Our Interpretation is that debate should be a question of methodologies.
A. Education – debate about methodology is a true debate. A competition of ideas is critical to learning and fostering democratic politics.
B. Fairness – Method debates is the most predictable and fair ground for the affirmative. They have to defend the way in which they solve the worlds problems. You can weigh your impacts as justification to vote affirmative, but that means we are able to question those assumptions which is the entire 1NC.
C. Politics is no longer a rule by the elite, we must learn how best to interact with ourselves and others ethically prior to be accountable to the citizenry as a democratically elected policy maker – this internal link turns their education claims.
[Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 68-69]
Later, in the Greco-Roman period to the second or third century A.D., the connection between one’s political subjectivity and one’s sexual subjectivity will be far less isomorphic and much more problematic. In fact, the collapse of the Greek city-state precipitated a “crisis of the subject” in which the self and its relations to others in the social and political sphere were put into question as never before. This crisis was characterized by a “problematization of political activity” that paralleled the political transformations of this period.20 The more complex political structure of the state brought about a “relativization” in the exercise of power. For the individual, this manifested itself in a Stoical detachment from one’s status as a political actor, reflecting a growing awareness of the factors that were beyond the individual’s control. At the same time, the ruler/ruled dichotomy of earlier reflections was replaced with a recognition of the individual’s “intermediary” function in the exercise of power. Instead of the classical Aristotelian alternation, one is both ruler and ruled at the same time: “Anyone who exercises power has to place himself in a field of complex relations where he occupies a transition point” (CS, 88). Where the individual found himself in this complex network of relations was a matter of birth or the artificial status projected onto him by society—neither of which he had any control over. But he could control the quality of the power and governance which he exercised from this position—and it was his moral duty to exercise this power the best way he could. And just as for the earlier Greeks, here also “the rationality of the government of others is the same as the rationality of the government of oneself” (CS, p. 89). That is, the object was to control the passions, to cultivate the virtues of discipline and moderation, to develop a self-mastery that would qualify one to govern others. Yet there were two important changes in the relation between self-government and government of others. First, it became less heautocratic, since one had to attend to multiple “levels” in the exercise of power. Second, self-mastery became a much more intense relation to self. This involved a separation, on the one hand, of virtue and the actual ethical work (regimen, ascetic practices) necessary to achieve virtue. On the other hand, while it was recognized that “a whole elaboration of the self by oneself was necessary” for the tasks of governing others, the exercise of power was based on the relationship the individual established (often through an arduous effort and attention to oneself) with himself, which tended to undermine the identification of oneself in terms of one’s socially defined political status. Explains Foucault, “From the viewpoint of the relation to the self, the social and political identifications do not function as authentic marks of a mode of being; they are extrinsic, artificial, and unfounded signs” (CS, 93). Rather, the true measure of one’s integrity, and the true register of one’s subjectivity was, for whatever position or status one held, the quality of character the individual constructed for himself through the “cultivation of the self.” The Cultivation of Individuality: J. S. Mill’s Manual of Autonomous Selfhood In Foucault’s analysis of the technologies of the self through which individuals constitute themselves as ethical subjects, he attempts to trace genealogically the cultural patterns that provide frameworks of self-formation for the individuals of a given historical period. He is able to identify such patterns by focusing his analysis on various representative texts, such as Plato’s Republic, Epictetus’s Discourses, and Cassian’s Institutiones. Foucault reads such texts not so much as philosophical treatises in the traditional sense, but rather as “aesthetic manuals,” as “manuals for living,” as practical handbooks that delineate for the individual certain values, standards, and practices the individual can appropriate in order to define a “style of existence,” a mode of being. Reading texts in this way allows Foucault to identify the sorts of problematizations that structure a given form of subjectivation—and thus, to understand the formation of subjectivity under a new dimension. We have seen that in antiquity there was a close connection between forms of political and sexual subjectivity, that the problematizations that structured the self’s relation to itself in these domains tended to overlap. Since Foucault was doing a genealogy of the modern self, had he been able to complete his project, we might have seen similar connections between modern political and sexual subjectivity.21 A genealogy of the modern political subject would concentrate at some point on the texts of the liberal tradition. If we were to analyze such texts as “manuals for living,” rather than as juridicophilosophical projects to define principles of justice that govern the exercise of power (the effect of which is to take the political subject as given), we would discover in them models of political subjectivation that become attached to—or are appropriated by—individuals, determining their actions, practices, beliefs, and ideals—that is, models for the constitution of specific modes of being. Such texts generate views about the ways individuals need to comport themselves politically toward the state and toward each other. They provide frameworks of self-formation and identity construction, modes of selfdefinition and conceptualization. They delineate lines of normativity and abnormality, of social acceptability, of model citizenship and appropriate moral behavior; and they provide points of departure for revolutionary or reactionary personas. Political subjects emerge, in part, as a result of the self-appropriation of concepts generated within the texts of traditional political philosophy, and which are disseminated, in various ways and along various channels, as cultural values. In short, such texts harbor technologies of self through which individuals constitute themselves as modern political subjects.