1: Inherency 3

Thus the plan 5

Observation II: Solvency 6

Advantage 1 is the Economy 7

Advantage 2 is Surveillance 14

Case Extensions 18

Inherency Extensions 19

Surveillance Increasing 20

USA Freedom Act Doesn’t Solve 22

702 is Expanding 23

Solvency 24

FISA Reform Solves 702 25

Declassification Solves 26

Special Advocate Solves 28

Section 702 Bad 30

702 --> Loophole 31

702 X 4th Amendment 34

702 X Constitution 40

702 X Privacy 41

No Oversight 42

AT: NSA Limitations Check 44

Advantage 1 Extensions 45

702  Data Loalization 46

Surveillance  Data Localization 49

Data Localization X Growth 52

Data Localization X Trade 54

Data Localization X Tech 55

AT: Data Localization Good 56

Data Globalization  Growth 58

We Solve Data Localization 59

Debt Bad 60

Advantage 2 Extensions 62

Surveillance Bad-Democracy 63

Surveillance Bad-4th Amendment 65

Surveillance Bad-Terrorism 66

Surveillance Bad-Soft Power 67

Surveillance Bad-Social Control 68

Surveillance Bad-Laundry List 70

Surveillance Bad-Corporate Control 71

Surveillance Bad-Unpopular 72

Human Rights Impacts 73

Utah Data Center Add-On 75

2AC Utah Data Center Add-On 76

Utah Data Center is Expanding 79

Data Centers Bad-Surveillance 81

Data Centers Bad-Democracy 84

Data Centers Bad-Resources 87

Data Centers Bad-Water 89

Data Centers Bad-Privacy 92

Data Centers Bad-Economics 93

Data Centers Bad-General 94

Data Centers Bad-Cyber Security 96

Energy Use Bad 100

Global Warming Impact 101

Answers to Neg Stuff 102

AT: T-Domestic 103

AT: Terrorism DA 105

AT: TPP Ptx: 108

Case Neg 109

States CP 110

Extend: States CP Solvency 112

CP Solvency: Congress doesn’t enforce 113

Courts CP 114

AT: Cyber Terror 115

Digital Innocence Turn 116



AT: 4th Amendment 121



1AC

Observation 1: Inherency

The recent passage of the USA Freedom Act weakened protections under section 702—it violates domestic and international human rights law, broadly expands federal surveillance powers, and threatens billions world wide.


Kayyali 14 (Nadia, JD, UC Hastings, Outreach Editor, Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal, and Board Member, National Lawyers Guild San Francisco Bay Area, “The Way the NSA Uses Section 702 is Deeply Troubling. Here’s Why,” Electronic Frontiers Foundation Blog, May 8, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/way-nsa-uses-section-702-deeply-troubling-heres-why)

The most recent disclosure of classified NSA documents revealed that the British spy agency GCHQ sought unfettered access to NSA data collected under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. Not only does this reveal that the two agencies have a far closer relationship than GCHQ would like to publicly admit, it also serves as a reminder that surveillance under Section 702 is a real problem that has barely been discussed, much less addressed, by Congress or the President. In fact, the "manager’s amendment" to the USA FREEDOM Act, which passed unanimously out of the House Judiciary Committee, has weakened the minimal changes to Section 702 that USA FREEDOM originally offered. Although Representative Zoe Lofgren—who clearly understands the import of Section 702—offered several very good amendments that would have addressed these gaps, her amendments were all voted down. There’s still a chance though—as this bill moves through Congress it can be strengthened by amendments from the floor.¶ Section 702 has been used by the NSA to justify mass collection of phone calls and emails by collecting huge quantities of data directly from the physical infrastructure of communications providers. Here’s what you should know about the provision and why it needs to be addressed by Congress and the President: ¶ Most of the discussion around the NSA has focused on the phone records surveillance program. Unlike that program, collection done under Section 702 captures content of communications. This could include content in emails, instant messages, Facebook messages, web browsing history, and more. ¶ Even though it’s ostensibly used for foreign targets, Section 702 surveillance sweeps up the communications of Americans. The NSA has a twisted, and incredibly permissive, interpretation of targeting that includes communications about a target, even if the communicating parties are completely innocent. As John Oliver put it in his interview with former NSA General Keith Alexander: "No, the target is not the American people, but it seems that too often you miss the target and hit the person next to them going, 'Whoa, him!'"¶ The NSA has confirmed that it is searching Section 702 data to access American’s communications without a warrant, in what is being called the "back door search loophole." In response to questions from Senator Ron Wyden, former NSA director General Keith Alexander admitted that the NSA specifically searches Section 702 data using "U.S. person identifiers," for example email addresses associated with someone in the U.S.¶ The NSA has used Section 702 to justify programs in which the NSA can siphon off large portions of Internet traffic directly from the Internet backbone. These programs exploit the structure of the Internet, in which a significant amount of traffic from around the world flows through servers in the United States. In fact, through Section 702, the NSA has access to information stored by major Internet companies like Facebook and Google.¶ Section 702 is likely used for computer security operations. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper noted Section 702's use to obtain communications "regarding potential cyber threats" and to prevent "hostile cyber activities." Richard Ledgett, Deputy Director of NSA, noted the use of intelligence authorities to mitigate cyber attacks.¶ The FISA Court has little opportunity to review Section 702 collection. The court approves procedures for 702 collection for up to a year. This is not approval of specific targets, however; "court review [is] limited to 'procedures' for targeting and minimization rather than the actual seizure and searches." This lack of judicial oversight is far beyond the parameters of criminal justice.¶ Not only does the FISA Court provide little oversight, Congress is largely in the dark about Section 702 collection as well. NSA spying defenders say that Congress has been briefed on these programs. But other members of Congress have repeatedly noted that it is incredibly difficult to get answers from the intelligence community, and that attending classified hearings means being unable to share any information obtained at such hearings. What’s more, as Senator Barbara Mikulski stated: "'Fully briefed' doesn’t mean that we know what’s going on." Without a full picture of Section 702 surveillance, Congress simply cannot provide oversight.¶ Section 702 is not just about keeping us safe from terrorism. It’s a distressingly powerful surveillance tool. While the justification we’ve heard repeatedly is that NSA surveillance is keeping us safer, data collected under Section 702 can be shared in a variety of circumstances, such as ordinary criminal investigations. For example, the NSA has shared intelligence with the Drug Enforcement Agency that has led to prosecutions for drug crimes, all while concealing the source of the data.¶ The President has largely ignored Section 702. While the phone records surveillance program has received significant attention from President Obama, in his speeches and his most recent proposal, Section 702 remains nearly untouched.¶ The way the NSA uses Section 702 is illegal and unconstitutionaland it violates international human rights law. Unlike searches done under a search warrant authorized by a judge, Section 702 has been used by the NSA to get broad FISA court authorization for general search and seizure of huge swathes of communications. The NSA says this is OK because Section 702 targets foreign citizens. The problem is, once constitutionally protected communications of Americans are swept up, the NSA says these communications are “fair game” for its use.¶ Innocent non-Americans don't even get the limited and much abused protections the NSA promises for Americans. Under international human rights law to which the United States is a signatory, the United States must respect the rights of all persons. With so many people outside the United States keeping their data with American companies, and so much information being swept up through mass surveillance, that makes Section 702 the loophole for the NSA to violate the privacy rights of billions of Internet users worldwide. The omission of Section 702 reform from the discourse around NSA surveillance is incredibly concerning, because this provision has been used to justify some of the most invasive NSA surveillance. That’s why EFF continues to push for real reform of NSA surveillance that includes an end to Section 702 collection. You can help by educating yourself and engaging your elected representatives. Print out our handy one-page explanation of Section 702. Contact your members of Congress today and tell them you want to see an end to all dragnet surveillance, not just bulk collection of phone records.

Thus the plan

The United States federal government should substantially curtail domestic surveillance by amending Section 702 of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 to 1) extend Fourth Amendment protections to U.S.-title-held Corporations operating overseas or engaged in overseas communication and 2) requiring warrants for law enforcement queries under Section 702 for the purpose of criminal investigation of U.S. persons. Funding and enforcement will occur through normal means. We reserve the right to clarify intent.

Observation II: Solvency

The US should reform Section 702 by limiting foreign intelligence collection to counterterrorism and national security and requiring warrants for criminal investigations.


Granick 14 (Jennifer, Director of Civil Liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society, “Reforming The Section 702 Dragnet (Part 1),” Just Security, January 30, 2014, http://justsecurity.org/6574/reforming-section-702-dragnet-1/)

Section 702 allows immense data to be collected, allows foreign rights violation, and cripples US business and democracy.¶ As Professor Christopher Sprigman and I argued in the New York Times, PRISM is designed to produce at least 51 percent confidence in a target’s “foreignness” — as John Oliver of “The Daily Show” put it, “a coin flip plus 1 percent.” We believe that the NSA intentionally designed PRISM so that it is a certainty it will regularly acquire information it is not allowed to have. Whether or not you agree with us or not that this is illegal, the fact remains that statistically the NSA is getting an immense amount of information it is not allowed to have, even under the terrifyingly broad auspices of section 702. That must be changed.¶ Another fundamental problem with section 702 is that it authorizes targeting and monitoring of average citizens of other countries for reasons that are not necessarily related to the security of the United States. Targets need only be non-U.S. persons, and communications which are not purely domestic are fair game. This disregard for other people’s privacy is a terrible idea. Not only does it violate international human rights principles, but—as Sprigman and I wrote back in June—it’s bad for American business and democracy. We can alleviate this problem through reintroducing some or all of the safeguards under traditional FISA, like limiting targets to foreign powers or agents of foreign powers, or limiting collection to facilities that the targets actually use. If we are going to continue to dragnet through foreigners’ communications with each other and with Americans, we might limit the categories of foreign intelligence information for which such a tool is used to counterterrorism and national security, and not for the mere conduct of foreign affairs or collection of economic information.¶ Good policy requires public awareness of how many Americans’ communications are swept up in section 702. We should be told that now, and the government should be obligated to do some kind of regular reporting.¶ The current proposal would allow “about” collection in terrorism contexts. But innocent people talk about terrorism all the time. We discuss and tell jokes about Osama bin Laden, we wonder about Yemen safe houses and Taliban oppression. We’ve seen no meaningful way that the government distinguishes between these healthy, private conversations, and obtaining meaningful intelligences. Until we do, we should consider completely prohibiting “about the target” collection.¶ Back door searches should require at least a Title III warrant. Outside of section 702, the government would not have access to this information concerning Americans without complying with the dictates of the Wiretap Act (or perhaps in some cases traditional FISA), and it should not be able to avoid those protections via a dragnet.¶ Similarly, we should consider under what conditions, if any, it is appropriate share communications obtained in a dragnet with the Internal Revenue Service, Drug Enforcement Agency, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, or other law enforcement agencies. If and when such referrals are made, the subjects ought to be notified.¶ Minimization should at least meet the standard of traditional FISA if not better.¶ People who are incidentally or mistakenly collected on should be notified.¶ We need to make it easier to enforce surveillance limitations, for victims of violations to obtain judicial remedies, and for public courts to review the lawfulness of Executive Branch operations.¶ So far, there has been no robust investigations into the sketchy ways the NSA is implementing section 702 via PRISM and overbroad upstream collection. Nor have we had a good public debate about the dangers of section 702 and how to avoid them. Nor have we talked about the ways privacy is being decimated by the NSA’s overseas collection. Now is the time for the NSA to come clean about what it is doing. Now is the time to have those public conversations. And now is the time to think creatively about enforcing the laws we have implementing reforms to alleviate the problems we’ve learned about

Advantage 1 is the Economy

First, surveillance like Section 702 costs the U.S. billions and drives investors out.


Schneier, 15 (Bruce (2015-03-02). Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World (p. 121-2). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.)

Those of us who fought the crypto wars, as we call them, thought we had won them in the 1990s. What the Snowden documents have shown us is that instead of dropping the notion of getting backdoor government access, the NSA and FBI just kept doing it in secret. Now that this has become public, US companies are losing business overseas because their non-US customers don’t want their data collected by the US government. NSA surveillance is costing US companies business in three different ways: people fleeing US cloud providers, people not buying US computer and networking equipment, and people not trusting US companies. When the story about the NSA’s getting user data directly from US cloud providers— the PRISM program— broke in 2013, businesses involved faced a severe public relations backlash. Almost immediately, articles appeared noting that US cloud companies were losing business and their counterparts in countries perceived as neutral, such as Switzerland, were gaining. One survey of British and Canadian companies from 2014 found that 25% of them were moving their data outside the US, even if it meant decreased performance. Another survey of companies found that NSA revelations made executives much more concerned about where their data was being stored. Estimates of how much business will be lost by US cloud providers vary. One 2013 study by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation foresees the loss of revenue at $ 22 to $ 35 billion over three years; that’s 10% to 20% of US cloud providers’ foreign market share. The Internet analysis firm Forrester Research believes that’s low; it estimates three-year losses at $ 180 billion because some US companies will also move to foreign cloud providers. US computer and networking companies are also taking severe hits. Cisco reported 2013 fourth quarter revenue declines of 8% to 10%. AT& T also reported earnings losses, and had problems with its European expansion plans. IBM lost sales in China. So did Qualcomm. Verizon lost a large German government contract. There’s more. I have attended private meetings where large US software companies complained about significant loss of foreign sales. Cisco’s CEO John Chambers wrote to the Obama administration, saying that NSA’s hacking of US equipment “will undermine confidence in our industry and in the ability of technology companies to deliver products globally.” Chambers’s comments echo the third aspect of the competitiveness problem facing US companies in the wake of Snowden: they’re no longer trusted. The world now knows that US telcos give the NSA access to the Internet backbone and that US cloud providers give it access to user accounts. The world now knows that the NSA intercepts US-sold computer equipment in transit and surreptitiously installs monitoring hardware. The world knows that a secret court compels US companies to make themselves available for NSA eavesdropping, and then orders them to lie about it in public. Remember the Lavabit story from Chapter 5? All of this mistrust was exacerbated by the Obama administration’s repeated reassurances that only non-Americans were the focus of most of the NSA’s efforts. More than half of the revenue of many cloud companies comes from outside the US. Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg said it best in a 2013 interview: “The government response was, ‘Oh don’t worry, we’re not spying on any Americans.’ Oh, wonderful: that’s really helpful to companies trying to serve people around the world, and that’s really going to inspire confidence in American internet companies.”

Second, that causes foreign investors to localize their data and pull out of U.S technology industries.


Castro 13 (Daniel, Vice President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation “How Much Will PRISM Cost the U.S. Cloud Computing Industry?” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, August 2013 http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computing-costs.pdf)

The recent revelations about the extent to which the National Security Agency (NSA) and other U.S. law enforcement and national security agencies have used provisions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and USA PATRIOT Act to obtain electronic data from third- parties will likely have an immediate and lasting impact on the competitiveness of the U.S. cloud computing industry if foreign customers decide the risks of storing data with a U.S. company outweigh the benefits. The United States has been the leader in providing cloud computing services not just domestically, but also abroad where it dominates every segment of the market. In the 2013 Informa Cloud World Global Insights survey, 71 percent of respondents (of which only 9 percent were from North America) ranked the United States as the leader in cloud computing usage and innovation.1 In this same survey, nine out of ten respondents linked cloud computing to their country’s economic competitiveness.¶ But other countries are trying to play catch-up to the United States’ early success. Of the $13.5 billion in investments that cloud computing service providers made in 2011, $5.6 billion came from companies outside North America.2 Even national governments are helping to bankroll these efforts to combat U.S. market leadership—France, for example, invested €135 million in a joint venture in cloud computing.3¶ At stake is a significant amount of revenue. As shown in figure 1, the global enterprise public cloud computing market will be a $207 billion industry by 2016.4 Europeans in particular are trying to edge out their American competitors, and they are enlisting their¶ governments to help. Jean-Francois Audenard, the cloud security advisor to France Telecom, said with no small amount of nationalistic hyperbole, “It’s extremely important to have the governments of Europe take care of this issue because if all the data of enterprises were going to be under the control of the U.S., it’s not really good for the future of the European people.”5¶ And governments have begun to respond. In a 2012 policy document titled “Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe,” the European Commission (EC) called for a number of steps to promote cloud computing adoption in Europe, including creating pan-European technical standards, EU-wide certification for cloud computing providers, and model contract language.7 The Europeans are quite frank about their intentions. The EC notes “this strategy is about building a new industry, and better competing against the United States in particular.”8 Gartner estimates that in Western Europe alone the cloud computing market will be $47 billion by 2015, and the EC estimates that European cloud computing providers stand to gain €80 billion in revenue by 2020.9¶ While much of this projected growth was until recently up for grabs by U.S. companies, the disclosures of the NSA’s electronic surveillance may fundamentally alter the market dynamics. Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Digital Affairs, stated the problem quite succinctly, “If European cloud customers cannot trust the United States government, then maybe they won't trust U.S. cloud providers either. If I am right, there are multibillion-euro consequences for American companies. If I were an American cloud provider, I would be quite frustrated with my government right now.”10¶ The impact of PRISM on U.S companies may be particularly acute because cloud computing is a rapidly growing industry. This means that cloud computing vendors not only have to retain existing customers, they must actively recruit new customers to retain¶ market share. Global spending on cloud computing is expected to grow by as much as 100 percent between 2012 and 2016, whereas the global IT market will only grow by 3 percent.11 If U.S. companies lose market share in the short term, this will have long-term implications on their competitive advantage in this new industry.

Third, that’s really bad—data localization destroys growth: raises business costs, reduces access to services, swamps tech advances, and creates economic burdens in the trillions


Chander and Le 15 (Anupam, Dir California Intl Law Ctr and Prof of Law at UC Davis; and Uyen, Free Speech and Technology Fellow, California Intl Law Ctr, “Data Nationalism,” 64 Emory L.J. 677, L/N)

Many governments believe that by forcing companies to localize data within national borders, they will increase investment at home. Thus, data localization measures are often motivated, whether explicitly or not, by desires to promote local economic development. In fact, however, data localization raises costs for local businesses, reduces access to global services for consumers, hampers local start-ups, and interferes with the use of the latest technological advances. In an Information Age, the global flow of data has become the lifeblood of economies across the world. While some in Europe have raised concerns about the transfer of data abroad, the European Commission has recognized "the critical importance of data flows notably for the transatlantic economy." n209 The Commission observes that international data transfers "form an integral part of commercial exchanges across the Atlantic including for new growing digital businesses, such as social media or cloud computing, with large amounts of data going from the EU to the US." n210 Worried about the effect of constraints on data flows on both global information sharing and economic development, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has urged nations to avoid "barriers to the location, access and use of cross-border [*722] data facilities and functions" when consistent with other fundamental rights, in order to "ensure cost effectiveness and other efficiencies." n211¶ The worry about the impact of data localization is widely shared in the business community as well. The value of the Internet to national economies has been widely noted. n212 Regarding Brazil's attempt to require data localization, the Information Technology Industry Council, an industry association representing more than forty major Internet companies, had argued that "in-country data storage requirements would detrimentally impact all economic activity that depends on data flows." n213 The Swedish government agency, the National Board of Trade, recently interviewed fifteen local companies of various sizes across sectors and concluded succinctly that "trade cannot happen without data being moved from one location to another." n214 Data localization, like most protectionist measures, leads only to small gains for a few local enterprises and workers, while causing significant harms spread across the entire economy. The domestic benefits of data localization go to the few owners and employees of data centers and the few companies servicing these centers locally. Meanwhile, the harms of data localization are widespread, felt by small, medium, and large businesses that are denied access to global services that might improve productivity. In response to Russia's recently passed localization law, the NGO Russian Association for Electronic Communications stressed the potential economic consequences, pointing to the withdrawal of global services and substantial economic losses caused by the passing of similar laws in other countries. n215 For example, besides the loss of international social media platforms, localization would make it impossible for [*723] Russians to order airline tickets or consumer goods through online services. Localization requirements also seriously affect Russian companies like Aeroflot because the airline depends on foreign ticket-booking systems. n216¶ Critics worried, at the time, that the Brazilian data localization requirement would "deny[] Brazilian users access to great services that are provided by US and other international companies." n217 Marilia Marciel, a digital policy expert at Fundacao Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, observes, "Even Brazilian companies prefer to host their data outside of Brazil." n218 Data localization affects domestic innovation by denying entrepreneurs the ability to build on top of global services based abroad. Brasscom, the Brazilian Association of Information Technology and Communication Companies, argues that such obligations would "hurt[] the country's ability to create, innovate, create jobs and collect taxes from the proper use of the Internet." n219¶ Governments implementing in-country data mandates imagine that the various global services used in their country will now build infrastructure locally. Many services, however, will find it uneconomical and even too risky to establish local servers in certain territories. n220 Data centers are expensive, all the more so if they have the highest levels of security. One study finds Brazil to be the most expensive country in the Western hemisphere in which to build data centers. n221 Building a data center in Brazil costs $ 60.9 million on average, [*724] while building one in Chile and the United States costs $ 51.2 million and $ 43 million, respectively. n222 Operating such a data center remains expensive because of enormous energy and other expenses - averaging $ 950,000 in Brazil, $ 710,000 in Chile, and $ 510,000 in the United States each month. n223 This cost discrepancy is mostly due to high electricity costs and heavy import taxes on the equipment needed for the center. n224 Data centers employ few workers, with energy making up three-quarters of the costs of operations. n225 According to the 2013 Data Centre Risk Index - a study of thirty countries on the risks affecting successful data center operations - Australia, Russia, China, Indonesia, India, and Brazil are among the riskiest countries for running data centers. n226¶ Not only are there significant economic costs to data localization, the potential gains are more limited than governments imagine. Data server farms are hardly significant generators of employment, populated instead by thousands of computers and few human beings. The significant initial outlay they require is largely in capital goods, the bulk of which is often imported into a country. The diesel generators, cooling systems, servers, and power supply devices tend to be imported from global suppliers. n227 Ironically, it is often American suppliers of servers and other hardware that stand to be the beneficiaries of data localization mandates. n228 One study notes, "Brazilian suppliers of components did not benefit from this [data localization requirement], since the imported products dominate the market." n229 By increasing capital purchases from abroad, data localization requirements can in fact increase merchandise trade deficits. Furthermore, large data farms are [*725] enormous consumers of energy, n230 and thus often further burden overtaxed energy grids. They thereby harm other industries that must now compete for this energy, paying higher prices while potentially suffering limitations in supply of already scarce power. Cost, as well as access to the latest innovations, drives many e-commerce enterprises in Indonesia to use foreign data centers. Daniel Tumiwa, head of the Indonesian E-Commerce Association (IdEA), states that "the cost can double easily in Indonesia." n231 Indonesia's Internet start-ups have accordingly often turned to foreign countries such as Australia, Singapore, or the United States to host their services. One report suggests that "many of the "tools' that start-up online media have relied on elsewhere are not fully available yet in Indonesia." n232 The same report also suggests that a weak local hosting infrastructure in Indonesia means that sites hosted locally experience delayed loading time. n233 Similarly, as the Vietnamese government attempts to foster entrepreneurship and innovation, n234 localization requirements effectively bar start-ups from utilizing cheap and powerful platforms abroad and potentially handicap Vietnam from "joining in the technology race." n235¶ Governments worried about transferring data abroad at the same time hope, somewhat contradictorily, to bring foreign data within their borders. Many countries seek to become leaders in providing data centers for companies operating across their regions. In 2010, Malaysia announced its Economic Transformation Program n236 to transform Malaysia into a world-class data [*726] center hub for the Asia-Pacific region. n237 Brazil hopes to accomplish the same for Latin America, while France seeks to stimulate its economy via a "Made in France" digital industry. n238 Instead of spurring local investment, data localization can lead to the loss of investment. First, there's the retaliation effect. Would countries send data to Brazil if Brazil declares that data is unsafe if sent abroad? Brasscom notes that the Brazilian Internet industry's growth would be hampered if other countries engage in similar reactive policies, which "can stimulate the migration of datacenters based here, or at least part of them, to other countries." n239 Some in the European Union sympathize with this concern. European Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, has expressed similar doubts, worrying about the results for European global competitiveness if each country has its own separate Internet. n240 Then there's the avoidance effect. Rio de Janeiro State University Law Professor Ronaldo Lemos, who helped write the original Marco Civil and is currently Director of the Rio Institute for Technology and Society, warns that the localization provision would have caused foreign companies to avoid the country altogether: "It could end up having the opposite effect to what is intended, and scare away companies that want to do business in Brazil." n241 Indeed, such burdensome local laws often lead companies to launch overseas, in order to try to avoid these rules entirely. Foreign companies, too, might well steer clear of the country in order to avoid entanglement with cumbersome rules. For example, Yahoo!, while very popular in Vietnam, places its servers for the [*727] country in Singapore. n242 In these ways we see that data localization mandates can backfire entirely, leading to avoidance instead of investment.¶ Data localization requirements place burdens on domestic enterprises not faced by those operating in more liberal jurisdictions. Countries that require data to be cordoned off complicate matters for their own enterprises, which must turn to domestic services if they are to comply with the law. Such companies must also develop mechanisms to segregate the data they hold by the nationality of the data subject. The limitations may impede development of new, global services. Critics argue that South Korea's ban on the export of mapping data, for example, impedes the development of next-generation services in Korea: Technology services, such as Google Glass, driverless cars, and information programs for visually-impaired users, are unlikely to develop and grow in Korea. Laws made in the 1960s are preventing many venture enterprises from advancing to foreign markets via location/navigation services. n243¶ The harms of data localization for local businesses are not restricted to Internet enterprises or to consumers denied access to global services. As it turns out, most of the economic benefits from Internet technologies accrue to traditional businesses. A McKinsey study estimates that about seventy-five percent of the value added created by the Internet and data flow is in traditional industries, in part through increases in productivity. n244 The potential economic impact across the major sectors - healthcare, manufacturing, electricity, urban infra-structure, security, agriculture, retail, etc. - is estimated at $ 2.7 to $ 6.2 trillion per year. n245 This is particularly important for emerging economies, in which traditional industries remain predominant. The Internet raises profits as well, due to increased revenues, lower costs of goods sold, and lower administrative costs. n246 With data localization mandates, traditional businesses [*728] will lose access to the many global services that would store or process information offshore.

Fourth, the plan will reverse these trends. Reforming 702 will bring hundreds of billions back to the U.S. and save the domestic technology industry


Donohue 15 (Laura, Prof of Law at Georgetown U Law Center, “Security vs. Freedom: Contemporary Controversies: The Thirty-Third Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy 2014: Article: Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter 2015, L/N)

There is a realpolitic argument to be made here as well, which ties more directly to U.S. foreign interests. Namely, U.S. failure to [*228] ensure privacy protections may lead to a loss in U.S. competitiveness. And economic concerns are central to U.S. national security. Consider the impact of the public release of information about NSA Section 702 surveillance on the U.S. cloud computing industry. There was an immediate, detrimental impact on the strength of the U.S. economy. Billions of dollars are now on the line because of concerns that the services provided by U.S. information technology companies are neither secure nor private. n450 The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation estimates that declining revenues of corporations that focus on cloud computing and data storage alone could reach $ 35 billion over the next three years. n451 Other commentators, such as Forrester Research analyst James Staten, have put actual losses as high as $ 180 billion by 2016, unless something is done to restore overseas' confidence in data held by U.S. companies. n452



Failure to extend privacy protections to individuals with substantial connections to the country via industry would, in this view, make it harder, not easier for the United States to assert its legitimate power and authority abroad. So, under Kennedy's reasoning, one could argue that Fourth Amendment rights should be extended to individuals economically tied to U.S. entities. This determination, however, is ultimately one of policy--not law. Deciding whether a greater national security threat is entailed in loss of competitiveness of U.S. industry, versus loss of protections extended to non-U.S. persons in the interests of privacy, is part of the weighing that must be done by the executive branch in pursuing its interests abroad. In this way, the Rehnquist opinion and [*229] the Kennedy concurrence can be read as compatible with not extending Fourth Amendment rights to individuals lacking a legal relationship (in other words, those stemming directly from the individual's status as a member of the political community). n453

This appears to have been the crux of President Obama's effort to reassure the international community in January 2014 that the United States would not use its authority to collect trade secrets to advantage U.S. corporations. n454 In Presidential Policy Directive 28, Obama acknowledged the privacy interests held by foreign persons:


Fifth, empirically, tech sustains growth and staves off other economic woes.


Jorgenson 01 (Dale, Frederic Eaton Abbe Professor of Economics at Harvard University and chair of the National Research Council’s Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy, “U.S. Economic Growth in the Information Age”

The resurgence of the U.S. economy from 1995 to 1999 outran all but the most optimistic expectations. It is not surprising that the unusual combination of more rapid growth and slower inflation touched off a strenuous debate among economists about whether improvements in U.S. economic performance can be sustained. This debate has been intensified by the recent growth slowdown, and the focus has shifted to how best to maintain economic momentum.¶ A consensus is building that the remarkable decline in information technology (IT) prices provides the key to the surge in U.S. economic growth. The IT price decline is rooted in developments in semiconductor technology that are widely understood by technologists and economists. This technology has found its broadest applications in computing and communications equipment, but has reduced the cost and improved the performance of aircraft, automobiles, scientific instruments, and a host of other products.¶ Although prices have declined and product performance has improved in many sectors of the U.S. economy, our picture of these developments is still incomplete. The problem faced by economists is that prices are difficult to track when performance is advancing so rapidly. This year’s computer, cell phone, and design software is different from last year’s. Fortunately, statistical agencies are now focusing intensive efforts on filling in the gaps in our information.¶ Price indexes for IT that hold performance constant are necessary to separate the change in performance of IT equipment from the change in price for a given level of performance. Accurate and timely computer prices have been part of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) since 1985. Software investment was added to the NIPA in 1999. Unfortunately, important information gaps remain, especially regarding price trends for investments in software and communications equipment.¶ Knowing how much the nation spends on IT is only the first step. We must also consider the dynamics of investment in IT and its impact on our national output. The national accounting framework treats IT equipment as part of the output of investment goods, and capital services from this equipment as a component of capital input. A measure of capital services is essential for capturing the effects of rapidly growing stocks of computers, communications equipment, and software on the output of the U.S. economy.¶ A substantial acceleration in the IT price decline occurred in 1995, triggered by a much sharper acceleration in the price decline of semiconductors. This can be traced to a shift in the product cycle for semiconductors in 1995 from three years to two years as the consequence of intensifying competition. Although the fall in semiconductor prices has been projected to continue for at least another decade, the recent acceleration may be temporary.¶ The investment boom of the later 1990s was not sustainable, because it depended on growth in hours worked that was substantially in excess of growth in the labor force. Nonetheless, growth prospects for the U.S. economy have improved considerably, due to enhanced productivity growth in IT production and rapid substitution of IT assets for non-IT assets in response to falling IT prices. An understanding of the role of IT is crucial to the design of policies to revive economic growth and exploit the opportunities created by our improved economic performance.

Sixth, that’s good, because an economic decline would cause war.


Royal 10 — Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. ¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 ¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write,¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) ¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. ¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. ¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. ¶ This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

Advantage 2 is Surveillance

First, Section 702 of the FISA Authorization Act authorizes a broad expansion of surveillance technology


Butler 13 (Alan, Appelate Advocate Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Ctr. And JD UCLA School of Law, “ARTICLE: Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance,” 48 New Eng. L. Rev. 55, L/N)

Recent debate about foreign intelligence surveillance relates to two key FISA provisions that were added and amended in the decade following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The first is the business records provision n5 which was established by Congress in the USA PATRIOT Act, Section 215. n6 [*58] The second provision governs the targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States, which was added by Section 702 of the FAA. n7 Both of these provisions expanded the scope of foreign intelligence surveillance that can be conducted within the United States.¶ The FISA was enacted to impose statutory restrictions on domestic intelligence gathering. n8 It outlines the Government's authority to conduct national security investigations both inside the United States and abroad. n9 Within the parameters of the statute, certain intelligence community members are authorized to engage in "electronic surveillance" of foreign agents; n10 to conduct physical searches targeting foreign agents; n11 and to use pen/trap n12 surveillance or apply for court orders compelling the production of business records in connection with certain national security investigations. n13 The FISA did not regulate any intelligence collection abroad until it was amended in 2007 and 2008. n14¶ Most FISA surveillance is authorized by orders of the FISC, n15 a special [*59] court created by Congress in 1978 to provide judicial oversight of electronic surveillance and other intelligence gathering activities. The FISC has jurisdiction under the FISA to authorize electronic surveillance, pen/trap surveillance, physical searches, and orders directing the production of business records. n16 The court may only issue orders for electronic surveillance and physical searches upon a showing of probable cause that the target is a "foreign power or agent of a foreign power." n17 However, the FAA broadened the scope of FISC-authorized surveillance by allowing the government to target persons "reasonably believed to be located outside [of] the United States" without establishing probable cause to show they are foreign agents. n18 In addition, under the PATRIOT Act, applications for pen register surveillance and business record orders can be used to obtain information for FBI national security investigations. n19 Under the new rules, the FISC "shall enter" orders granting such applications if the information sought is "relevant" to an ongoing investigation of international terrorism. n20¶ In addition to granting new intelligence collection authority, the FAA imposed new rules for collection abroad. n21 The FAA authorizes members of the Intelligence Community to acquire foreign intelligence by targeting persons that they reasonably believe are located outside the United States, without following the traditional FISA rules governing "electronic [*60] surveillance" or "physical search." n22 Instead, the FISC reviews targeting and minimization procedures, adopted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to Section 702, for compliance with the statute and the Fourth Amendment. n23 After the FISC approves the targeting and minimization requirements and reviews the government certification to ensure it "contains all the required elements," the court "shall enter" the order to the government. n24 Once the order is granted, the government can issue "directives" to "electronic communication service providers," such as telephone and Internet companies, requiring their assistance in collecting electronic communications. n25¶ The FAA amendments were the result of an effort by executive and legislative branch officials to "modernize" the FISA. n26 This modernization was justified in part by the government's belief that certain requirements for surveillance and collection unduly restricted the "speed and agility" [*61] needed to fight post-9/11 threats. n27 In this modernization debate, the question arose whether the government should rely on internal executive branch procedures to ensure adequate oversight of intelligence gathering, or should be required to provide individualized evidence to the FISC before conducting electronic surveillance.¶ At the time the FAA was passed, the Bush administration claimed that the amendments were a necessary response to changing technology, specifically the shift from satellite to fiber optic transmission of international communications. n28 Yet, as Kris and Wilson demonstrate in their leading treatise, a review of telecommunications history shows that claim to have been greatly exaggerated. n29 Still, changing technologies used to transmit emails and one-end domestic and international wire communications presented new challenges to the application of FISA's provisions governing "electronic surveillance." n30 Email and other electronic [*62] communications present special difficulties because many international messages are stored in, or transmitted through, facilities in the United States. n31 As a result, the government attempted to expand its surveillance authority: first with unilateral executive action, n32 then judicial authorization, n33 and finally through legislation with the PAA n34 and its successor the FAA. n35

Second, Section 702 authorizes programmatic surveillance-violates the 4th Amendment


Donohue 15 (Laura, Prof of Law at Georgetown U Law Center, “Security vs. Freedom: Contemporary Controversies: The Thirty-Third Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy 2014: Article: Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter 2015, L/N)

Almost immediately after passage of the FAA, members of Congress, scholars, and others began criticizing Section 702 because [*154] of the potential for the government to use the authorities to engage in programmatic surveillance. n144¶ In 2009 prominent national security law Professor William Banks explained, "the FAA targets do not have to be suspected of being an agent of a foreign power or, for that matter, they do not have to be suspected of terrorism or any national security offense, so long as the collection of foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of the surveillance." n145 Surveillance could be directed at a person, organization, e-mail address, or even "an entire ISP or area code." n146 He noted, "the surveillance permitted under the FAA does not require that the Government identify a particular known facility where the intercepted communications occur." n147 These provisions represented a sea change from how FISA had previously worked (albeit introducing, for the first time, statutory restrictions in an area previously governed by Executive Order). U.S. persons' communications now could be incidentally collected under the statute, on a large scale, without many of the protections in traditional FISA. n148¶ Banks presciently pointed out the most likely way in which the new authorities would be used:¶ Although details of the implementation of the program . . . are not known, a best guess is the Government uses a broad vacuum cleaner-like first stage of collection, focusing on transactional data, where wholesale interception occurs following the development and implementation of filtering criteria. Then the NSA engages in a more particularized collection of content after analyzing mined data . . . [A]ccidental or incidental acquisition of U.S. persons inside the United States [will] surely occur[], especially in light of the difficulty of ascertaining a target's location. n149¶ For Professor Banks, part of the problem was that the nature of international information flows meant that it would be impossible [*155] to tell if an individual is located overseas or within domestic bounds. n150¶ Banks was not the only one to question the implementation of Section 702. Cases began to appear, raising facial and as applied constitutional challenges. Problems characteristic of relying on Article III courts in the context of surveillance came to the fore. In Clapper v. Amnesty International, plaintiffs alleged that Section 702 violated the targets' Fourth Amendment rights because it allowed for the acquisition of international communications absent an individualized court order supported by probable cause. n151 The Supreme Court dismissed the suit for lack of standing--that is, the absence of any concrete injury. It did not reach the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim. n152

Third, that erodes U.S. constitutionalism and rights guarantees-there are no checks.


Donohue continues in 15 (Laura, Prof of Law at Georgetown U Law Center, “Security vs. Freedom: Contemporary Controversies: The Thirty-Third Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy 2014: Article: Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter 2015, L/N)

As aforementioned, Section 702 places four limitations on acquisition, each of which is meant to restrict the amount of information that can be obtained by the government. n166 The NSA has sidestepped these statutory restrictions in three important ways: first, it has adopted procedures that allow analysts to acquire information "about" selectors (that is, communications modes used by targets) or targets, and not merely communications to or from targets (or selectors employed by targets), or information held by targets themselves. Second, it has created a presumption of non-U.S. person status: That is, if an individual is not known to be a U.S. person (and thus exempted from Section 702 and treated either under Sections 703 and 704 or under traditional FISA, depending on the location), then the NSA assumes that the individual is a non-U.S. person. Third, the NSA has failed to adopt standards that would require it to ascertain whether a target is located within domestic bounds. Instead, the agency, having looked at the available evidence, absent evidence to the contrary, assumes that the target is located outside the United States. These interpretations work together to undermine Congress's addition of Sections 703 and 704, even as they open the door to more extensive collection of domestic communications.


Fourth, privacy is a lynchpin to a variety of other human rights—absent a guarantee of privacy authoritarianism can flourish


Banisar and Davies 15 (David, Electronic Privacy Information Center, and Simon, Privacy International, Global Internet Liberty Campaign 15 (“PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Practice” http://gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html)

Privacy is a fundamental human right recognized in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and in many other international and regional treaties. Privacy underpins human dignity and other key values such as freedom of association and freedom of speech. It has become one of the most important human rights issues of the modern age. The publication of this report reflects the growing importance, diversity and complexity of this fundamental right.¶ This report provides details of the state of privacy in fifty countries from around the world. It outlines the constitutional and legal conditions of privacy protection, and summarizes important issues and events relating to privacy and surveillance.¶ Nearly every country in the world recognizes a right of privacy explicitly in their Constitution. At a minimum, these provisions include rights of inviolability of the home and secrecy of communications. Most recently-written Constitutions such as South Africa's and Hungary's include specific rights to access and control one's personal information.¶ In many of the countries where privacy is not explicitly recognized in the Constitution, such as the United States, Ireland and India, the courts have found that right in other provisions. In many countries, international agreements that recognize privacy rights such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights have been adopted into law.¶ In the early 1970s, countries began adopting broad laws intended to protect individual privacy. Throughout the world, there is a general movement towards the adoption of comprehensive privacy laws that set a framework for protection. Most of these laws are based on the models introduced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Council of Europe.¶ In 1995, conscious both of the shortcomings of law, and the many differences in the level of protection in each of its States, the European Union passed a Europe-wide directive which will provide citizens with a wider range of protections over abuses of their data.[fn 1] The directive on the "Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data" sets a benchmark for national law. Each EU State must pass complementary legislation by October 1998.¶ The Directive also imposes an obligation on member States to ensure that the personal information relating to European citizens is covered by law when it is exported to, and processed in, countries outside Europe. This requirement has resulted in growing pressure outside Europe for the passage of privacy laws. More than forty countries now have data protection or information privacy laws. More are in the process of being enacted.¶ ¶ Reasons for Adopting Comprehensive Laws¶ There are three major reasons for the movement towards comprehensive privacy and data protection laws. Many countries are adopting these laws for one or more reasons.¶ To remedy past injustices. Many countries, especially in Central Europe, South America and South Africa, are adopting laws to remedy privacy violations that occurred under previous authoritarian regimes. To promote electronic commerce. Many countries, especially in Asia, but also Canada, have developed or are currently developing laws in an effort to promote electronic commerce. These countries recognize consumers are uneasy with their personal information being sent worldwide. Privacy laws are being introduced as part of a package of laws intended to facilitate electronic commerce by setting up uniform rules.¶ To ensure laws are consistent with Pan-European laws. Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe are adopting new laws based on the Council of Europe Convention and the European Union Data Protection Directive. Many of these countries hope to join the European Union in the near future. Countries in other regions, such as Canada, are adopting new laws to ensure that trade will not be affected by the requirements of the EU Directive.

Fifth, upholding constitutional principles of democracy and human rights solves global wars in the middle east.


Rosenberg et al, 6 (Yemeni National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms (HOOD), Brief Amicus Curiae of the Yemeni National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms, in Support of Petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Counsel of Record, in Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Petitioner, v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, et al., Respondents, n. 05-184, 2005 U.S. Briefs 194, 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4, January 6, 2006, LN)

On issues of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, the United States sets the example for the rest of the world. Especially since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has challenged the Middle East to follow in its footsteps--to embrace the development of democratic institutions, to respect human rights, and to adhere to the rule of law. The Arab world has responded, and progress has been made throughout much of the Middle East. But progress is difficult, especially in the post-9/11 environment. For the Middle East to continue pursuing these ideals, it is critical that the United States continue to lead the way. The September 11 attacks worked a fundamental shift in United States policy in the Middle East. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has acknowledged this change of direction: "For sixty years, . . . the United States[] [**10] pursued stability at the expense of democracy . . . in the Middle East, and . . . achieved neither. Now we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people. Successful societies allow room for healthy civic institutions--for political parties and labor unions and independent newspapers and broadcast media. Id. As the world's oldest, strongest, and most important democracy, the United States sets a key guidepost for other nations when it clearly enunciates and applies the principles upon which free societies necessarily are based. Arab nations pay heed to the United States' [**12] example and efforts. "The Arab world holds in high esteem . . . the ambitious American dream of attaining a more just, peaceful and tolerant human society." The League of Arab States Statement on the Occasion of the 1st Anniversary of the Tragic Events of 11/9/2001 (Sept. 11, 2002), available at http://www.arableagu...98&level_id=219 (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). King Abdullah of Jordan, for example, has acknowledged [*6] that "the leadership of the United States is crucial in all our efforts to reach a just and lasting peace of the Middle East." President Bush, Jordanian King Discuss Iraq, Middle East (May 6, 2004), available at http://www.whitehous...20040506-9.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). This recognition and admiration are derived from the United States' moral and political legitimacy. Moreover, the United States has backed up its words with concrete efforts that "vividly demonstrate[] U.S. commitment to promoting democracy and respect for human rights." Freedom, democracy and human rights all go hand in hand. . . . The promotion of democracy and freedom is a cornerstone of the foreign policy of the administration. And we can already see the results . . . . Human Rights "Extremely Important" To U.S., Says Delegate to UNCHR, July 21, 2005 (statement of Goli Ameri, U.S. delegate to United [**18] Nations Commission on Human Rights), available at http://usinfo.state..../21-564409.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). But "the experiment of human rights is still new in [Yemen]," and the difficult task still remains "to pay great and special attention to the principles of human rights, to consolidate them and surround them with the respect they deserve, to make them an ideal road to the flourishing of the democratic experiment . . . ." Yemen Human Rights Report at 8. As Yemen and other Middle East nations tackle that difficult task, it is essential to recall that "America[,] not just the nation[,] but an idea, [is] alive in the minds of people everywhere." George H.W. Bush, President, State of the Union Address. To foster continued progress on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the Middle East, the United States must continue to nurture and promote this "idea" that it has long represented throughout the world.
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