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Aff – Global Good


We have a moral obligation to the global community, where we were born and where we live are all just accidents.

Nussbaum, 94 – Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School

(Martha, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” The Boston Review,  www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan /nussbaum1.html)


where he came from, the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes replied, "I am a citizen of the world." He meant by this, it appears, that he refused to be defined by his local origins and local group memberships, so central to the self-image of a conventional Greek male; he insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed his image of the kosmou politês or world citizen more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities -- the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that "is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun" (Seneca, De Otio). It is this community that is, most fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations. With respect to the most basic moral values such as justice, "we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors" (Plutarch, On the Fortunes of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, deliberations about human problems of people in particular concrete situations, not problems growing out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a sense, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of life from the point of view of justice and the good. The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, his Stoic successors held, we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect. >
Working global allows us to have self-knowledge, solve our problems better, and allows us to recognize the value of each and every person

Nussbaum, 94 – Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School

(Martha, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” The Boston Review,  www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan /nussbaum1.html)


<Stoics who hold that good civic education is education for world citizenship recommend this attitude on three grounds. First, they hold that the study of humanity as it is realized in the whole world is valuable for self-knowledge: we see ourselves more clearly when we see our ways in relation to those of other reasonable people. Second, they argue, as does Tagore, that we will be better able to solve our problems if we face them in this way. No theme is deeper in Stoicism than the damage done by faction and local allegiances to the political life of a group. Political deliberation, they argue, is sabotaged again and again by partisan loyalties, whether to one's team at the Circus or to one's nation. Only by making our fundamental allegiance that to the world community of justice and reason do we avoid these dangers. Finally, they insist that the stance of the kosmou politês is intrinsically valuable. For it recognizes in persons what is especially fundamental about them, most worthy of respect and acknowledgment: their aspirations to justice and goodness and their capacities for reasoning in this connection. This aspect may be less colorful than local or national traditions and identities -- and it is on this basis that the young wife in Tagore's novel spurns it in favor of qualities in the nationalist orator Sandip that she later comes to see as superficial; it is, the Stoics argue, both lasting and deep.>


Aff – Astropolitics



MacDonald, 2007

[Fraser McDonald, Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Anthropology, Geography & Environmental Studies in the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik: outer space and the orbit of geography”, June 24, 2011,LMM]


The primary problem for those advancing Astropolitik is that space is not a lawless frontier. In fact the legal character of space has long been enshrined in the principles of the OST and this has, to some extent, prevented it from being subject to unbridled interstate competition. ‘While it is morally desirable to explore space in common with all peoples’ writes Dolman without conviction ‘even the thought of doing so makes weary those who have the means’ (Dolman 2002: 135). Thus, the veneer of transcendent humanism with regard to space gives way to brazen self-interest. Accordingly, Dolman describes the rescommunis consensus of the OST as ‘a tragedy’ that has removed any legal incentive for the exploitation of space (137). Only a res nullius legal order could construct space as ‘proper objects for which states may compete’ (138). Under the paradigm of res nullius and Astropolitik, the moon and other celestial bodies would become potential new territory for states. And here Dolman again parallels

Karl Hausofer’s Geopolitik. Just as Hausofer desired a break from the Versailles Treaty (Ó Tuathail 1996: 45), Dolman wants to see the US withdraw from the OST, making full speed ahead for the Moon (see also Hickman and Dolman 2002). Non-space-faring developing countries need not worry about losing out, says Dolman, as they ‘would own no less of the Moon than they do now’ (140). To his credit, Dolman does give some attention to the divisive social consequences of this concentrated power. Drawing on earlier currents of environmental determinism and on the terrestrial model of Antarctic exploration, he ponders the characteristics of those who will be first to colonise space. They will be ‘highly educated, rigorously trained and psychologically screened for mental toughness and decision-making skills, and very physically fit’; ‘the best and brightest of our pilots, technicians and scientists’; ‘rational, given to scientific analysis and explanation, and obsessed with their professions’ (26). In other words, ‘they are a superior subset of the larger group from which they spring’ (27). As if this picture isn’t vivid enough, Dolman goes on to say that colonizers of space ‘will be the most capably endowed (or at least the most ruthlessly suitable, as the populating of America and Australia … so aptly illustrate[s])’ (27; my emphasis). ‘Duty and sacrifice will be the highest moral ideals’ (27). Society, he continues, must be prepared ‘to make heroes’ of those who undertake the risk of exploration (146). At the same time, ‘the astropolitical society must be repared to forego expenditures on social programs … to channel funds into the national space program. It must be embued with the national spirit’ (146).Dolman slips from presenting what would be merely a ‘logical’ outworking of Astropolitik, to advocating that the United States adopt it as their space strategy. Along the way, he acknowledges the full anti-democratic potential of such concentrated power, detaching the state from its citizenry: ‘the United States can adopt any policy it wishes and the attitudes and reactions of the domestic public and of other states can do little to challenge it. So powerful is the United States that should it accept the harsh Realpolitik doctrine in space that the military services appear to be proposing, and given a proper explanation for employing it, there may in fact be little if any opposition to a fait accompli of total US domination in space’. Although Dolman claims that ‘no attempt will be made to create a convincing argument that the United States has a right to domination in space’, in almost the next sentence he goes on to argue ‘that, in this case, might does make right’, ‘the persuasiveness of the case’ being ‘based on the self-interest of the state and stability of the system’ (156; my emphasis). Truly, this is Astropolitik: a veneration of the ineluctable logic of power and the permanent rightness of those who wield it. And if it sounds chillingly familiar, Dolman hopes to reassure us with his belief that ‘the US form of liberal democracy … is admirable and socially encompassing’ (156) and it is ‘the most benign state that has ever attempted hegemony over the greater part of the world’ (158). His sunny view that the United States is ‘willing to extend legal and political equality to all’ sits awkwardly with the current suspension of the rule of law in Guantanamo Bay as well as in various other ‘spaces of exception’ (see Gregory, 2004; Agamben, 2005).

MacDonald, 2007

[Fraser McDonald, Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Anthropology, Geography & Environmental Studies in the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik: outer space and the orbit of geography”, June 24, 2011,LMM]


Two things should now be clear. First, outer space is no longer remote from our everyday lives; it is already profoundly implicated in the ordinary workings of economy and society. Secondly, the import of space to civilian, commercial and, in particular, military objectives, means there is a great deal at stake in terms of the access to and control over Earth’s orbit. One cannot overstate this last point. The next few years may prove decisive in terms of establishing a regime of space control that will have profound implications for terrestrial geopolitics. It is in this context that I want to briefly introduce the emerging field of astropolitics, defined as ‘the study of the relationship between outer space terrain and technology and the development of political and military policy and strategy’ (Dolman, 2002: 15). It is, in both theory and practice, a geopolitics of outer space. Everett Dolman is one of the pioneers of the field. An ex-CIA intelligence analyst who teaches at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he publishes in journals that are perhaps unfamiliar to critical geographers, like the modestly titled Small Wars and Insurgencies. As what follows is uniformly critical of Dolman’s work, I should say that his Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the space age (Dolman, 2002) is unquestionably a significant book: it has defined a now vibrant field of research and debate. Astropolitik draws together a vast literature on space exploration and space policy, and presents a lucid and accessible introduction to thinking strategically about space. (In the previous section, I drew heavily on Dolman’s description of the astropolitical environment). My critique is not founded on scientific or technical grounds but on Dolman’s construction of a formal geopolitics designed to advance and legitimate the unilateral military conquest of space by the United States. While Dolman has many admirers among neoconservative colleagues in Washington think-tanks, critical engagements (e.g. Moore, 2003; Caracciolo, 2004) have been relatively thin on the ground. the Russian Sputnik (Hooson, 2004: 377). But Dolman is not just re-fashioning classical geopolitics in the new garb of ‘astropolitics’; he goes further and proposes an ‘Astropolitik’ – ‘a simple but effective blueprint for space control’ (p. 9) – modeled on Karl Hausofer’s Geopolitik as much as Realpolitik. Showing some discomfort with the impeccably fascist pedigree of this theory, Dolman cautions against the ‘misuse’ of Astropolitik and argues that the term ‘is chosen as a constant reminder of that past, and as a grim warning for the future’ (Dolman, 2002: 3). At the same time, however, his book is basically a manual for achieving space dominance. Projecting Mackinder’s famous thesis on the geographical pivot of history (Mackinder, 1904) onto outer space, Dolman argues that ‘who controls the Lower Earth Orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra [Earth]. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind’. Dolman sees the quest for space as already having followed classically Mackinderian principles (Dolman, 2002: 87). And like Mackinder before him, Dolman is writing in the service of his Empire. ‘Astropolitik like Realpolitik’ he writes, ‘is hardnosed and pragmatic, it is not pretty or uplifting or a joyous sermon for the masses. But neither is it evil. Its benevolence or malevolence become apparent only as it is applied, and by whom’ (Dolman, 2002: 4). Further inspiration is drawn from Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose classic volume The Influence of Sea power Upon History, has been widely cited by space strategists (Mahan, 1890; Gray, 1996; see also Russell, 2006). Mahan’s discussion of the strategic value of coasts, harbours, well–worn sea paths and chokepoints has its parallel in outer space (see France, 2000). The implication of Mahan’s work, Dolman concludes, is that ‘the United States must be ready and prepared, in Mahanian scrutiny, to commit to the defense and maintenance of these assets, or relinquish them to a state willing and able to do so’ (Dolman, 2002: 37).

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